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1History teaches us that major economic crises usually lead to a period 
of soul searching followed by a radical rewiring of economic policy. The 
1929 stock market crash and subsequent depression saw classical 
economic thinking gradually give way to Keynesian central planning. 
The onset of stagflation in the 1970s ushered in neoliberalism and the 
advent of market deregulation. The 2008 financial crisis and ongoing 
recessionary fallout in most advanced economies would appear, on the 
face of it, to represent a similar historical turning point.
Each of these crises called into question the credibility of conventional 
economics. Economists have never enjoyed a good reputation and 2008 
marked a new nadir for the profession. However, we have yet to witness 
a radical transformation in economics of the sort that accompanied 
past upheavals. The policy options being debated today are largely an 
extension of past arguments that occurred in 1929 and 1970. Whether 
fiscal austerity versus growth or supply-side reforms versus demand 
stimulus measures, the positions of the leading players are entirely 
predictable and rest on established political allegiances. The opportunity 
for radical policy change is gradually fading. A crisis is going to waste.
While public policy debates make little explicit reference to economic 
theory, Keynes’s comment that ‘practical men, who believe themselves 
exempt from any intellectual influence, are generally the slaves of some 
defunct economist’, is as true as ever. The rational choice models and 
general equilibrium theory that were developed in the 25 years after the 
second world war fed into the neoliberal policymaking of the quarter 
century that followed. These approaches remain the dominant academic 
paradigm, especially in finance theory and macroeconomics. 
They describe a world in which economic agents are rational, informed 
and make optimal decisions, and markets are either in, or geared 
towards, a state of equilibrium. Governments should, it is suggested, 
design economic policy on this basis. Differences between left and right 
turn on the narrow issue of the extent of ‘market failure’, a narrowly 
defined categorisation of legitimate reasons for policy intervention. The 
chief assumptions behind economic policymaking on the left and right 
are largely the same. The simplifying assumptions of an abstract theory 
are treated as universal truths about the real world.
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But there are many alternative insights into economic phenomena. New 
economic thinking provides us with a far richer account of the economy, 
taking into account real-world human behaviour and the complex 
micro-level interactions that make up economic activity. Complexity, 
evolutionary and network economics are emerging fields of inquiry that 
offer a robust critique of neoclassical theory. They reject the latter’s 
deference to static equilibrium and perfect rationality, ignorance of 
innovation, downplaying of institutions, and assumption of zero-sum 
market transactions. They depict instead an economy made up of 
millions of overlapping activities, in which individuals, businesses and 
other institutions are highly connected and constantly interact, where 
preferences change and markets shift in unpredictable ways. It is a 
description that is immediately more recognisable in reality. 
While nods in the direction of behavioural economics have become 
fashionable, these ideas have received scant attention in policy 
circles. The market failure doctrine remains the required framework of 
microeconomic debate. Macroeconomic forecasting and analysis in the 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the Office for Budget Responsibility 
still draws on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
and other staples of conventional economics. The majority of 
government economists and policymakers responsible for providing 
solutions to the most important economic challenges of the day – how 
financial instability might be tamed, how regional development can be 
boosted, and how the carbon emissions and other environmental side 
effects of economic growth can be reduced – are heavily influenced by 
the old neoclassical order. This must change.
This book – which is the culmination of a two-year programme of work 
led by IPPR entitled New Era Economics, on whose advisory panel I 
have been a member – is the first serious attempt to bring insights from 
new economic thinking to policymakers. It draws together contributions 
from a group of respected economists and academics, which discuss 
what these new heterodox economic theories might mean for policy. 
In so doing, it is an attempt to kick-start a much-needed debate about 
how economic policymaking can be improved for the better.
Changing the nature of mainstream economics will be no straightforward 
task. Yet if we do not take advantage of the current crisis to rethink the 
way we make economic policy, the opportunity will be missed. We need 
a far more eclectic approach to economic policy and economic debate. 
Thankfully, there is a solution and it lies in new economic thinking. 
This book sketches out the contours of a new approach to economic 
policymaking centred on this thinking. For that reason, it deserves a 
wide readership.
3Pauline Anderson is a research fellow at the Centre for Research in 
Lifelong Learning, Glasgow Caledonian University. Her research lies in 
the areas of skills policy and contemporary labour market issues. She 
has a particular interest in intermediate occupations, the youth and 
graduate labour markets, skill ecosystems, and jobs growth and skills in 
the renewable energy industry. Pauline also manages a programme of 
internal institutional research currently focused on widening participation, 
progression and regional coherence.
Eric Beinhocker is executive director of the Institute for New Economic 
Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. He is also a 
visiting professor of economics at Central European University and chair 
of IPPR’s advisory panel on Promoting Growth and Shared Prosperity 
in the UK. Prior to his Oxford role, Eric was a partner at McKinsey & 
Company and a senior fellow at the McKinsey Global Institute.
Tony Dolphin is senior economist and associate director for economic 
policy at IPPR. His research focuses on identifying the best ways to 
promote growth in output and employment in the UK and how to 
ensure greater economic justice. Prior to joining IPPR, Tony worked in 
the financial sector and for HM Treasury. He has an honours degree in 
economics from the University of Liverpool.
Greg Fisher is managing director of Synthesis, a new thinktank set 
up to explore complex systems and their implications for public and 
corporate policy. After growing up in the West Midlands, he studied 
economics and politics at St John’s College, University of Cambridge. 
Previously, Greg worked for the Bank of England, as a global 
macroeconomic strategist for a hedge fund, and as chief economist 
at ResPublica. Greg is also a senior research associate of the London 
School of Economics’ Complexity Group
Dr Orit Gal is a political economist specialising in the practical 
applications of complexity theories. Over the past decade she has 
concentrated much of her work on issues of complexity in conflict 
environments and the intersection between economic development and 
security. She served as a senior researcher at the Operational Theory 
Research Institute of the Israeli defence forces (OTRI) where she worked 
ABOUT The AUThOrs
IPPR  |  Complex new world: Translating new economic thinking into public policy4
to develop the economic dimension of military operational design. Prior 
to this Orit worked as a project director for the Economic Cooperation 
Foundation (ECF), where she participated in the track-two negotiations, 
and developed policy recommendations on economic peacebuilding 
and the potential role of international intervention. Previously an 
associate fellow at Chatham House, Orit is also a visiting lecturer at 
Regent’s College where she teaches international political economy, 
development and strategy from a complexity perspective.
Michael Hallsworth is a senior researcher at the Institute for 
Government. His work focuses on new ways of improving policy 
making, with a focus on applying behavioural economics and complexity 
theory. He is a co-author of the MINDSPACE report and he is currently 
involved with applying randomised controlled trials to the public sector. 
He previously worked at the RAND Corporation and is studying for a 
PhD at Imperial College London.
Geoffrey M Hodgson is research professor in business studies at 
the University of Hertfordshire. His books include From Pleasure 
Machines to Moral Communities (forthcoming), Darwin’s Conjecture 
(with Thorbjoern Knudsen, 2010), Economics in the Shadows of Darwin 
and Marx (2006), The Evolution of Institutional Economics (2004), 
and How Economics Forgot History (2001). He has also published 
over 120 articles in academic journals. Geoffrey is an academician of 
the Academy of Social Sciences and editor-in-chief of the Journal of 
Institutional Economics.
Adam Lent is director of programme at the RSA and an associate 
fellow at IPPR. Previously he was head of economics at the Trades 
Union Congress and research director for the Power Inquiry, a Joseph 
Rowntree-funded commission exploring how to increase and deepen 
political participation in the UK. Adam studied politics at the University 
of Durham and industrial relations at the London School of Economics, 
and holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Sheffield, 
where he was also a lecturer and research fellow. 
David Nash is a policy adviser at the Federation of Small Businesses 
and was until recently a research fellow at IPPR, in which capacity 
he edited this volume. His research interests span the fields of 
macroeconomics, business growth, employment and policies to prevent 
climate change. He also has a long-standing interest in emerging 
heterodox economic theories. Previously, David worked for the Fabian 
Society and in local government in the UK and Australia. He holds an 
honours degree in French and History from the University of Warwick 
and a joint masters degree in European politics from the University of 
Bath and Sciences-Po, Paris.
5Paul Ormerod is a leading UK economist and acclaimed author of 
a number of books, including The Death of Economics, Butterfly 
Economics and his most recent work, Positive Linking: How networks 
can revolutionise the world. He is also a partner at Volterra Consulting 
and director of Synthesis. Paul studied economics at the University of 
Cambridge and his career has spanned the academic and practical 
business worlds, including working at the Economist and as a director of 
the Henley Centre for Forecasting. He is a fellow of the British Academy 
of Social Science and has been awarded a DSc honoris causa for his 
contribution to economics by the University of Durham.
Sue Richards is honorary fellow in the Centre for Innovation and Service 
Research at the University of Exeter. She was professor of public 
management at the University of Birmingham and has also worked in the 
private sector, the Cabinet Office and at the Institute for Government. 
Sue has written on many aspects of public service reform and has been 
heavily involved in leadership development across the public policy 
system. She is also an associate of Synthesis.
Amna Silim is a research assistant at IPPR. Her current work focuses 
on employment and long-term fiscal policy. Prior to joining IPPR, Amna 
worked at the Government Office for Science on the global food and 
farming futures project and previously worked at the World Agroforestry 
Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. Amna holds an MSc in economics and 
development economics from the University of Nottingham and a BSc 
from the University of Western Ontario, Canada.
Chris Warhurst is professor of work and organisational studies at the 
University of Sydney. His work focuses on the labour process, labour 
markets and employment policy. He has recently completed projects 
on gender and pay in financial services and higher education student 
financing and is currently researching aesthetic labour, skill utilisation 
and job quality. Chris is co-editor of the forthcoming Handbook of Skills 
and Training for Oxford University Press. Previously, he was director of 
the Scottish Centre for Employment Research and has also worked 
in an advisory capacity for HM Treasury, the Scottish executive and 
government, Scottish Enterprise, Skills Australia and the OECD.
Professor Jim Watson is director of the Sussex Energy Group, 
University of Sussex. He has over 15 years’ research experience on 
a range of energy, climate change and innovation policy issues. He 
frequently advises government departments and has been a specialist 
adviser with two House of Commons select committees. Jim was chair 
of the British Institute for Energy Economics in 2011, and is a member 
of DECC and Defra’s social science expert panel.
IPPR  |  Complex new world: Translating new economic thinking into public policy6
Stian Westlake is director of policy and research at NESTA. Prior 
to this, he worked in social venture capital at the Young Foundation, 
making and managing investments in a range of social enterprises 
and founding Healthy Incentives, an innovative health venture. He also 
worked for McKinsey & Company in Silicon Valley and London, providing 
strategic advice to a range of private and public sector clients with 
a focus on healthcare, technology, and corporate and infrastructure 
finance. Stian holds a bachelors degree from the University of Oxford 
and a masters in finance with distinction from London Business School. 
He also pursued graduate work in economics and government at 
Harvard University as a Kennedy Memorial Scholar.
7Introduction: Nash
We live in uncertain economic times. The financial crash of 2007/08 and 
the subsequent downturn have shaken the global economic system to 
its core with severe consequences that are still playing out. Across the 
developed world, governments are treading uncharted territory in their 
attempts to shore up their banking sectors, bring sovereign deficits down 
to sustainable levels and reboot economic activity after the worst reces-
sion in living memory. High unemployment, falling living standards and a 
widespread perception that small groups of elites continue to enjoy unbri-
dled excess have brought the crisis in economics to the fore of our every-
day lives. Citizens and politicians of different hues call for a different type 
of capitalism, but without necessarily being clear what this might entail. 
If one thing is certain, it is that the events of recent years have thrown 
mainstream economic thinking into disrepute. When the Queen asked 
why economists had not foreseen the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and the drying up of global credit markets,1 she posed a question to 
which many wanted an answer. The now infamous response came 
from the Nobel Prize winning economist Robert Lucas, who asserted 
that, according to contemporary economic theory, ‘no one could have 
predicted it’.2 
To many mainstream economists Lucas’s answer was a perfectly 
valid, albeit fundamentally unsatisfactory, response. Traditional, or 
neoclassical, economic theory – pioneered by the likes of Leon 
Walras and William Stanley Jevons in the late 19th century and later 
embellished by the Chicago school of neoliberal economists including 
Milton Friedman and Lucas himself in the mid-20th century – argues 
that markets are geared to equilibrium, essentially self-regulating and, 
left to themselves, ought to deliver the best possible economic and 
social outcomes. A market collapse of the sort that happened in the 
world of finance in autumn 2008 was essentially impossible according 
to conventional economics. So, while Lucas’s assertion was in keeping 
with neoclassical economic theory, he inadvertently highlighted that 
theory’s fundamental flaws: its unedifying focus on prediction and, above 
all, its inability to explain economic developments in the real world.
1	 See	Pierce	2008	
2	 See	Kay	2011	
inTrOdUcTiOn
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Despite this rather colossal shortcoming, conventional economic 
thinking has underpinned the vast majority of economic policymaking in 
most advanced economies throughout the last century and continues to 
do so. In the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan embraced 
aspects of conventional economics to justify minimal state intervention 
and the use of monetary policy to achieve stable inflation and steady 
growth. Yet conventional economics has not just been the preserve of 
neoliberalism. In its belief that fiscal policy could be used to achieve a 
full employment equilibrium, post-war Keynesianism was also rooted 
in a neoclassical understanding of how the economy functions. More 
recently, the notion that the business cycle could be managed and a 
state of equilibrium eventually reached lay behind the thinking of the 
architects of the Great Moderation in the US and, implicitly, Gordon 
Brown’s claim that he could abolish boom and bust. The late Hyman 
Minsky3 would have told them, in no uncertain terms, that they were 
mistaken.
In the aftermath of the 2007/08 crash and its highlighting of traditional 
economics’ shortcomings, scholars and commentators are turning to 
new, heterodox economic theories as a way of better understanding 
how the economy really works and how governments might manage the 
economic system more effectively. Although they pre-date the crisis, the 
schools of complexity and evolutionary economics are the subjects of 
increasing interest and stand out as important critiques of neoclassical 
thought and the mathematical models and abstractions that lie at the 
heart of general equilibrium theory. Meanwhile, and perhaps for different 
reasons, behavioural economics has already started to draw attention 
in the UK and is now the focus of a specialised ‘Nudge Unit’ within the 
Cabinet Office. 
Yet although new economic thinking offers a far better account of how 
the economic system functions, we have far less of an idea from the 
existing literature of its implications for policymaking. With the exception 
of behavioural science,4 most new economic theories have yet to 
penetrate policy circles and remain largely confined to small cohorts of 
academics operating outside the mainstream.5 Very few proponents 
3	 Minsky,	an	American	economist	whose	work	was	largely	ignored	when	it	first	appeared	in	the	1960s,	
came	up	with	the	now	revered	‘financial	instability	hypothesis’.	This	argued	that	credit	cycles	are	
centred	on	speculative	investments,	which	are	borne	out	of	economic	fragility.	Speculation	takes	place	
during	a	period	of	calm	immediately	after	the	storm	and	leads	to	the	building	up	of	asset	bubbles.	
Eventually	the	bubble	bursts,	causing	financial	collapse	and	a	fresh	opportunity	for	speculative	
investment	and	so	on.	For	Minsky,	booms	and	busts	were	endogenous	to	the	business	cycle.
4	 Behavioural	economics	has	been	applied	to	areas	such	as	personal	finance	and	health.	More	
recently,	work	has	been	done	to	explore	how	‘nudges’	might	be	used	to	improve	tax	take	and	
influence	low-carbon	behaviour.
5	 Part	of	the	reason	why	these	theories	have	yet	to	emerge	from	their	academic	silos	is	that	they	have	
effectively	been	marginalised	in	academic	debates	by	the	continuing	predominance	of	orthodox	
economics.	As	Geoffrey	Hodgson	(2009)	has	argued,	a	group	of	elite,	neoclassically	trained	
academics	continue	to	dominate	the	peer	review	journal	process	and	determine	what	university	
students	are	taught,	preventing	any	major	changes	to	curriculums.	In	complexity	theory	this	process	
is	known	as	‘lock-in’.
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of these theories have set out in any detail what, according to their 
research, policymakers should actually do differently,6 let alone how they 
might achieve particular economic ends.
The upshot is that orthodox economics remains the only game in town 
for economic policymaking. The vast majority of mainstream economic 
policy debate continues to oscillate between the arguments of free 
market economists and neo-Keynesians about how best to restore 
global growth and prevent future crises. Hence many of the solutions 
that are being advanced are based on a conventional economics 
understanding of how markets behave. Although there is a common 
feeling that the status quo isn’t worth returning to, without clear and 
viable alternatives that is exactly what will happen. 
This book starts from the premise that there is a lot wrong with 
conventional economics and that insights from new economic thinking 
need to be taken seriously. It seeks to bring new economic thinking to 
the attention of policymakers and to reappraise the ways in which policy 
is designed and implemented when real-world economics is taken into 
account. 
What	do	we	mean	by	‘new	economic	thinking’?	
A number of new economic schools have emerged since the financial 
crisis, including market monetarists, neo-chartalists and post-Marxists 
with several making important headways in the blogosphere.7 While 
these schools offer some interesting and innovative insights for 
policymaking in the post-crisis era, they are effectively extensions to, 
or variants on, mainstream economic thinking and are therefore not 
considered here. 
This book is instead interested in a more radical strand of economics; 
radical because it approaches the economy from a completely different 
starting point. It focuses on evolutionary economics (which draws on 
the work of Joseph Schumpeter) and complexity science (which has its 
roots in the natural sciences). It touches also on closely related fields, 
including behavioural science and the study of networks. While each 
of these schools has its differences and nuances, they share many 
similarities; so, when referring to them we use ‘heterodox economics’ 
and ‘new economic thinking’ as catch-all terms. 
What each of these schools has in common is a shared critique of 
the core tenets of neoclassical economic theory, in particular the 
notion of static equilibrium. This suggests that markets are generally 
6	 A	notable	exception	is	the	Greater	London	Authority’s	Crossrail	project,	which	was	given	the	
go-ahead	in	part	due	to	the	results	of	impact	modelling	on	the	likely	benefits	of	the	infrastructure.	
This	modelling,	which	was	undertaken	by	Paul	Ormerod	and	Bridget	Rosewell	at	Volterra	Partners,	
incorporated	feedback	effects	and	other	complexity	dynamics.
7	 Market	monetarists	such	as	Scott	Sumner,	for	instance,	have	made	an	important	contribution	to	the	
debate	over	whether	the	US	Federal	Reserve	should	adopt	a	nominal	GDP	target.	See		
http://www.economist.com/node/21542174	
IPPR  |  Complex new world: Translating new economic thinking into public policy10
stable and that, while external shocks to the system can occur, the 
inherent tendency is for markets to move back into equilibrium. This 
happens because economic actors are rational and self-interested 
and possess all the information necessary to make optimal decisions 
in the marketplace. Following the laws of supply and demand, market 
transactions are processed at which point the market is said to ‘clear’. 
According to the models used by neoclassical economists, such 
clearing takes place instantaneously, leaving no time for market lag. 
Although they incorporate discount rates and scenarios to account for 
uncertainties, their models are essentially rigid and linear and are based 
on the notion that economic transactions are a zero sum game.
There are clearly many faults with this analysis. In his seminal book, The 
Origin of Wealth, Eric Beinhocker (2007) describes how the economy is 
more akin to a ‘complex adaptive system’; that is, an entity made up of 
heterogeneous groupings of agents, networks and institutions, which 
are influenced by and adapt to one another’s behaviour as well as to the 
surrounding environment. Within this system, activity is driven constantly 
by a multitude of overlapping and interconnected processes,8 which tend 
not to lead to a given fixed point or necessarily follow a specific cycle (Day 
1994). Hence, the economy is never in equilibrium or even geared towards 
achieving equilibrium, but instead is constantly evolving in non-uniform and 
dynamic ways, driven by so-called ‘emergent phenomena’. 
Furthermore, decision-making in the real world is not static or optimal, 
nor does it follow the rational expectations hypothesis of conventional 
economic theory. The preferences of, and decisions made by, individual 
actors in the marketplace are shaped by their everyday experiences and 
interactions. These so-called ‘network effects’ are difficult to predict 
and crucially do not necessarily follow preconceived assumptions of 
rational behaviour. Preferences and courses of action can change at 
different moments over time as individual agents learn from past failures, 
adapt and innovate. Modelling, monitoring and tracking complex 
adaptive systems is therefore highly challenging. It typically depends 
on sophisticated computer simulation as opposed to conventional 
mathematical modelling, which tends to be based on reductionist 
calculations and ‘as if’ assumptions (Fisher 2009).
Heterodox economics reaches two important conclusions. First, 
macro level patterns and outcomes can only be fully understood by an 
appreciation of activity and interactions at the micro level. Importantly, 
this can not be deduced by analysing individual actors or properties in 
situ, independent of their networks. Second, because of the non-stop 
and unpredictable interactions and adaptation that occur, economies are 
volatile and, at the macro level, very likely to display intermittent periods 
of chaos and calm. 
8	 External	shocks	can	also	shape	the	system,	but	they	are	more	infrequent.
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Most non-economists would recognise these conclusions as a 
reasonable description of the real world and would accept that ‘without 
an adequate understanding of [the inherent dynamics and instability of 
economic systems], one is likely to miss the major factors that influence 
the economic sphere of our societies’ (Colander et al 2008: 3). They 
would be surprised, therefore, to discover that the vast majority of 
economists and, hence, economic policymaking overlook these insights. 
Structure	of	the	book
In the first part of this book, we explore in detail the main academic 
strands associated with ‘new economic thinking’ and sketch out 
some initial implications for policymaking. Amna Silim provides a 
deeper overview of heterodox theory than is provided here, focusing 
on complexity, evolutionary and behavioural science. She also draws 
attention to the key features of neoclassical economics that heterodox 
economics refutes. 
An important element in the study of new economic thinking is the role of 
networks. In chapter 2, Paul Ormerod suggests that network theory not 
only highlights the deep flaws in laissez-faire economics, but also casts 
doubt on the efficacy of broad-based state intervention. Ormerod argues 
that ‘mechanistic’ policy tools such as taxation and generic incentives 
often fail to have the desired effect because they tend to treat economic 
actors in isolation and are unable to anticipate ‘network effects’ within the 
economic system. Instead, policy interventions need to be grounded in 
a holistic understanding of emergent economic activity and should seek 
to alter the structure of existing networks. To do this, Ormerod suggests, 
a new intellectual foundation for policy is required, which is embedded in 
social norms and taps into avenues for collective action. 
What might new economic thinking mean for the institutions and 
the art of government? In chapter 3, Michael Hallsworth argues 
government institutions, law makers and civil servants could learn a 
lot from complexity science. While the broad trend in government over 
the years has been to approach ever more complex challenges by 
‘a more sophisticated application of traditional, linear thinking, such 
as more analysis and evidence reviews, more detailed strategies and 
plans, more rigorous performance monitoring’, this has had limited 
success. An appreciation of complex adaptive systems would, argues 
Hallsworth, allow politicians to overcome the policy inertia that results 
from rigid, preformed plans, as well as generating greater feedback and 
learning. It would also ensure that complex, cross-cutting challenges 
were dealt with in a system-wide manner, rather than by isolated central 
government departments. Such ‘system stewardship’ would, he argues, 
significantly improve strategies for governing.
The second section of the book explores the implications of heterodox 
economics for a number of different policy areas. Greg Fisher (chapter 4) 
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looks at how an understanding of complexity and network thinking 
might lead us to re-evaluate the tools policymakers should use to 
better manage the financial system. Drawing on the work of Professor 
David Tuckett on the psychology of financial markets, Fisher finds 
that – contrary to orthodox financial theories such as modern portfolio 
theory and the capital asset pricing model – investors are susceptible 
to ‘groupthink’, leading to herd-like behaviour and markets that are 
inherently volatile. Financial stability and certainty can never, as a result, 
be assured. However, policymakers can take steps to dampen the 
impact of market volatility by improving the robustness of the financial 
system. In particular, Fisher advocates the devolution of the banking 
sector and a rethinking of mark-to-market accounting principles among 
other reforms needed in the City. 
In chapter 5, Geoffrey Hodgson takes an evolutionary approach to 
business policy. He argues that there are at least three flaws in the way 
conventional economics deals with businesses and industries: viewing 
the firm as a single entity that sits independently within the marketplace 
and is not influenced by a wider network of institutions; failing to 
appreciate the diversity of firms; and wrongly assuming that industries 
have fixed production functions, move up the cost-curve and therefore 
are in, or close to, equilibrium. For Hodgson, the last simply overlooks 
‘the core dynamic of modern capitalism’, namely that most businesses 
are in a constant struggle to grow, adapt and survive. Instead he offers 
a new business policy framework that treats the firm as an evolving 
social organism and places innovation, experimentation and variation 
at its heart. Hodgson also argues that the role of the state should be 
institution building (ensuring the right educational, infrastructure and 
finance building blocks are in place) and promoting corporate and 
financial ethics at the expense of shareholder value.
Tony Dolphin asks in chapter 6 what complexity means for 
macroeconomic policy. In the post-war period, successive UK 
governments have attempted to pursue macroeconomic stability 
– most recently through the use of monetary policy primarily. It is a 
strategy that has met with limited success and one which, he argues, 
is fundamentally at odds with complexity theory. Since complexity 
suggests that the economic cycle evolves in unpredictable ways, with 
short bursts of growth and inflation, punctuated with periods of calm, 
controlling the cycle will prove difficult and at times impossible. To better 
appreciate economic reality, Dolphin argues that policymakers in the 
Bank of England and the Treasury should abandon their overreliance 
on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models and develop a better 
understanding of the impact of policy interventions and their limitations 
through the use of simulations and impact assessments. He also 
suggests that monetary policy needs to be set by reference to a broader 
set of indicators than just consumer price inflation.
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Stian Westlake looks at how new economic thinking might inform our 
approach to innovation policy, which is largely ignored in conventional 
economic theory. Westlake argues in chapter 7 that orthodox innovation 
policy is too readily conceived as a response to market failures, 
especially the ‘failure’ of businesses to do ‘enough’ research and 
development, and has taken the form of top-down measures, such 
as R&D tax credits and national R&D investment targets. Rather than 
obsessing about arbitrary measures of innovation, Westlake argues for a 
much closer focus on technology policy in its own right, tailored policies 
in support of entrepreneurs who drive innovation, and a new policy 
framework that appreciates the complexity of the ‘innovation system’.
In chapter 8, Jim Watson asks how insights from evolutionary, 
behavioural and network theories might improve the way policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and drive forward the low-carbon 
economy are designed. According to Watson, conventional economics’ 
treatment of climate change as a market failure has led policymakers 
to favour broad-based market responses, such as carbon pricing. 
Since carbon pricing assumes that businesses and consumers respond 
rationally to price signals it will, he argues, struggle on its own to lead to 
significant CO2 reductions, stimulate sufficient green investment or shift 
the embedded economic networks that have ‘locked in’ high carbon 
to our infrastructure and energy systems and personal lifestyles. Thus, 
governments should supplement carbon pricing with a richer policy 
framework that recognises the complexity of the low-carbon challenge. 
This would include far greater emphasis on technological innovation 
as well as greater efforts to influence consumer behaviour and spur 
bottom-up, community-level low-carbon initiatives. 
The formulation of skills policy has too often focused on supply-side 
strategies to boost skills, in the hope of achieving a so-called ‘high-
skill equilibrium’. As Pauline Anderson and Chris Warhurst argue in 
chapter 9, the concept of ‘skills ecosystems’ which is rooted in network 
and institutional theories, offers a better way of approaching skills 
policy. It seeks to understand the interactions and interconnectedness 
of different actors and institutions across economic networks and 
the dynamics at play with regard to the development and supply of 
skills and training, employer demand for skills and barriers to skills 
deployment. This framework is already being pioneered in places such 
as Australia and Scotland but, as the authors argue here, has been lost 
in translation in attempts to apply it to skills policy in England.
An appreciation of bottom-up, local dynamics should naturally inform 
strategies to boost regional development. Yet, in her chapter on 
regional policy, Sue Richards argues that since the 1980s, the conduct 
of regional policy has – notwithstanding the devolution of power in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – by and large displayed a 
centralising tendency. This has meant a largely generic approach to 
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regional development, particularly in England, which fails to appreciate 
the local idiosyncrasies that determine policy outcomes. Furthermore, 
she argues that power, authority and accountability are too detached 
from the local level to respond to emergent phenomena and unexpected 
change. A real commitment to devolution in higher and further education 
and labour market policy to the city-region level – coupled with the 
reallocation of resources from the centre necessary to achieve this – is, 
according to Richards, long overdue.
The final section of the book explores the political economy of new 
economic thinking. In chapter 11, Eric Beinhocker argues that not only 
does complexity science pose challenges for political culture that centre 
on the need for assuredness and a desire not to change course, it also 
has implications for the traditional left–right divide. By questioning the 
merit of black and white ideological standpoints regarding the role of the 
state, complexity science challenges our conception of politics, as well 
as the nature of democratic engagement.
In chapter 12, Orit Gal demonstrates how complexity science can shed 
light on geopolitical trends and in particular how governments might 
respond to structural fault lines and deeper tensions within the global 
economy. Gal focuses on one recent emergent global phenomenon: the 
rise of a dissatisfied global middle class epitomised by the ‘99%’ and 
Occupy movements in the west, the Arab Spring, and similar protests 
in China and India. She suggests that complexity economics helps 
to frame our understanding of the interconnected processes that are 
fuelling this ‘middle crisis’, including economic globalisation, structural 
inconsistencies and loss of political sovereignty. In response to these 
co-evolving trends, Gal argues that ‘anomie’ – what she describes 
as ‘the gradual structural breakdown of social bonds, standards, and 
infrastructure for cooperation’ – is the most likely consequence. Tackling 
this, she argues, will require far greater emphasis on social resilience 
and developing new avenues and resources for political participation 
and self-organisation. But it is also crucial that policy responses treat the 
drivers of anomie as emergent and network-based phenomenon rather 
than a set of separate, disconnected conditions.
Adam Lent and Greg Fisher close this book by drawing on some of 
the ideas in the other chapters and their own thinking to sketch out 
the parameters of a new framework for economic policy in the 21st 
century based on complexity and network thinking. In reflecting on the 
insights provided by new economic thinking into the role of collective 
action, collaboration and institutions in addressing emergent problems, 
they suggest that policymaking should contain four critical elements: 
it must be a collaborative endeavour, non-ideological, reflexive and 
diverse. They make a pitch to policymakers and all political parties 
to draw on complexity and network thinking in order to inform policy 
options, which they argue would entail ‘an understanding of the real 
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world from the ground up, providing a more realistic and less ideological 
picture of reality’. The task for economic policy – and the role of the 
state in economic policymaking – is, according to Lent and Fisher, to 
develop ‘a collective response that takes account of the ... dynamic and 
unpredictable economy’ that new economic thinking teaches us exists. 
Lessons	for	policy:	some	important	pointers
The purpose of this book is to bring insights from new economic 
thinking to the attention of policymakers. A number of important 
implications, lessons and recommendations for policy can be deduced 
from our understanding of the economy as a ‘complex adaptive system’ 
and they are discussed in the following chapters. However, it is worth 
drawing attention to a few common lessons here.
First, the contributors to this book share the view that the assumption 
that free and unfettered markets lead to the best socioeconomic 
outcomes is at worst fundamentally flawed and at best woefully 
incomplete. New economic thinking demonstrates that markets do not 
operate as neoclassical textbooks suggest: market actors do not have 
a full access to information, their decision-making is rarely optimal, and 
markets are not inherently geared towards reaching a point of stability 
or equilibrium. Any attempt to construct an economic policy built on 
these assumptions is destined to unravel, with potentially disastrous 
consequences. But, at the same time, the assumption that the state can 
simply step in to correct ‘market failures’ by introducing broad-brush 
regulations or generic tax measures fails to appreciate the complexity of 
economic activity. The precise role of the state is far more nuanced and 
complex9 and policy tools need to reflect this.
Second, complexity, evolutionary and network economics suggest that 
a more integrated and holistic policy approach towards economic 
systems is likely to produce better results. One important lesson from 
the 2007/08 financial crash was that policymakers failed to anticipate 
the effects of the interconnectedness of financial institutions. Indeed, 
it was wrongly assumed that distributing risk throughout the banking 
system through use of various credit derivatives including credit default 
swaps would ultimately reduce systemic risk – a logic which turned out 
to be inherently flawed. The stark lesson here is that policymakers and 
regulators misunderstand network dynamics at their peril. Furthermore, 
treating economic actors or particular problems in isolation, as separate 
entities, will increase the likelihood of policy interventions being 
unsuccessful. Policymakers should instead plan their interventions on 
the basis of seeking to shape the ‘fitness landscape’ and altering the 
behaviour of networks, rather than the current approach which, in crude 
terms, identifies a problem and aims to solve it through one or two 
9	 As	far	as	abstractions	go,	complexity	economics	provides	for	a	set	of	less	inaccurate	ones.	Theory	will	
always	be	abstract	but	it	is	important	to	remember	that	there	are	degrees	of	accuracy	in	abstraction.
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incentive-based policies arising from an empirically defective framework. 
Much work remains to be done in terms of defining policy methods that 
incorporate this system-wide approach, yet the principle is clear.
Third, there are no silver bullets in policymaking. An appreciation 
of networks and complex systems suggests that the success of 
policy interventions depends on a diverse range of factors and will 
vary according to locality as well as the nature and extent of network 
interactions and influences. Consequently, policy needs to be suitably 
tailored to specific problems: blanket interventions are unlikely to be 
sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of all local communities. Timing is also 
important; a policy instrument launched today might not always work 
tomorrow because the economic system is constantly evolving in 
unpredictable ways. Policy therefore needs to be dynamic, without 
being haphazard, inconsistent, or made on a whim. Experimentation, 
innovation, discovery and effective monitoring and evaluation all need 
to be factored in. Policymaking also needs to be backed up by detailed 
and robust evidence and careful prior analysis. 
Fourth, greater decentralised economic policymaking is needed. 
New economic thinking and its emphasis on networks and emergent 
phenomena suggests that policymaking is often more likely to be 
successful if it is locally rooted, aware of local conditions, and locally 
administered and evaluated. Decentralisation can also help shorten the 
feedback loops that inform decision-making, so actors can respond 
more quickly to developments. This does not take away the importance 
of overarching policy goals, clearly defined strategy or even national 
policy instruments, but rather points to the need for a richer policy 
framework that bridges the divide between national strategic priorities 
and the grassroots realities that policy is attempting to influence. It also 
points to the severe flaws in micro-management from Whitehall. 
Fifth, new economic thinking suggests that policy outcomes are 
inherently uncertain. This is unsurprising given the nature of complex 
adaptive systems and the emergent and interlocking phenomena 
that make economic outcomes difficult to predict. This rejection of 
predictability poses a massive challenge for conventional economic 
policymaking which has historically relied heavily on forecasting and 
continues to do so to this day: whether this is the Office for Budget 
Responsibility projecting economic developments to underpin fiscal 
policy, the Bank of England forecasting inflation in order to set interest 
rates, or City economists making predictions about the future level of 
interest rates, exchange rates, bond yields and stock markets. However, 
a different type of forecasting, one that is more nuanced, might be 
possible. Instead of depending on their models and simple cost–benefit 
and regression analyses, policymakers and forecasters could make 
greater use of computerised simulations, randomised control trials, 
trial and error pilot projects, community outreach, and real time data 
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monitoring and analysis. At the same time, we also need to acknowledge 
the sometimes messy reality of policymaking: policies are often the 
result of political bargaining or a politician’s pet project, may be designed 
and implemented without full access to the necessary information, 
possibly based on preconceived bias, and almost always dependent 
on the assumptions used by civil servants who design the policy and 
practitioners who implement it on the ground (Fisher and Gal 2012).
Finally, policymakers – and the general public alike – should accept 
that failure happens and learn from it. There is still a pervasive fear of 
failure in policymaking circles – in part because of the potential political 
ramifications that tend to follow. Yet the most successful companies 
and entrepreneurs, such as Google, Henry Ford and Steve Jobs, are 
those that at some stage experienced failure. The same is true of 
policymaking: taking risks is necessary and sometimes failure can be 
healthy. The critical issue is the propensity and ability of policymakers 
to learn from failure and to adapt policy responses appropriately. This 
provides fundamental challenges for the nature of politics.
Drawing lessons and policy ideas from new economic thinking is a task 
that is still very much in its infancy. There are many important ideas in 
this book, yet much work remains to be done. In bringing together a 
number of leading experts and challenging them to explore the policy 
implications of heterodox economics, we hope this collection will help 
start a broad debate in policy circles. And ultimately, we hope that it will 
help bring about change in economic policymaking for the better.
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The financial collapse of 2007/08 and the subsequent deep recession 
and sluggish recovery have left huge scars on the global economy. In 
the UK, the government is grappling with an unprecedented budget 
deficit and unemployment is over 1 million higher than it was before 
the recession. This is a crisis for the real economy and for economic 
policymakers, but it should also be seen as a crisis for the economics 
profession and for economic theory. Not only did mainstream 
neoclassical economics – which has been the overwhelmingly dominant 
strand in economic thinking for over a century – fail to predict the 
collapse and recession, its models do not even concede that such 
events could happen. In the future, there is bound to be more interest in 
economic theories that offer a better explanation of recent events; and 
this is where heterodox economics comes in.
Neoclassical	economics
The failure to predict or explain the financial collapse and recession has 
put neoclassical economic thinking in the dock, but such an interrogation 
is long overdue. Sharp fluctuations in economic growth are just one of the 
real-world phenomena that traditional economics is poor at understanding. 
From actual human behaviour through to constant innovation, there is 
much that traditional economic thinking struggles to explain.
Neoclassical economic theories describe a world in which rational agents 
act as optimal decision-makers. Guided by possession of a full set of 
information, self-interested agents maximise utility while firms maximise 
profits. As a result, the economy is said to behave in a static and linear 
manner and the system tends towards a state of equilibrium: supply equals 
demand and an optimal price is set. Macroeconomic patterns are simply 
the sum of microeconomic properties (Blanchard 2010). 
In this model, economies are not necessarily always in equilibrium; 
exogenous shocks, such as the development of a new technology, 
can disrupt them. But these disruptions will be temporary and market 
mechanisms will work to push the economy back to equilibrium. 
From a neoclassical perspective, economic development occurs 
through cyclical patterns of equilibrium, shocks, destabilisation and 
restabilisation. In each cycle the content of the economy such as the 
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goods and services it offers might change, but its very nature essentially 
remains the same.1 
This conventional model can be challenged on four fundamental fronts:2 
the tendency to equilibrium, exogenous shocks, individual rationality 
and systemic consistency. In the real world, economies are not static 
and geared towards equilibrium; they are dynamic and in constant 
flux. This dynamism is endogenous; it originates within the system, not 
from exogenous shocks. Consumer preferences are not formed by 
individuals acting solely on their own but are the result of a complex 
process that includes observing and interacting with other consumers. 
Economic agents do not have a fixed set of preferences based on 
rational assessment; they are subject to whims and to mimicking the 
behaviour of other agents. As a result, the nature of the economic 
system transforms over time.
In reality, the economy is a complex ecology rather than a complicated 
machine. It does not respond in predictable ways. It is path-dependent, 
with each phase building on the previous one. A greater appreciation 
of this reality has led to the emergence of new schools of thought that 
are challenging the neoclassical world view and attempting to provide a 
more realistic understanding of the way economies develop and change.
Complexity,	evolutionary	and	behavioural	
economics
Various schools of economic thought outside the neoclassical 
mainstream are often placed together under the banner heading of 
‘heterodox economics’. This term is used to describe any innovative 
way of thinking about the economy, from those that represent complete 
breaks from the neoclassical approach to others seeking to undermine 
only some of its main ideas.
In this chapter, three strands of heterodox economics are discussed 
in some detail: complexity, evolutionary and behavioural economics. 
Each offers different insights into economic analysis by seeking a more 
accurate representation of the economy, and in so doing opens up 
new possibilities for policymakers. This chapter summarises their basic 
tenets – and discusses what they might mean for public policy.
Complexity economics challenges fundamental orthodox assumptions 
and seeks to move beyond market transactions, static equilibrium 
analysis and homo economicus (the perfectly rational, self interested 
individuals defined in orthodox economic models). Brian Arthur, Steven 
Durlauf and David Lane (1997) suggest complexity has six defining 
characteristics.
1	 This	traditional	view	of	the	economy	was	based	not	only	on	economic	theories	but	on	our	
understanding	of	nature	as	lying	within	the	Newtonian	paradigm.
2	 Thanks	to	Orit	Gal	for	her	input	to	this	section.	For	a	full	discussion	of	the	shortcomings	of	
neoclassical	economics	and	of	complexity	economics	see	Beinhocker	2007.
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1. Dispersed interaction: Developments in the economy result from the 
interaction of heterogeneous agents, whose actions are determined 
by their environment and by the predicted actions of other agents.
2. The absence of a global controller: The economy is characterised 
by competition and coordination between decision-makers and no 
single agent is able to exploit all opportunities in the economy.
3. A cross-cutting hierarchical organisation: The economy is 
comprised of many levels of organisation and there are many 
intertwined interactions that span across all levels.
4. Continual adaptation: Decision-makers or agents are continually 
learning and adapting to their environment, emergent patterns and 
interactions.
5. Perpetual novelty in the system: New niches continually emerge 
out of new markets, new technologies, new behaviours and new 
institutions.
6. Out-of-equilibrium dynamics: The economy is typically operating 
far from any equilibrium or optimal output and there is constant 
improvement.
An alternative definition is based on the observed tendency of the 
economy to produce dynamic outcomes. Richard Day (1994) argues, 
for example, that ‘[an] economic system is dynamically complex if its 
deterministic endogenous processes do not lead it asymptotically to 
a fixed point, a limit cycle, or an explosion’. In other words, complex 
systems are non-linear, dynamic and involve continuous adaptation 
to patterns the economic system itself creates. As a result, these 
systems are, in contrast to the linear systems described by neoclassical 
economics, unlikely to rest at a given equilibrium point.
Complexity economics considers the economy to be a ‘complex 
adaptive system’ in which constant interaction plays a significant role. A 
complex adaptive system allows for a wide set of interactions between 
individuals and recognises that an economic actor’s preferences are 
diverse (Beinhocker 2007). Agents do not just respond to market 
signals, such as price; they also interact with other agents and this 
influences their subsequent choices and actions (Arthur 1999). The 
system is adaptive because agents learn from experience, and from 
the experience of others, and so gain knowledge they would otherwise 
have lacked. (In contrast, in traditional economic theory, the economy 
is populated by ‘representative agents’ or identical decision-makers 
operating in isolation.) If we accept the existence of these complex 
and overlapping interactions, this requires us to rethink the equilibrium 
outcomes that are at the centre of neoclassical assumptions.
In complexity economics, it is accepted that interactions between 
different actors at the micro level will lead to particular macroeconomic 
outcomes. Unlike in traditional economics however, the complexity 
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view is that micro- and macroeconomics are not separate fields and 
macro patterns are not the simple aggregation of the micro decisions of 
uniform decision-makers3 (Fontanta 2008). Micro level interactions mean 
macro patterns cannot be reduced to individual level behaviour; these 
patterns can only be seen as a whole (Durlauf 2011). Thus, economic 
growth, for example, cannot be reduced to its individual properties or 
elements; rather it is a result of various interactions at the micro level 
(Metcalfe et al 2002). 
Furthermore, once a macro pattern has been established, there is non-
stop adaptation that leads to a generation of new patterns – emergent 
phenomena – arising from within the system. This process is referred to 
as endogenous evolution.
In a complex system, these interactions not only influence macro 
patterns but also create increasingly complex networks. Economic 
transactions take place across a range of networks, unlike in traditional 
models, which assume agents interact only through auctions or one-
to-one negotiation (Beinhocker 2007). If agents have the ability to 
learn and adapt their behaviour accordingly, and alter their preferences 
and decision-making in an unpredictable manner, they can no longer 
be seen as rational entities operating with perfect information. In this 
respect, complexity economics has much in common with behavioural 
economics, while learning and adapting is central to evolutionary 
economics.
Evolutionary economics is closely related to complexity economics 
and, as its name suggests, sees the process of evolution as central to 
economic developments. Evolution involves endogenous change – a 
process of selection, adaptation and multiplication (Metcalfe et al 2002). 
As a result of experience and adaptation, some economic strategies 
and decisions work and some fail. Those that succeed are scaled up 
or multiplied; those that fail are cast aside. This process of continuous 
knowledge gathering and adaptation is driven by feedback mechanisms 
and the interactions between agents and their environment (Nelson and 
Winter 1982). 
Innovation is central to evolutionary economics and is considered 
a marker of the capitalist economic system (Lent and Lockwood 
2010). Indeed, innovation implies experimentation with new forms of 
physical technology, social technology and business techniques which 
– as history tells us – are core drivers of increases in efficiency and 
productivity, economic growth and the generation of wealth (Beinhocker 
2007). This process of selection, adaptation and multiplication also 
takes place at the firm-level, where there is continual generation and 
3	 Indeed,	according	to	complexity	economics,	macro	outcomes	can	be	very	different	from	what	one	
might	expect	from	a	micro	analysis	of	so-called	‘representative	agents’.	So	an	understanding	of	the	
interactions	between	agents	is	required	to	fully	explain	macro	outcomes.
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selection of new products and services. The lack of narrative around 
innovation is one of conventional economic theory’s greatest flaws: 
indeed, by assuming that economies and firms are in or close to 
equilibrium, neoclassical models simply overlook the role of innovation in 
modern capitalism.
Like complex systems theory, evolutionary economics emphasises 
the crucial role of history in shaping the future. Past interactions and 
decisions have major impacts on the economy – a characteristic known 
as path dependence – and any initial small changes in an economy 
can produce drastic downstream effects, partially driven by networks 
and cross-cutting hierarchical organisation. Economic outcomes are 
determined not only by current conditions but also by previous decisions 
and initial conditions (Durlauf 1997).
If adaptation and innovation are central to the evolutionary economics 
critique of neoclassical economics, then the psychology of human 
beings is central to that of the behavioural economists. In short, 
behavioural science is a combination of psychology and economics 
that has led to a debunking of the traditional economic assumption of 
rational, self-interested individuals. This approach explores the limits to 
human rationality in decision-making. It argues that human agents do 
not possess the flawless ability to maximise utility or profits by weighing 
all available alternatives presented to them and that there are flaws and 
imperfections associated with decision-making (Lambert 2006).
Behavioural economists believe decision-makers exhibit what they call 
bounded rationality, bounded self-interest and bounded willpower (Jolls 
et al 1998). Bounded rationality recognises the limitations agents face 
when it comes to decision-making. Despite any prior intentions to be 
rational, limited information and other constraints prevent agents from 
making optimal decisions. In addition, agents are not always selfish, 
or self-interested: their self-interest is usually bounded by a sense of 
fairness. And bounded willpower acknowledges that agents at times find 
it difficult to make decisions that will benefit them in the long term.
Agents and firms rely on decision-making methods that differ from 
those described in neoclassical economics. Heuristics, framing and loss 
aversion shape their choices (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). When making 
decisions, economic agents cut corners. They use rules of thumb 
(heuristics) rather than gather all the relevant available information (an 
impossible task anyway); they reach different conclusions depending on 
how a problem is framed to them; and they avoid taking decisions that 
might lead to losses (Lambert 2006).
These behaviours characterise the actions of consumers. For example 
in a study commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading in the UK (2010), 
price framing was found to heavily influence outcomes. Consumers 
frequently miscalculated and achieved lower value when purchasing 
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special offers compared to those offered at a simple unit price. They 
simply assumed that the special offer must be the best deal. Evidence 
of market inefficiencies like this shows people are not always rational 
decision-makers in their role as consumers.
Acknowledging the psychology of individuals in decision-making has 
led to more accurate representations of agents in economic models, 
thanks in part to behavioural science. These findings are shared by other 
heterodox economic schools. In models derived from a complexity or an 
evolutionary economics perspective, therefore, people are not assumed 
to be rational agents: they factor in the ability of agents to learn and 
adapt based on past experience and allow for trial and error and flexible 
behaviour (Nelson and Winter 1982).
To summarise then, complexity, evolutionary and behavioural 
thinking puts strong emphasis on dynamics, adaptation, psychology, 
disequilibrium and innovation. Modern economies are complex 
adaptive systems, rarely tending towards a steady state equilibrium in 
which supply equals demand and markets clear. Most change occurs 
endogenously, rather than as a result of exogenous shocks. Economies 
operate with constant fluctuation and multiple equilibria.
Policy	implications
Policymakers operate in a neoclassical framework for the most part. 
They tend to evaluate various policy interventions by estimating 
the impact a given policy change might have on the economy and 
comparing this to what would happen in the absence of that policy 
being pursued.
Complexity economics on the other hand suggests that since the 
economy is a complex, adaptive and dynamic system, it is inherently 
difficult to predict outcomes and responses to particular policy changes 
(Ormerod 2010a). This presents immediate challenges for policymakers. 
Predicting future trends is problematic if markets and economies do 
not return to equilibrium, when agents are not always rational and when 
uncertainty is in-built into the system.
A deeper understanding of the relationship between macro outcomes 
and individual decisions is therefore needed for policy formulation. 
Solutions under complexity tend not to be based on deductive analysis 
or top-down approaches, but explore interaction and behaviour using 
a bottom-up approach. This inductive method makes use of empirical 
analyses such as agent-based modelling (Holt et al 2010) and tends to 
do away with conventional modelling techniques.
Indeed complexity economists believe emergent phenomena are better 
understood through computer simulations than through mathematical 
theorems (Rosser 1999). Computer simulations allow researchers to 
explore a wide range of possible outcomes (Arthur et al 1997) while 
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agent-based modelling allows us to capture the key features of complex 
economic systems, in particular the interactions and networks between 
agents. 
Given the above, Eric Beinhocker (2007) argues that the role of 
government should start from the premise of seeking to ‘shape the 
fitness environment’. This would allow free markets to assume their 
natural role of differentiating, selecting and amplifying successful 
economic behaviour. But by analysing and monitoring evolutionary 
processes within the market, policymakers can attempt to influence 
them so as to better respond to society’s needs. The aim of 
policymakers should, therefore, be to shape the environment in which 
plans or projects are more or less likely to succeed or fail according to 
their ability to meet society’s needs. 
An example is the use of carbon taxes. One of the main purposes 
of a carbon tax is to shift the fitness landscape so that projects and 
technologies with low emissions have a better chance of succeeding. 
Here the market is still allowed to differentiate, select and amplify 
successful plans – but the environment in which the market operates 
is shaped by government. However, while they can be important in 
influencing behaviour and market outcomes, carbon taxes and other 
pricing instruments have their limitations. As Jim Watson argues in 
chapter 8, carbon pricing assumes that consumers and businesses 
will react rationally to the price signal. Since complexity economics 
suggests that this will not always be the case, additional measures may 
be needed to drive forward the low-carbon transition at a sufficient rate 
– particularly if the carbon price is set too low. 
Policy can also draw from evolutionary economics, for example, by 
focusing on how selection mechanisms create desirable and socially 
optimal outcomes. Evolutionary economics sheds light on problems 
of long-term economic growth (Nelson 2005), environmental change 
(Faber and Frenken 2009) and regional policy (Boschma and Lambooy 
1999), as well as new innovations and technologies, and the effects of 
technological and social change (Lent and Lockwood 2010).
In particular, evolutionary economics argues that the way to thrive in 
an evolving and changing economy is to innovate. Perhaps because 
neoclassical models overlook its role, innovation has rarely featured at 
the centre of economic policymaking in the UK. Historically, innovation 
has been patchily applied in the UK as part of growth strategies, 
and businesses and policymakers have been slow to respond to 
rapid business transformations. The evolutionary approach, however, 
suggests innovative business activity should be actively encouraged. 
Indeed, as Adam Lent and Matthew Lockwood (2010) argue, the UK’s 
growth strategy would greatly benefit from placing innovation at its 
core.
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Methods from evolutionary economics have also been used to inform 
approaches to international development. Richard Nelson (2005) 
suggests moving away from the overly rigid neoclassical prescriptions 
of simply increasing investment in human and physical capital in 
developing countries and towards greater learning and innovation. 
This would involve learning how other countries have advanced their 
economy and gaining the knowledge of how modern technology can be 
used most effectively in achieving desired economic outcomes (Reinert 
2006). In an earlier article with Sydney Winter (1982) Nelson argued that 
‘flexibility, experimentation, and ability to change direction as a result of 
what is learned are placed high on the list of desiderata for proposed 
institutional regimes’.
Crucially, policymaking from an evolutionary economics perspective 
recognises that the state is limited by the same factors facing agents: 
it is not, and cannot be, in possession of a full set of information. 
Therefore, the state must be willing to learn from experience and adapt 
its approaches. Policymaking needs to be more flexible and willing to 
break with organisational routines.
While complexity and evolutionary economics have struggled to get a 
foothold in policymaking to date, many governments have begun to 
reflect on the analysis of behavioural economists when exploring policy 
interventions. In the UK, for example, the government set up in July 
2010 a dedicated Behavioural Insights Team (also known as the ‘Nudge 
Unit’), tasked with assessing potential policy interventions through the 
lens of behavioural thinking. In particular, it is seeking to use what is 
referred to as ‘choice architecture’ to evaluate the impact that framing 
details in different ways can have on how people make decisions. 
Choice architecture has already been applied and proved to be effective 
across a number of areas, including savings for pensions. While most 
people understand that pensions offer substantial rewards in the future 
for a relatively modest sacrifice made in the present, enrolment in 
voluntary schemes tends to be at a low level. Changing the rules so 
that workers must ‘opt out’ rather than ‘opt in’ to pension schemes has 
been found to significantly increase participation.
As the title of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s influential book 
(2008) implies, small changes of this sort can ‘nudge’ people to make 
better decisions about their health and financial wellbeing. Libertarian 
paternalism has the potential to create better outcomes, while retaining 
people’s right to choose. What is more, change can often be brought 
about at little to no cost; simply paying more attention to framing a 
particular choice may have a greater chance of achieving the desired 
outcome. As a result, behavioural concepts are being progressively 
incorporated into policies in many areas including environmental change, 
finance, international development, healthcare and competition policy. 
But, as Paul Ormerod has argued elsewhere (2010b), successful 
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‘nudges’ must also be grounded in an awareness of the network effects 
that influence an individual’s choices and behaviour and how this can 
change over time: without this understanding, nudges may fail in the 
same way as conventional command and control policies.
Conclusion
The neoclassical economic model is based on a series of simplifying 
assumptions that result in a poor representation of the real world. New 
schools of economic thought are emerging built on a more accurate 
analysis of the way economic agents behave and the way decisions 
are really made. These heterodox schools of economic thought dismiss 
notions of rational economic agents and profit-maximising firms in favour 
of a greater focus on psychology, interactions and history.
Complexity economics emphasises the power of networks, feedback 
mechanisms and the heterogeneity of individuals. Evolutionary 
economics is centred on the ideas of continuous adaptation and the 
creation of novelty; it recognises the key roles of innovation, selection 
and replication in the economy. And behavioural economics seeks 
to understand how and why individuals behave as they do, rather 
than assuming that they act like the robotic homo economicus of the 
neoclassical textbook.
Already these approaches are beginning to help us understand some 
of the economic anomalies that orthodox economics cannot explain. 
As they develop in the future and the appetite for new economic 
thought grows, our understanding of the economy – and our economic 
policymaking – can only be improved.
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Modern economic theory was first set out on a formal basis in the late 
19th century. While there have been many developments since then, 
at heart the view in economics of how the world operates remains the 
same. Mainstream economic theory is essentially concerned with how 
decisions are made by individuals, what information is gathered and how 
it is used by decision-makers. The intellectual basis of most social and 
economic policy in the western world is provided by this conventional 
economic theory. A whole range of activities in state bureaucracies, 
such as forecasts, policy evaluation, cost–benefit analysis and the 
design of regulation, stem directly from mainstream economics.
All scientific theories, even quantum physics, are approximations 
to reality. Developing theories involves making assumptions and 
simplifications to enable us to better understand problems. A key feature 
of a good theory, therefore, is that its assumptions are a reasonable 
description of the real world.
In the early 21st century, just as in the late 19th, economics in general 
makes the assumption that individuals operate autonomously, isolated 
from the direct influences of others. A person has a fixed set of tastes 
and preferences; when choosing from a set of alternatives, he or she 
compares the attributes of those alternatives and selects the one which 
most closely corresponds to his or her preferences. At first sight, this 
may seem quite reasonable, or even ‘rational’, as economists describe 
this theory of behaviour. If I am interested in buying a product which 
many people want, I may have to pay a high price. So the choices other 
people make affect me indirectly through the workings of the market. My 
preferences, however, remain unaltered, according to this conventional 
view of economics. 
There is a serious problem with this assumption that individuals operate 
in isolation from each other, that their preferences are not affected 
directly by the decisions of others. The social and economic worlds of 
the 21st century are simply not at all like this. In the real world we are 
far more aware than ever before of the choices, decisions, behaviours 
and opinions of other people. In 1900, not much more than 10 per 
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cent of the world’s population lived in cities. Now, for the first time in 
human history, more than half of us do, in close, everyday proximity to 
large numbers of other people. In addition, since the end of the 20th 
century the internet has revolutionised communications in a way not 
experienced since the invention of the printing press 500 years earlier.
So the assumption that people make choices in isolation, that they do not 
adopt different tastes or opinions simply because other people have them, 
is no longer sustainable. Perhaps – and it is a big ‘perhaps’ – a century or 
so ago this was a reasonable assumption to make, but no longer.
The choices people make, their attitudes and their opinions are 
influenced directly by others and the medium across which this influence 
spreads is social networks. Commonly, social networks are thought of 
as purely a web-based phenomenon: sites such as Facebook, Twitter 
and MySpace. These online social networks indeed can influence 
behaviour, but it is real-life social networks – such as family, friends, 
colleagues – that are even more important in helping us shape our 
preferences and beliefs, what we like and what we do not like.
Network	effects
The fact that a person can and often does decide to change his or her 
preferences simply on the basis of what others do is known in economics 
as network effects. Also called network externalities or demand-side 
economies of scale, network effects pervade the modern world. 
Network effects have in fact been pervasive throughout human history. 
A crucial feature of human behaviour is our propensity to copy or imitate 
the behaviours, choices and opinions of others. We can see it, for 
example, in the fashions in pottery in the Middle Eastern Hittite Empire of 
three and a half millennia ago. And we can see it today in the behaviour 
of traders on financial markets, where the propensity to follow the 
herd can lead all too easily to the booms and crashes experienced by 
economies around the world. 
Networks are especially important in finance. When, in September 
2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, it precipitated a crisis that 
almost led to a total collapse of the world economy and a repeat of 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was precisely because Lehman 
was connected into a network of other banks that the situation was 
so serious. Lehman’s bankruptcy could easily have led to a cascade 
of bankruptcies across the global financial network, initially in those 
institutions to which Lehman owed money, and then spreading wider 
and wider across the entire network as more and more institutions 
became exposed. Incredibly, neither the systems of financial regulations 
which were in place, nor the thinking of mainstream economics that 
influenced policy so strongly, took any account of the possibility of such 
a network effect. Ironically, policymakers and the financial establishment 
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thought that risk could be mitigated by spreading it across the system 
in the form of securitisation and the slicing up of risky assets. They 
misunderstood completely the dynamics of financial networks and the 
possibility that such networks would not reduce risk but instead would 
trigger uncertainty and upheaval.
A world in which network effects are a driving force of behaviour is 
completely different from the world of conventional economics, in 
which isolated individuals carefully weigh up the costs and benefits of 
any particular course of action. A world in which network effects are 
important is a much more realistic description of the human social and 
economic worlds which actually exist in the 21st century. Incentives, of 
course, have not disappeared as a driver of human behaviour: it is still 
the case that if, say, Pepsi raises its price compared to Coca-Cola, more 
Coke and less Pepsi will be sold. This is the world that conventional 
economic theory describes. It is not wrong, but it is often misleading. It 
offers only a very partial account of how decisions are made in reality, 
where network effects can have far greater influence on behaviour than 
incentives. Network effects, in fact, can completely swamp the impact 
of incentives, leading to very different outcomes to the ones intended by 
those who altered the incentives, whether they are companies or public 
policymakers.
Network effects require policymakers, whether in the public or corporate 
spheres, to have a markedly different view of how the world operates. 
They make successful policy much harder to implement and they help 
explain many of the failures of policies that are based on the view that 
incentives, rather than network effects, are the key drivers of behaviour. 
Understanding the influence of network effects and harnessing our 
knowledge of how they work in practice, however, opens up the 
possibility of far more effective and successful economic policies.
Why	we	need	a	new	intellectual	foundation	of	policy
We might reasonably reflect that we are very much better off than we 
were in, say, the middle of the 20th century. Over this period, we have 
had a great deal of state activity, of public policy interventions in both 
social and economic problems based on the model of economically 
rational agents: that agents respond solely to incentives. Network effects 
and copying are entirely absent from this model. So why do we need a 
new perspective on policy at all? Surely we have done well using the old 
model, especially when boosted by the addition of the late 20th century 
insights into asymmetric information and the principle of ‘market failure’?
A distinguishing feature of the social and economic history of the 
second half of the 20th century is the enormous rise in the role of the 
state throughout the western world. Gradually, many of the functions 
previously within the domain of the third or private sectors have been 
embraced within the public sector. President Roosevelt’s New Deal 
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in the US in the 1930s was bitterly denounced by critics at the time 
as being nothing less than socialism. But the percentage share of 
the whole economy accounted for by the spending of the Federal 
government then was not much more than half of what it was under 
Ronald Reagan 50 years later. Likewise, the most avowedly socialist 
government in the history of the UK was that of Clement Attlee from 
1945 to 1951. Yet the share of the public sector in the economy as 
a whole under Attlee was less than it was during the government of 
Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990), renowned for her robust approach to 
the privatisation of state activities.
The intellectual underpinning of the burgeoning activity of the state has 
been provided by mainstream economics. Paradoxically, a theoretical 
construct which purports to establish the efficiency of the free market 
has justified an enormously enhanced role for the state. It is not just 
the sheer size of the public sector, but the range of private activities 
which the state now tries to influence or control: either through direct 
regulation or through exhortations to avoid behaviours deemed 
inappropriate by civil servants, such as those which lead to obesity 
or the consumption of anything more than small amounts of alcohol. 
Generations of policymakers have been raised to have a mechanistic 
view of the world, and a checklist mentality: to achieve a particular 
set of aims, draw up a list of policies, and simply tick them off. It is a 
comforting environment in which to live, being seemingly dependable, 
predictable and controllable. 
The concept of ‘market failure’, at first sight a critique of free market 
economics, has provided powerful backing to state intervention. If 
markets, for whatever reason, are unable to function in practice as 
the theory suggests they should, then regulation, taxes, incentives of 
all shapes and forms, are justified. They are justified in order to make 
the imperfect world conform to the perfect one of economic theory. 
Economists slip all too easily into the attitude that their core theory 
does not merely purport to describe how the world actually is, it is a 
prescription for how the world ought to be.
The world view of free market economic theory is precisely one in which 
rational agents are able to make optimal decisions and achieve the 
best possible outcome in any particular set of circumstances. And so 
behaviour can be influenced by the appropriate set of incentives selected 
by the authorities. Indeed, we see a vast array of taxes, subsidies and 
benefits, all aimed at achieving precise and detailed outcomes. And 
where there are obstacles to agents making the best choice, where there 
is ‘market failure’, the clever, rational planner can intervene to ensure that 
the world works as the theory deems it should do.
We have now had over 60 years of this vision. It is fundamentally 
different from anything seen before in the western world, except during 
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the two world wars. And yet, the stark fact is that the combination of 
large-scale state activity and a mechanistic intellectual approach to 
policymaking has simply not delivered anything like the success that 
the founding fathers of the post-second world war social settlement 
imagined would be the case. Deep social and economic problems 
remain. For example, both the average rate of unemployment and the 
range within which it varies are scarcely any different in the six decades 
since the end of the second world war to the same period preceding it. 
If policy planners were supposed to achieve anything, then surely – in 
the wake of the massive unemployment that was the scourge of the 
west in the early 1930s – it was very low levels of unemployment. To be 
fair, the maximum rates of unemployment in the west have not hit the 
heights of the Great Depression, but unemployment has consistently 
remained a serious problem and in 2012 stands at an alarmingly high 
level in many countries. 
Taking a long-term view, averaging over decades, the unemployment 
rates are very similar in the pre- and post-second world war periods. 
In the US, the pre-war average was 7 per cent compared to just under 
6 per cent post-war; in the UK the two averages are virtually identical 
at around 5.5 per cent; while in Germany, for example, the average 
unemployment rate since the second world war, at just over 5 per cent, 
is even higher than the pre-war average of some 4 per cent.
Other social and economic problems also remain deeply rooted. 
Comparing crime rates over time is difficult, but despite sharp falls 
since the mid-1990s in both the US and Britain, for example, crime 
is everywhere much higher now than it was in 1950. Meanwhile, the 
distribution of income and wealth has widened dramatically, while 
rational planning and clever regulation designed to cope with ‘market 
failure’ did not prevent the biggest economic recession since the 1930s 
from taking place in 2008/09.
However, the principal cause of the failure of what we might describe 
as the post-war western model to achieve its objectives is not the size 
of the state but the intellectual framework in which it operates. The 
differences between the centre-right and centre-left within this model 
have been of merely second-order importance. Both the main parts of 
the political spectrum have embraced not only a much greater role for 
the state than obtained before the second world war, but have shared 
this same intellectual vision. At heart, from this perspective the world is 
seen as a machine, admittedly a complicated one, but one that can be 
controlled with the right pressure on this button, just the right amount 
of pull on that lever. It is a world in which everything can be quantified 
and targets can not only be set, they can be achieved thanks to the 
cleverness of experts. But the world is simply not like this. It is a much 
more complex, much less controllable place than ‘rational’ planners 
believe. Policy is very difficult to get right.
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What	are	the	implications?
The ability to gauge in advance the reaction of agents to changes 
in policy is seriously weakened in situations where they base their 
actions, choices and opinions in part on those of others on the relevant 
network. So even if, by some miracle, we know for certain how any 
given agent will react to a policy change now, there is no guarantee that 
the response will be the same tomorrow, next week, or in six months’ 
time. The response will depend to a greater or lesser extent on how 
others react. This may seem obvious. But these things are not taken into 
account either in many ex-ante assessments of the policy terrain, or in 
the ex-post analysis of the impact of policies. The introduction of these 
fundamental features of reality into the picture rapidly leads to great 
uncertainty about the consequences of any given action.
A fundamental feature of any system in which network effects are 
important is that it is ‘robust yet fragile’. The collection of individuals who 
make up a network will, most of the time, exhibit stability with respect to 
most of the ‘shocks’ the network receives when a few agents change 
their opinion or their behaviour. The system is stable in the sense that 
most shocks make very little difference, they are absorbed, shrugged 
off, and few other agents change either their minds or their behaviour 
as a result. So the network is ‘robust’. But, every so often, a particular 
shock may have a dramatic effect. So the network is also ‘fragile’. The 
behaviour of individuals across the whole, or almost the whole, of any 
particular network might be altered.
An example from the physical world is power grids. Minor outages 
occur all the time, but the loss of power is confined to a local area. Very 
occasionally, however, a small outage triggers a cascade on a large 
geographical scale. The connectivity of the power grid enables this to 
happen. A small event has a dramatic consequence, in ways which are 
extremely difficult to anticipate in advance.
The build-up to the financial crisis after 2007 is an illustration of the 
same principles. In the normal course of business, there is a large 
volume of interbank loans, of banks lending and borrowing money to 
and from each other. By the early summer of 2007, a few commentators 
had begun to express doubts about the sustainability of the economic 
boom. Their particular concern was the huge levels of debt which were 
building up in the private sector. But this was not perceived in general 
to be a problem. Banks continued to be happy to lend and borrow from 
each other as usual. Then, suddenly, in August, confidence among 
banks evaporated. The interbank lending market froze. Nothing had 
really changed in the economic fundamentals. No drastic event had 
occurred. The network of confidence across the banking sector simply 
proved fragile, and pessimism spread like wildfire.
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This freezing of the interbank loans market led, of course, to the demise 
of Northern Rock in the autumn of 2007. As a salutary reminder of 
the perils of conventional thinking, John McFall, then chairman of the 
Treasury select committee, proclaimed at the time: ‘The banking system 
in the United Kingdom is strong. We’ve had 60 quarters of continued 
growth, the world economy has grown for the past five years. So it’s 
against a strong background ... Northern Rock will be able to carry on 
its business.’ I suppose he can hardly be blamed: the government had, 
after all, used its formidable intellectual and planning powers to abolish 
boom and bust!
The belief that clever people, with sufficient thought, really can be social 
engineers and design the perfect society is very deeply embedded. Just 
as real engineers can design bridges that work exactly as intended, 
so the vision of society and the economy as machines encourages 
policymakers to take the same view of their ability to design human 
behaviour. But it is no longer relevant, if it ever was, to most aspects of 
human social and economic behaviour. This is why the network effects 
view of behaviour is so challenging. I have heard frequent arguments 
along the lines: this is all very well, these networks seem very clever, but 
you lack clear guidelines about what we should actually do to solve a 
problem. If we use the economically rational approach, we know what 
to do.
The latter point is an obvious non sequitur. The economic rational agent 
model is indeed capable of providing policymakers with an exact answer 
to a problem: in order to achieve X, do Y. But all too often, doing Y 
leads to Z, or even to what we might call ‘minus X’ – in other words, the 
complete opposite of what was intended. During 2011, for example, 
there was constant concern about the state of Europe’s economies, 
and the future of both the euro and the eurozone. Periodically, the 
French president or the German chancellor or the head of the European 
Commission made a statement intended to calm the markets, or the 
European Central Bank intervened in the bond market with the same 
intention in mind. But instead of recovering, the markets often fell further. 
This way of thinking about policy does not provide control, merely the 
illusion of control.
These criticisms do not apply simply to the centre-left, where the often 
uncritical elevation of public bureaucracy into a ‘good thing’ has become 
a hallmark. A sharp distinction also needs to be made between the 
network approach to understanding both society and the economy 
and, on the other hand, the Chicago, free market approach beloved 
of the centre-right. Ironically, this latter modus operandi is the mirror 
image of the ‘clever planner’ concept of policymaking. So, if the correct 
set of prices – read incentives – can be put in place, all markets will 
operate efficiently, and no resources will be left unused; all markets will 
clear. The role of the state is minimal. But how are these prices ever to 
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be discovered? Economic theory gives no guidance here at all, and is 
forced to rely on a mythical creature called the Auctioneer to perform 
this task. It is merely a short step from this vision of the world to the 
bureaucrat and his or her belief that the right benefit, the right tax rate, 
the right regulation can be set in order to achieve any desired aim.
In any event, the network view of the world inherently gives rise to the 
concept of collective action. If a set of values spreads across a network, 
the behaviour of the individual component parts is altered by these 
emergent, collective values. The agents in the network are not isolated 
individuals, but operate in society and have their behaviour, at least in 
part, shaped by society. 
Take, for example, the issue of drink-driving. In most social circles today, 
driving after drinking substantial amounts of alcohol is the subject of 
strong disapproval. But this was not always the case. When Barbara 
Castle introduced drink-driving legislation in the late 1960s, it met with 
strong resistance and was widely ignored. Many of the late-night heavy 
drinkers in my uncle’s pub on the moors above Bolton were the police 
themselves. Gradually, however, a different set of attitudes spread 
across social networks and drink-driving has become very much less 
widespread than it was then. Even though the penalties are severe, the 
chances of being caught remain very low. It is the social norms that have 
emerged rather than the legislation which keep drink-driving incidents 
down. A contrast is provided by attitudes to the speed limit, especially 
on motorways and fast dual carriageways. The 70mph limit has very 
little social acceptance and is routinely ignored, again despite penalties 
if caught. On the M40 motorway, for example, more vehicles travel at 
speeds in excess of the legal speed limit than at 70mph or below. 
So, sometimes traditional legislation works – and its impact is boosted 
by emergent social norms – and sometimes it does not. But the key 
feature of both the drink-driving and the speed limit examples is that 
it is the social norm, emerging across networks, which is critical. This 
collective feature of the network exercises a powerful influence on the 
behaviour of the individual agents within the network.
As an illustration of a specific policy area, we might usefully think 
about local unemployment rates across the UK. Over time, these vary 
according to the overall state of the economy. But there is a remarkable 
and worrying stability in relative unemployment rates across different 
local areas. If we rank local authority areas by their unemployment rates 
and see how the rankings change over time, as a broad generalisation 
they barely change at all – even over a 20-year period. The correlation 
between the rankings now and 20 years ago is as high as 0.85. In other 
words, an area with a relatively high or low unemployment rate 20 years 
ago has a very strong chance of having a high or low one now. These 
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strong correlations can be observed not merely across the country as a 
whole, but even within individual counties.
Billions of pounds have been spent trying to change this situation, 
through bodies such as the regional development agencies, with little 
effect. Conventional policies have failed.
Instead, the problem can be seen as one of networks, in which the 
spread of culture and attitudes is just as, and possibly even more, 
important as standard economic considerations. A key point here is 
that when network effects are present, the most effective policies are 
unlikely to be generic, across-the-board changes to incentives. Careful 
prior analysis and thoughtful targeting become the order of the day. If 
we can get it right, or even approximately right, less can be more. Fewer 
resources used more intelligently can potentially lead to much more 
effective strategies.
Altering the structure of the network might itself also become a policy 
target, and one which could have powerful effects. At a very local level 
– even in poor towns – different public housing schemes, with residents 
from essentially identical socioeconomic backgrounds, can exhibit quite 
different levels of worklessness. A culture can readily evolve in which an 
income from benefits supplemented by petty crime and casual labour 
becomes the social norm. In short, it is essential to take into account the 
fact that people live in a social context, and the particular circumstances 
of their various social networks can have a decisive influence on their 
decisions.
The most important way in which people find jobs is through personal 
contact. A vacancy is heard about through a friend, a family member, a 
neighbour. In turn, the fact that such individuals are the source of your 
information may send a signal to the prospective employer, especially 
from your informant who already works there. In an informal way, you are 
being recommended.
For professionals, the idea of networking – making personal contact as 
a key means of advancement – is second nature. But the same effect 
occurs at all levels of skill and qualification. Social networks are the 
single most important avenue for the individual to discover that a job 
vacancy exists. They are much more important than formal channels 
such as newspapers, the internet, recruitment agencies or public 
employment services. And from the point of view of the employer, the 
grapevine is less risky than recruiting from the open market, because 
they have additional information about the recruit.
Equally, however, the network of connections the residents have to the 
world of employment may just be too sparse. They simply do not hear 
about vacancies because not enough of them are in the loop, as it were. 
So policy in this instance should be directed towards increasing the 
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social connections of the residents with the world of work, of altering 
the structure of the network so that it is easier for information about job 
vacancies to spread among the workless residents. And at the same 
time, the stronger these connections become, the greater the chance 
that a different social norm, that of being in work – even if it is low-paid 
– will spread. Exactly how this is achieved, or attempted, will depend a 
great deal upon purely local circumstances, of particular knowledge of 
the area.
Conclusion
The recognition of the fundamental importance of networks for 
outcomes in the modern social and economic worlds does not mean 
that governments are powerless. Instead it calls for smarter government 
rather than no government. It almost certainly means fewer state 
bureaucrats, working in an outdated intellectual framework, searching 
for the elusive silver bullet which is guaranteed to solve a problem.
The silver bullet of this approach is that there are no silver 
bullets. Instead, we need to rely much more on the processes of 
experimentation and discovery. A key influence on behaviour in many 
social and economic contexts is the prevailing social norm in the 
relevant network, which emerges from the interactions of the individuals 
who comprise the network. But there are no levers, no magic buttons 
to press, which will guarantee that social norms can be altered in ways 
which the policymaker desires. We can only discover what works by 
experiment. 
This does not mean that we are operating in the dark, that the 
success or otherwise of a policy is merely a matter of chance. The 
more knowledge we have of how people are connected on the 
relevant network, of who might influence whom and when, the more 
chance a policy has of succeeding. Much of this knowledge is held 
at decentralised levels in tacit form, a form which is hard or even 
impossible to codify. But it is crucial to how most social and economic 
systems work in practice. 
Our current political institutions are to a large extent based on the vision 
of society and the economy operating like machines, populated by 
economically rational agents. This view of the world leads to centralised 
bureaucracies and centralised decision-making. We live in a society 
where decisions are made through several layers of bureaucracy, in both 
the public and private sectors. On the whole, this leads to decisions that 
are insensitive to local (micro) conditions, and which are insensitive to 
society as it changes.
A lack of both resilience and robustness is a characteristic feature of 
such approaches to social and economic management. Structures, 
rules, regulations, incentives are put in place in the belief that a desired 
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outcome can be achieved, that a potential crisis can be predicted and 
forestalled by such policies. As the recent financial crisis illustrates 
only too well, this view of the world is ill-suited to creating systems 
which are resilient when unexpected shocks occur, and which exhibit 
robustness in their ability to recover from the shock. The focus of policy 
needs to shift away from prediction and control. We can never predict 
the unpredictable. Instead, we need systems which exhibit resilience 
and robustness together with the ability to adapt and respond well to 
unpredictable future events.
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‘Between	the	operations	of	the	public	and	the	private	sectors	
there	is	often	no	clear	boundary.	Central	and	local	government	
stand	in	a	similarly	intricate	relationship	…	As	the	tasks	of	
government	have	grown	and	become	more	complex,	so	the	
need	to	consult	and	coordinate	has	grown	as	well.’	
When do you think this statement was made? 
If I said it was from last year’s Open Public Services white paper, few 
people would think twice: the complexity created by public and private 
sector relationships, and the corresponding need for a more open, 
consultative approach, seem unique to our current situation. In fact, they 
were pressing enough for Lord Fulton to make this claim on page 2 of 
his report on the structure of the civil service back in 1968.1 
At the same time, we often talk as if ‘complexity’ is a challenge that is 
specific to governments of the past twenty years, brought about by 
globalisation and the internet (among many other causes). But even 35 
years ago, one commentator could label as an ‘accepted cliché’ the 
idea that contemporary societies were ‘experiencing unprecedented 
rates of change, and that they have been drawn together by trade and 
mass communications into a global village’.2 
Of course, there is plenty of evidence that the task of governing society 
has become significantly more complex.3 I mention this past history 
to stress that simply diagnosing government and society as ‘complex’ 
can distract us from what is new and interesting: our improved 
understanding of complexity and the ways it could be applied to 
enhance government.4 
And there clearly is a need to think differently about the way policy 
actors and institutions approach complexity. Broadly speaking, recent 
1	 HMSO	1968
2	 Parker	et	al	1977
3	 See	Pierre	and	Peters	2005
4	 See	Klijn	2008:	299–317
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governments have attempted to deal with complex challenges by a more 
sophisticated application of traditional, linear thinking: more analysis and 
evidence reviews, more detailed strategies and plans, more rigorous 
performance monitoring.5 In other words, we retain a centralised, 
directing policy ‘brain’; it is just better informed and more responsive. 
Unfortunately, there is much evidence that this approach has had limited 
success when applied to the twin challenges outlined above: the com-
plexity of the public sphere, and the complexity of the problems govern-
ment faces.6 As was clear even in 1968, realising policies in practice 
involves many different actors joined through interlocking relationships.7 
The important point is that often the way these actors respond to each 
other does not constitute a ‘complicated’ system, which could theoreti-
cally be mapped and understood, given effort. Rather, it is ‘complex’, and 
characterised by rapid change, uncertainty and limited predictability.8
This means that an apparently self-contained policy may produce 
wide-ranging and unintended effects in another part of the public 
policy system. For example, schedule 21 of the 2003 Criminal Justice 
Act focused on setting sentencing levels for the most serious crimes. 
However, as former Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf has commented, ‘the 
[criminal justice] system strives for consistency not only between people 
who are convicted of the same offence, but between those convicted 
of offences in the system as a whole’. Therefore, although the policy 
focused on a particular goal (sentences for serious crimes), it ‘affect[ed] 
sentencing right down the system’.9
But complexity theory offers something more than an explanation of 
the problems encountered by approaches that base success solely on 
analysing, planning and controlling. The concept of a complex adaptive 
system reveals credible new strategies for governing.10
A complex adaptive system is a dynamic network of many agents, who 
each act according to individual strategies or routines. These agents 
have many connections with each other, so they are constantly both 
acting and reacting to what others are doing. At the same time, they are 
adapting to the environment they find themselves in. Because actors are 
so interrelated, changes are not linear or straightforward: small changes 
can cascade into big consequences; equally, major efforts can produce 
little apparent change.11
5	 Jones	2011:	5
6	 For	an	extended	account,	see	Chapman	2004
7	 See	Ostrom	et	al	1961
8	 Teisman	et	al	2009
9	 Lord	Woolf,	House	of	Lords	Hansard,	27	May	2010,	col	147.	http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/100527-0003.htm	
10	 See	Duit	and	Galaz	2008	,	Boviard	2008:	319–340
11	 This	definition	is	taken	from	many	different	sources,	including:	Axlerod	and	Cohen	1999;	Klijn	2008:	
299–317;	and	New	Synthesis	of	Public	Administration	2009.	
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The crucial point is that coherent behaviour can emerge from the 
interactions between these various actors. This ‘emergent’ behaviour 
can arise from the aggregation of actions that, in themselves, are simple; 
the system therefore produces something greater than the sum of its 
parts. This chimes with recent findings from political science (see for 
example Poteete et al 2010) that individuals and organisations have a 
greater capacity to self-organise than traditional policy analyses would 
indicate. And, since these actors are adapting to their environments, 
they are more likely to produce effective ways of addressing the 
challenges they face. 
In other words, it may be most effective to allow the systems in the 
public sphere to tackle complex problems through the power of 
adaptation and emergence, rather than attempting to direct and control 
according to a rigid, preformed plan. This notion has been called the 
‘diversity hypothesis’ (Duit and Galaz 2010): that institutional and 
organisational diversity is the best way of coping with complexity.12 A 
complex governance system may be most able to deal with complex 
problems. Thus, we can now look at complexity for new insights into 
how to enhance government, rather than just seeing it as a challenge 
governments have to address.
Encouraging	system	stewardship
The obvious question is: how can we use these ideas to rethink the 
institutions and structures of government? But perhaps the first thing 
to ask is what they suggest about the way we rethink institutions and 
structures. 
In broad terms, the way we think about central government 
organisations still owes much to the 1918 Haldane Report, which 
addressed the question ‘Upon what principle are the functions of 
Departments to be determined and allocated?’13 Rather than structuring 
government functions around particular groups in society, the report 
recommended ‘defining the field of activity in the case of each 
Department according to the particular service which it renders to the 
community as a whole’.14 The idea of organising institutions around 
abstract functions such as ‘Health’ or ‘Education’ was born.
As we have seen, there are reasons to be cautious about addressing 
complex goals through a top-down design that breaks down the 
issue into separate parts, each tackling a defined problem as part of 
a comprehensive and cohesive solution.15 If the goal is simple and 
the system well understood, this will be fine; but increasingly this is 
12	 The	diversity	hypothesis	originated	in	W	Ross	Ashby’s	‘Law	of	Requisite	Variety’	(Ashby	1956),	which	
states	that	a	regulator	or	manager	with	more	flexibility	of	behaviour	will	have	more	capacity	to	control	
a	system,	since	‘only	variety	can	destroy	variety’.	
13	 Ministry	of	Reconstruction	1918:	7
14	 ibid:	8
15	 Kay	2010:	chapters	7	and	8
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not the case. Designing departments this way can lead to disruptive 
reorganisations: a new analysis of ‘the problem’ can seem to demand 
a new, abstract design to be imposed on messy reality. As White and 
Dunleavy (2010) note, in the UK thirty departments were affected by 
reorganisations between 1997 and 2009, at a cost of at least £15 million 
for each department created.  
Thinking about complex adaptive systems suggests a different 
approach: identify the kind of behaviours that are likely to be most 
effective in addressing complex challenges, and then consider how 
institutions may enable them.16 I am not proposing that every specific 
behaviour is mapped, along the lines of standard operating procedures. 
Rather, I propose that general principles of perception and behaviour 
should be identified, as a first step to developing institutions that guide 
(but not specify) how individuals act under conditions of complexity. 
For central government, we can identify a set of principles that are likely 
to be particularly suited to current challenges. They can be grouped 
under the term ‘system stewardship’.17 System stewardship involves 
two main tasks: choosing the approach, and oversight.18 
Choosing the approach
As noted above, a policy is not just made and then executed; it is 
made and constantly re-made by many players interacting in a system. 
Rather than just being undesirable ‘drift’ from a plan, the way policy is 
re-made may produce a better outcome, since actors can adapt to their 
environment to achieve an overall goal. But system stewards need to 
have the capacity to judge when to rely on the adaptive power of the 
system, and when to be more directive. Elsewhere, we have proposed 
detailed criteria for making this judgment (see Hallsworth 2011).
Oversight 
The second task is oversight. Until local accountability flourishes, central 
government still has a role in ensuring that public policy goals are met. 
System stewardship involves policymakers overseeing the ways in which 
policies are being adapted, and attempting to steer the system towards 
certain outcomes, if appropriate. 
Again, we can break this task down into four key aspects. The way 
that these aspects are realised will depend on the approach chosen; 
they may be performed in a very directive way. However, for reasons of 
simplicity I have presented each aspect as if the system steward had 
decided to take a more ‘adaptive’ approach. 
16	 This	does	not	mean	I	believe	institutions	are	simply	aggregations	of	individual	actions.	Institutions	
also	shape	the	behaviour	of	their	members.	See	March	and	Olson	1984.
17	 These	ideas	are	explored	in	full	in	Hallsworth	2011.
18	 Although	my	comments	are	aimed	mainly	at	central	government,	system	stewards	vary	according	to	
the	policy	issue,	and	can	exist	at	any	‘level’	of	government.	Nevertheless,	central	government	is	likely	
to	retain	responsibility	for	overall	system	functioning.
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The first aspect is setting goals. Both ministers and civil servants agree 
that a clear sense of direction is essential for good government (see 
Hallsworth et al 2011). But imposing a set of detailed yet continually 
shifting goals is likely to be ineffective. If the policy issue is complex, 
then these goals need to be sufficiently strategic or high-level that they 
provide shared direction for the system, while also being resilient in the 
face of the adaptation that is likely to occur. System stewards can also 
act as ‘gatekeepers’ for the system, ensuring it is not overloaded with 
too many specific priorities.
There is also a need to develop rules. As Holland (1995, 1998) has 
explained, actors within complex adaptive systems generally guide 
their actions by a core set of rules or principles, even if the way their 
behaviours combine is complex. Therefore, rather than prescribing every 
action, system stewards may be better off setting a few such ‘rules’ for 
actors – who will then act and adapt to further their own self-interests.19 
In government, these rules may include incentive structures, minimum 
standards, boundaries, and principles to guide action.20
System stewards need to receive feedback to understand how policies 
are emerging in practice. More flexible, inquiring modes of monitoring and 
evaluation will be required in order to capture better the informal feedback 
coming from the system actors, which can indicate how the system is 
coping. Central government has to be much more comfortable in searching 
out experience and ideas, networking, facilitating, and understanding 
complexity. System stewards will also need to recognise that actors do not 
need rational plans to be effective. They may rely on learnt ability, informal 
know-how or metis, the ‘practical skills that underwrite any complex activity’ 
and upon which formal order often depends.21
The final role is that of response to this feedback. Increasingly, 
policymakers are likely to be in the situation of trying to steer a system 
in the absence of direct control. This could be done through advocacy, 
changing incentives or prices, influencing citizens, catalysing the spread 
of ideas, building the capacity of system actors, or creating greater 
transparency.
System stewardship does not preclude the use of directive approaches 
and plans from central government. If a planned, directive approach is 
judged to be best, then it should be adopted. The point is that when 
choosing an intervention (whatever it may be), policymakers should be 
thinking in terms of overseeing a whole system, rather than discrete 
initiatives. 
19	 See	Boviard	2008:	324–325,	Rhodes	and	MacKechnie	2003	
20	 See	Lerner	and	Tetlock	1999	for	evidence	that	basing	accountability	on	principles,	rather	than	
outcomes,	increases	the	cognitive	effort	put	into	decisions.	
21	 See	Scott	1998:	331.	To	see	how	important	this	know-how	is,	consider	that	actually	obeying	all	
the	rules	of	an	organisation	is	one	of	the	most	effective	ways	of	disrupting	it	–	that	is	why	unions	
sometimes	choose	to	‘work	to	rule’.
IPPR  |  Complex new world: Translating new economic thinking into public policy44
Rethinking	policy	actors,	institutions	and	structures
If central government is increasingly in the position of stewarding 
complexity, we need to reconsider four main aspects of the nature and 
roles of institutions: the relationship between central and local levels; 
the balance between stability and flexibility; feedback and learning; and 
politics.
The relationship between central and local levels 
We will need to adjust processes that are based on the notion that the 
centre’s role is to provide ‘the solution’ to complex problems.22 Instead, 
this role should increasingly involve creating the conditions for others 
(foundation trusts, teachers, businesses and citizens) to deal with 
problems using innovative and adaptive approaches. 
Decentralisation is the obvious corollary of this approach. As Swanson 
and Bhadwal (2009: 92) explain, Greater decentralisation can help 
shorten the feedback loops that inform decision-making, so actors can 
respond more quickly to developments. Lower transaction costs may 
also make it easier to generate ‘open source policy’ that includes a 
greater variety of actors in diagnosing problems and creating solutions.23 
As noted above, issues may need to be dealt with at different levels 
of governance. This implies, according to Swinney et al (2011) that it 
may be helpful to have a diverse range of platforms and actors, such 
as mayors, with effective information flows between these levels. At the 
extreme of decentralisation, it may be that non-state actors combine 
and create their own institutions from the bottom up, leading to more 
‘polycentric governance’ (Jones 2011: 21). There is some evidence 
(Brondizo et al 2009) that these self-organised systems have a range of 
benefits, including enhanced innovation, learning and trust, and more 
equitable and sustainable outcomes. However, they may also present 
problems of coordination and accountability.
A crucial role for system stewards will be to give the system clear goals. 
For example, since 2007 the Scottish government has developed 
a single defined purpose and set of national outcomes. In turn, the 
relationship between central and local tiers has changed. A 2007 
Concordat agreed that the former would ‘set the direction of policy 
and the over-arching outcomes’, but ‘stand back from micro-managing 
service delivery’.24 At the same time, Elvidge (2001: 35) argues, 
Edinburgh would progressively reduce the proportion of its funding 
22	 In	the	following	sections,	I	use	the	term	‘the	centre’	to	refer	to	central	concentrations	of	power	that	
have	traditionally	undertaken	policy	development	and	direction	(for	example	Whitehall,	Edinburgh).	
Therefore,	the	term	does	not	equate	exactly	to	central	government,	since	it	attempts	to	exclude	those	
parts	of	central	government	which	are	geographically	decentralised	and	which	have	traditionally	
taken	direction	from	‘the	centre’	for	example	Jobcentre	Plus,	Highways	Agency).	
23	 This	is	different	from	an	‘open	source	policy’	model	that	simply	uses	the	internet	to	widen	policy	
suggestions	for	civil	servants	to	consider,	along	the	lines	of	an	enhanced	consultation.	See	also	
Bason	2010.
24	 See	http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/923/0054147.pdf	
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to local government that was ringfenced. Rather than councils being 
directed through multiple performance measures, they would have 
to work towards a Single Outcome Agreement, aligned to the set 
of national outcomes, with much greater freedom as to the specific 
approaches taken. 
More fundamentally, the power balance between the centre and the rest 
of the system may change. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) have noted that 
for various reasons, including New Public Management reforms, ‘policy 
development’ has been seen as the responsibility of the former; power 
and prestige have been focused there. ‘Policy execution’ has been seen 
as a menial task to be undertaken under direction by agencies or local 
government. 
This separation is misleading, and always has been.25 In the future this 
will be increasingly apparent; the ‘real’ policymaking, the real power and 
challenge, may be seen to lie in localities or ‘delivery’ roles. In contrast, 
as Kickert et al (1997) have pointed out, the centre will act more as 
a broker, capacity builder, adviser, arbitrator, convenor, connector, 
motivator and facilitator of others’ collaborations. Some of the changes 
that will be required to fulfil these roles are given below.
The stability–flexibility balance
How can stewards be part of the system yet supervise it? Continuity 
through stewardship and change through adaptation seem to be in 
conflict. And so they are: reconciling the demands for flexibility and 
stability is seen as the ‘fundamental tension’ in applying complexity 
thinking to governance.26 Whitehall in particular needs the capacity to 
both adapt to new challenges, and also to provide attentive, constant 
oversight of a system.  
Recent years have seen attempts to tackle institutional inertia in central 
departments. There has been a move to flexible policy ‘pools’, which 
can allow resources to be deployed more quickly to emerging priorities, 
rather than leaving them locked into standing teams (Hallsworth et 
al 2011). However, so far it seems that governance of these pools is 
not yet adequate: resource allocation, overall departmental objectives 
and policy commissioning are not fully aligned. We have proposed 
(Hallsworth and Rutter 2001) that one solution may be to create a 
departmental ‘policy director’, who works closely with the minister to 
commission policymaking within the department, thus breaking the 
inertia created by directorates-general.  
The problem, of course, is that the logic of flexible policy pools 
encourages us to see the role of the centre as launching a series of 
individual projects, not overseeing a system. Therefore, the stability 
25	 See	Hallsworth	2011	
26	 See	Duit	and	Galaz	2010,	Chapman	2004:	61
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function also needs to be enhanced. Officials at the centre need to be 
able to build up expertise, judgment and relationships in a particular area. 
They also need to ensure their area is resilient to the sudden, unexpected 
events that complex systems can produce. This can be done through 
horizon-scanning, scenario-planning, foresight exercises, prototyping, 
systems mapping, computer-based modelling, and maintaining a 
sophisticated understanding of how the system is developing.27 These 
are not just defensive manoeuvres: as Boyd (2001: 2) suggests, systems 
that are resilient enough to respond to unexpected events can also use 
the opportunity to innovate and open up new future paths.
But current career structures limit the incentive to carry out these 
functions, since success is equated to the number of people one 
manages, not the expertise one possesses.28 New ways (perhaps 
alternate career paths) are needed for rewarding those with 
relationships, expertise and experience in one area, as happens for 
‘individual contributors’ in the private sector. 
Feedback and learning 
When dealing with complex problems, the most effective setup is likely 
to be the centre helping local areas to exploit their knowledge and 
adapt to their experiences, rather than the centre identifying the ‘best’ 
solution and training others to adopt it. This is not a new idea; Donald 
Schön proposed it some 40 years ago in Beyond the stable state. 
Schön (1973: 28) claimed that in response to increasing uncertainty, it is 
not enough to keep intervening to modify institutions; rather, ‘we must 
invent and develop institutions which are “learning systems”’, which are 
‘capable of bringing about their own continuing transformation.’ This 
task has never been more pressing. 
The problem is that one of the main learning mechanisms, policy 
evaluation, does not function very well.29 Most politicians and civil 
servants doubt whether Whitehall learns from evaluations: lessons often 
do not feed back into policy design or problem formulation. In other 
words, evaluations are often commissioned but equally often ignored. 
One principal reason is that evaluations are usually commissioned and 
managed by the same department that carried out the policy. This can 
lead to departments setting a narrow question that reduces cross-
government learning, and ‘toning down’ critical yet useful findings.
So, there is a case for departments losing their monopoly on 
commissioning evaluations. Instead, they would have to negotiate with 
a central evaluation function. This does not mean that all evaluation 
would be centralised, since this can impede learning. Rather, this central 
function would have three sub-functions. First, overseeing or auditing 
27	 See	Mulgan	2009;	Sharpe	and	Van	der	Heijden	2007;	Lempert	et	al	2003
28	 See	Hallsworth	et	al	2011
29	 These	conclusions	and	recommendations	are	presented	in	Hallsworth	and	Rutter	2011.
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the quality of evaluations commissioned by departments. Second, 
running a process of open commissioning, which would take bids from 
evaluators to assess policies; this would open out the task of learning 
and encourage innovation. Third, commissioning ‘lessons learned’ 
exercises in cases of exceptional policy failure. Some of these could be 
public, like the recent report (IMF 2011) by the International Monetary 
Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office on the IMF’s role in the run-up to 
the financial crisis. 
Politics
Perhaps the most fundamental change will need to come from political 
actors and institutions. Currently, politics in the UK is founded on an 
adversarial model where each side offers a competing solution that is 
presented as if it is guaranteed to solve a problem totally. Insights from 
complexity suggest that this is both implausible and counterproductive. 
Rather than solutions, ‘policies [should] be treated as experiments, with 
the aim of promoting continual learning and adaptation in response to 
experience over time’, as John Dewey (1927) put it 85 years ago.
If politics were to draw on complexity thinking, there would be 
recognition that there is inherent uncertainty in how policies turn out – 
not because the policies are ‘bad’, but because success often lies in 
how governments adapt to the unanticipated effects their own actions 
produce. But currently all the focus is on whether ‘the policy’ was ‘right’, 
and adaptations are pilloried as ‘U-turns’. Of course, this does not 
excuse ineffective planning: governments should plan for anticipated 
future conditions; the point is, as Swanson and Bhadwal (2009: 15) 
warn, the unanticipated ones are likely to increase in frequency and 
impact.
In a sense, though, abandoning attempts to say there is a single, 
coherent and certain plan for success is an innately political stance: it 
recognises there are a range of incompatible perspectives, values and 
priorities that are addressed (and missed) by any solution. To govern 
may be to choose among these partial solutions; but their very partiality 
should give politicians greater freedom to modify them according to the 
feedback they generate. 
Indeed, it may be that we should abandon the idea that policies need 
to be entirely coherent in order to be successful. While an adversarial 
political system encourages us to see policy choices in a binary way, it 
may be, as Verweij and Thompson (2006) have argued, that we actually 
need ‘clumsy solutions for a complex world’. This concept, drawn from 
the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas, suggests that successful 
policies are ones that appeal to four mutually incompatible ‘cultural 
frames’ (hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian and fatalistic), not the 
ones that coherently adopt just one of these perspectives. The same 
may be true of our institutions.
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Conclusion
Theories of complexity offer new ways of thinking about government 
and governance. Not all areas of government activity are complex, and 
for those areas that are not, a more traditional, directive approach is 
likely to be best. But these areas are often not where the most pressing 
challenges lie. The insights from complexity can help where other 
approaches are failing, and here there is a strong case for governments 
using them.
But not over-using them. Adaptability should not be seen as a panacea 
for complex problems. Organisations can be over-sensitive to feedback, 
and thus fail to recognise that a lack of expected response does not 
mean failure – it can just be another example of how complex systems 
do not respond as expected. The action may actually be effective, but, 
as March (2003) asserts, ‘adaptive organisations are likely not to repeat 
the action, thus failing to accumulate the competence and experience 
that would reveal the true value of the action’. The process of applying 
complexity to government should itself be one that proceeds by 
experimentation, adaptation and learning.
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The dominant approach to economics and finance in the west advises 
freeing up the financial system to allow ‘the invisible hand’ to guide 
the services provided by financial institutions. The important role of 
allocating society’s capital is conducted through the provision of a 
number of these services so that savings products are directed to 
investment opportunities. Broadly speaking, market liberation has 
formed the core of successive governments’ approaches to the City 
since Margaret Thatcher gained power in 1979, including the Labour 
administrations of 1997 to 2010. In the UK, regulation by the Financial 
Services Authority was, and remains known as, ‘light touch’. 
Moreover, since the financial crisis began in August 2007, many 
exponents of free markets have argued that the crisis was due not to 
liberated financial markets but to bad public sector policies, including lax 
monetary policies and the implicit subsidisation of mortgage providers 
in the US, including by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Is this ‘external 
fault’ claim fair or is a largely private financial system inherently volatile? 
Should we expect volatility even without undue government influence? 
Financial crises are not new after all. In 2009 Carmen Reinhart and 
Kenneth Rogoff published an acclaimed book that looked at financial 
crises over the past 800 years or so. In it, they sought to ascertain 
whether past instances of financial crisis had been the fault of 
governments. Were governments responsible for ‘Tulipmania’, the 
‘South Sea Bubble’ and the ‘Dotcom Boom’? According to Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), they were not primarily responsible. So who or what 
was?
The purpose of this chapter is to draw on new economic thinking and 
fresh areas of research to ask if we can we learn anything new about 
how the financial system operates in order to answer these questions, 
and better inform public policy concerning the financial sector. The three 
main areas of research highlighted in this chapter are network theory; 
its ‘sibling’ field of study, complexity theory; and research conducted by 
David Tuckett, a psychoanalyst at University College, London. I will draw 
out some key principles from each, to help us better understand the 
world of finance.
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It is important to state from the outset that any criticism of the 
application of pure free markets to the financial sector does not 
necessarily lead us, in the words of a colleague of mine, to the 
conclusion ‘… therefore socialism’. Like the financial sector, national 
governments have a chequered record with respect to resource 
(including capital) allocation. Indeed, as argued in chapter 13 in this 
collection written by Adam Lent and myself, the same body of work 
that allows us to question the application of free markets to finance also 
warns against centralised state intervention. In a nutshell, it emphasises 
the need for a much smarter form of government.
Market	psychology
An important lesson from the new fields of complexity and network 
theory is that it is preferable not to start with a hypothesis and then to 
test that hypothesis against empirical evidence. Rather, we should work 
from the level of the group upwards in order to understand a whole 
system. This is best done by starting with an empirical appreciation of 
what is going on, on the ground, right now, and working from there. 
This is the approach taken by Professor David Tuckett of University 
College London in a recent study (2011) on the behaviour of financial 
markets. In 2007, Tuckett interviewed 50 investment managers in New 
York, London and Edinburgh with an eye to getting to grips with exactly 
how investment managers make sense of their working environments 
and make decisions. 
When, during the pilot interview phase, he started to formulate the 
questions he would ask in his main interviews, Tuckett quickly came to 
the realisation that orthodox approaches to finance were not particularly 
helpful. There seemed to be a wide gap between conventional 
theory and how investment managers made decisions in uncertain 
environments. So the questions he asked were on the whole outside 
the realm of orthodox finance (including behavioural finance) and were 
instead designed to develop an accurate picture of how investment 
managers made sense of the world and made decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty.1 Tuckett came to the conclusion that ‘once 
uncertainty is properly included [in economics and finance] just about 
everything changes’ (Tuckett 2011: 12).
After conducting his fieldwork, Tuckett developed a framework based 
on concepts from the field of psychoanalysis, which suggests that 
investment managers make sense of the present and the potential future 
through the use of narratives. An example of such a narrative would be 
‘Greece has a history of fiscal mismanagement; it is in the process of 
1	 The	word	‘uncertainty’	is	used	here	as	distinct	from	the	word	‘risk’.	Uncertainty	involves	the	important	
idea	that	in	constantly	evolving	systems,	and	in	systems	involving	reflexivity	(both	of	which	are	
features	of	social	systems),	the	future	is	inherently	impossible	to	predict.
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defaulting; and it will take the European financial system with it’ (note 
how the past, present, and future are combined in a coherent ‘story’). 
In today’s world of finance, there is too much information for any one 
individual to process and, within constantly evolving systems, there 
are many plausible future scenarios at any given moment in time. Yet, 
this reality sits in stark contrast to conventional economic thinking, 
which allows for only one future scenario to be expected to transpire, a 
scenario that ought to be identifiable with enough information. Narratives 
allow investment managers to organise a mass of information about 
the present and also potential futures in a coherent way. Importantly, 
the process of narrative formation involves human emotions and the 
subconscious: people are often hardly aware this is what they are doing.
The idea that people use narratives to make sense of both the world 
we live in and the possible future in order to make decisions is not new. 
There is a deep literature on this subject in the fields of psychology 
and psychoanalysis. The novelty of Tuckett’s study is that it uses this 
framework to understand financial markets. He also incorporates 
a number of psychoanalytic ‘bells and whistles’ into his framework 
to illustrate how, at times, investment managers can collectively tell 
themselves stories that are ultimately implausible. Concepts such as 
‘phantastic objects’ and ‘groupfeel’ are combined in a framework – 
which he appropriately terms ‘emotional finance’ – that gets to the 
psychological heart of asset price bubbles and crashes. 
To readers not familiar with orthodox financial theory and to those with 
experience of real financial markets, this might sound blindingly obvious. 
But orthodox financial theories, including modern portfolio theory, the 
capital asset pricing model and the efficient market hypothesis, are a 
long distance from the reality Tuckett describes in his research. This 
is not a trivial, theoretical point: financial policies are heavily influenced 
by these orthodox approaches to finance, meaning that our financial 
institutional arrangements are built on deeply unreliable models.
The framework outlined in Tuckett’s book indicates that financial markets 
are in large part about a portfolio of competing narratives concerning the 
present and the future.2 The dominant narrative in the market at any one 
time, which we might call ‘market sentiment’, changes through time. 
And new narratives emerge, unpredictably, over time. To visualise this 
process of emergence (an important concept in complexity theory), we 
can think of a large inflatable ball released into a crowd at a concert. The 
ball will move around unpredictably: over time everybody will influence 
the direction of the ball but no one individual will have full control over 
2	 Note	that	while	his	work	focuses	on	investment	managers,	there	is	strong	reason	to	believe	that	
Tuckett’s	framework	is	applicable	to	the	whole	financial	system.	However	even	if	it	were	not,	in	this	
chapter	I	focus	on	the	financial	intermediation	role	of	the	financial	system;	that	is,	the	channelling	of	
savings	to	investment	projects,	in	which	investment	managers	clearly	have	the	most	important	role.
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its movement. The direction the ball is travelling in is emergent and 
inherently impossible to predict.3
By contrast, the building blocks of orthodox economics and finance 
are deterministic, which means that with enough information, the 
direction of the ball ought to be fully determinable. Clearly, this is not 
true. It is a fundamental flaw in conventional thinking in both finance and 
economics. 
So what? This research sounds rather abstract and esoteric. What does 
it mean for our understanding of the financial system? And what does it 
mean for public policy concerning the financial system? There are three 
implications I would like to highlight here.
First, using Tuckett’s framework as a building block for our 
understanding, we can see more clearly that the financial system is a 
great deal more volatile than orthodox financial theory would have us 
believe. But it is important to appreciate that this work emphasises 
that the financial system is inherently volatile. By contrast, a lot of the 
analysis of the financial crisis has looked for causal factors that are 
external to the financial system. For example, as noted above, many 
people have tried to lay the blame on imperfect (or even too much) 
government regulation and central bank monetary policy as the ‘causes’ 
of the crisis. Tuckett deals with these perspectives in his book: this 
framing implies that investment managers had no free choice, which 
of course is simply not true. Many of them chose to participate in the 
boom through buying collateral debt obligations, credit default swaps, 
and other exotic instruments, which they could have chosen not to buy. 
This is not an argument that governments were blameless, it merely 
emphasises that arguments laying all blame on governments are flawed. 
Volatility appears to be endogenous in the current financial system, it is 
not only imposed on it from outside.
The second implication is about the distribution of income and wealth 
caused in part by market volatility. Currently, the reward structures 
determining how City employees are paid make the financial system look 
like a lobster pot, allowing lots of money to seep in during good times 
(typically drained through profits and bonuses) but returning very little 
during bad times. Contracts reward investment managers handsomely 
when the markets move in their direction (hedge funds have typically 
charged 2 per cent of assets under management plus 20 per cent of all 
profits made). But with the exception of a minority of contracts which 
include a ‘watermark’ that allows investors to recoup losses, these 
profits are typically not given back when returns are negative or below 
3	 This	metaphor	of	a	ball	at	a	concert	is	useful	for	visualising	the	concept	of	emergence.	To	be	clear,	
and	stepping	back	from	this	metaphor,	the	key	characteristics	of	emergent	phenomena	are:	(i)	
they	are	unpredictable;	(ii)	they	are	systemic;	and	(iii)	the	sum	of	the	whole	is	different	to	the	sum	
of	the	parts.	In	addition,	system-wide	emergence	often	feeds	back	on	the	agents	from	which	the	
phenomenon	emerged,	influencing	them	and	their	interaction	with	other	agents.
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benchmark. Not only are rewards asymmetric, but also, when market 
oscillations are particularly extreme – as in recent years – the taxpayer 
has to step in to rescue the whole system. 
The combination of this asymmetric reward system and inherent volatility 
is a dangerous one. Over time, it leads to a cross-subsidisation of 
City employees by taxpayers. Given the recent boom and bust, future 
taxpayers will have to pay higher taxes to fund the recent borrowing 
that was required to rescue the financial system. These future taxes will 
therefore, in effect, fund the bonuses earned during the recent boom. 
It is also noteworthy that investment managers are largely not to blame 
for these asymmetric returns – their clients are. In addition, it is only 
since the 1980s that financial market participants have been rewarded 
such substantial sums. Before then investment managers were paid well 
but not to the degree we see today. The system-wide effect of market 
volatility combined with asymmetric rewards has been to augment 
inequality in society.
The third implication of Tuckett’s work concerns the allocation of capital 
and other resources in society. The mixture of human psychology and 
free markets does not necessarily lead to an optimal allocation of capital 
over time. Put another way, and oversimplifying for effect, Tuckett’s 
work suggests that capital allocation via the private financial system is at 
the whim of the market. A lengthy discussion of this important subject 
is beyond the scope of this chapter but there are three aspects worth 
highlighting here.
First, if uncertainty in dynamic networks increases the further we look 
into the future, it is inevitable that the private financial system will 
focus on ‘less uncertain’ (that is, shorter) time horizons. This point has 
been well rehearsed. However, it is worth noting that the new fields 
of complexity and network theory add further legitimacy to this point 
because they help us better understand the nature and prevalence of 
uncertainty in human systems. 
Second, booms and busts, which appear to be inherent in financial 
systems like that of the UK, have historically involved an enormous 
misallocation of resources. As is well known, when prices rise 
production increases (subject to the elasticity of supply). When this 
happens as a result of misallocation, the consequences are to be 
expected. There is now, for example, a sizeable glut of housing in the 
US, built during the recent property price bubble. Interestingly, there was 
no counterpart rise in UK housing because particular supply-side factors 
make the market sclerotic, which creates its own serious problems.
Finally, recessions typically follow financial crashes, leading to an 
underutilisation of resources, notably labour. Hence it is usual for 
unemployment to increase in the immediate aftermath of a financial 
crisis, as has been demonstrated in the US and UK since 2007. The 
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financial and emotional cost of recessions to individuals is clearly 
enormous. That this outcome can occur calls into question the very 
notion that financial markets and the optimal allocation of capital go 
hand in hand.
The	financial	system	as	a	network
There has been a flurry of work in recent years, following the financial 
crisis, looking at the financial system as an integrated network. This 
work is very important and it is likely to help us redesign our institutional 
arrangements to make the financial system safer. 
Historically, the approach taken by many academics – and subsequently 
adopted by policymakers – has been to view financial institutions as 
relatively disconnected from each other. This is typical of orthodox 
approaches in both economics and finance, which emphasise 
individuals at the expense of understanding the interaction of, and 
adaptation by, constituents of the system. The new fields of complexity 
and network theory are helping to redress this imbalance but, as often 
happens in academic and policy circles, these new disciplines are 
meeting with resistance from established figures, despite their relevance 
and consistency with empirical evidence.
While the use of network theory, complexity theory and computer 
simulations in finance is relatively new, the fields themselves are not. 
There have been several decades of work in these areas, however 
most of it has been in the natural sciences. During this time these 
subjects have reached a useful stage of maturity, and a number of social 
scientists have begun to use the material in their own field of study.4 
New conceptual toolboxes are helping us to make better sense of 
integrated systems that are constantly evolving, including the financial 
system.
The key implication of looking at the financial system as a network is 
that we become more aware of various types of network effects,5 
and this awareness can help us to design policies that might eliminate 
or mitigate the detrimental types of such effects. A useful concept in 
such approaches is a global cascade, which can be thought of as a 
system-wide domino effect. We saw something like this in the global 
financial system after the US money markets seized up in August 2007. 
That seizing up was a key moment in the financial crisis because it led 
to ripple effects, which became increasingly amplified, ending in what 
was almost a full-blown financial crisis in September 2008. Examples 
4	 To	help	tease	out	the	academic	work	in	these	new	fields	and	to	bring	this	new	material	to	bear	on	
policy	questions,	Paul	Ormerod	and	I	recently	set	up	a	thinktank,	‘Synthesis’:	see	at	
http://www.synthesisips.net.
5	 For	a	clear	articulation	of	the	significance	of	network	effects	in	social	systems,	including	a	contrast	
with	conventional	‘incentive’	approaches	to	policy	formation,	I	would	recommend	a	book	by	my	
colleague,	Paul	Ormerod,	entitled	Positive Linking: How Networks and Incentives Can Revolutionise the 
World	(Faber	and	Faber,	2012).
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of network effects in nature are the spread of contagious diseases and 
forest fires.
The argument goes that by appreciating (and modelling) the financial 
system as a network, we can begin to build forms of ‘fire breakers’ to 
eliminate or mitigate these global cascades because we understand 
the interconnected, interdependent nature of the system much better. 
It might also be possible to identify ahead of time which institutions are 
‘too integrated to fail’, allowing us to design policies, including capital 
requirements, that reflect the risk of particular institutions.
So there is cause to be optimistic because these new fields of study 
are increasingly being applied to financial regulation. However, these 
same disciplines also emphasise some general warnings about trying to 
regulate, or control, highly complex, integrated and fast-moving systems 
like the world of finance. 
First, the financial system is not static, it is a dynamic network. The 
difference between these two is enormous. The constituents of dynamic 
networks constantly adapt to each other – they co-evolve.6 This 
includes the regulators and the regulated institutions. The most important 
implication of viewing the financial system as a dynamic network is that 
it emphasises how the future of the system is inherently unpredictable. 
That said, by understanding the system better, for example by treating it 
as a dynamic network, we can respond more sensitively.
A useful phrase to describe particular types of dynamic networks is 
that they are robust yet fragile: some shocks to the network will be 
absorbed by the system but other shocks might destabilise it in a way 
that is detrimental to all. Importantly, it is impossible to know for certain 
what shocks will be absorbed by the system (robust) and which will 
create types of detrimental global cascades (fragile).
Clearly, if the future of the financial system is inherently unpredictable, 
this creates serious problems for any attempt to regulate it. It means that 
regulators, who design the regulatory rules of the game, will struggle to 
predict with any degree of accuracy how financial market participants 
will react to new regulations. We should not overemphasise this point, 
however. It is not an argument for no regulation, rather it warns against 
being overconfident that regulations can solve all ills.
A second warning relates to attempts to model the financial system as 
a network. These approaches have tended to focus on network effects 
following some shock to a single institution within the system. Given 
an ‘idiosyncratic shock’, does the system prove robust or fragile? Here 
Tuckett’s work has an important insight: it points to a form of systemic 
volatility that is inherent in the whole system. Given this inherent volatility, 
6	 Complexity	theorists	have	defined	co-evolution	as	‘the	change	of	an	object	triggered	by	the	change	
of	a	related	object’.
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which has been clearly evident in recently years, it is unlikely that fire 
breakers designed to mitigate global cascades will be sufficient to 
prevent some full-blown financial crisis. Fire-breaker-type regulation 
will probably make the system more robust but not completely so. The 
contemporaneous example is Greece: if Greece defaulted in such a way 
that a Europe-wide financial crisis was viewed as inevitable, it is unlikely 
that regulatory fire breakers would prevent a Europe-wide financial 
crisis. A commonly held narrative, which is not the same as a ‘rational 
expectation’, can overpower a financial system.
The recent work attempting to map the financial system as a network 
is clearly a move in the right direction. However, the fields of study that 
gave rise to this new work also provide a number of important warnings 
about the ability of regulators to use policy tools to overcome the 
financial system’s inherent volatility.
Overcentralisation	of	the	financial	system
While the two preceding sections are based on new academic 
research, this section is more speculative. It is largely based on my own 
interpretation of network and complexity theory, my own experiences of 
the financial system,7 and an interesting case study. 
In a speech given in March 2010,8 Andy Haldane, executive director for 
financial stability at the Bank of England, noted the following:
‘Economies	of	scale	appear	to	operate	among	banks	with	
assets	less,	perhaps	much	less,	than	$100	billion.	But	above	
that	threshold	there	is	evidence,	if	anything,	of	diseconomies of	
scale.’
To provide context to this figure of $100 billion, the average asset 
holdings of the four major UK banks at the end of 2008 was about 
$3,100 billion, approximately 30 times greater than this apparent 
threshold.
Why then is the UK (and global) financial system made up of relatively 
few, and very large, financial institutions? Why is it so centralised? And 
do the new fields of study discussed in this chapter have anything to say 
about the concentration of capital allocation in British society?
A core reason why the financial system has gravitated towards 
centralisation is that our models of how the economy and organisations 
work lead us to this outcome. Orthodox approaches to economics 
and management science have been based on a mechanistic view of 
human systems in which the world is also seen as static. Within such 
approaches, economies of scale are feasible and the objective of the 
organisation is that of efficiency. Resilience is underemphasised because 
7	 I	worked	at	the	Bank	of	England	for	nine	years	until	2004	and	in	a	global	macro	hedge	fund	for	three	
years	until	2008.
8	 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech433.pdf
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the world is not expected to change. Moreover, these approaches also 
lead to ‘best practice’ and ‘one size fits all’ outcomes, which make 
dealing with idiosyncrasies very difficult.
The real world, however, is constantly evolving in ways that are 
inherently unpredictable, and this means that resilience is important at 
the individual, organisation, and whole-system levels. And idiosyncrasies 
matter more than is appreciated by orthodox thinking in economics and 
management science: systems that rest on centralised control tend to 
be insensitive to local conditions. What all of these points indicate is that 
the British financial system is overcentralised and lacking in resilience. 
All of this sounds very abstract, so let’s focus on an example. During 
the Swedish financial crisis of the early 1990s, Svenskehandel Bank 
(SHB), Sweden’s largest bank, outperformed its peers. Its loan default 
rate rose during that crisis but it seemed to fare better than most other 
Swedish banks. In 2008, the SHB’s board asked Volterra, a consultancy 
run by Paul Ormerod and Bridget Rosewell, to investigate whether this 
outperformance was due to its operational model, or something else.
SHB ran a relatively devolved banking model, giving its branch 
managers, and the loan officers in those branches, much more 
autonomy than is typical in the banking industry. Loan officers use 
not only quantitative information about a client, they also use tacit 
information and informal communication networks to build up a better 
picture of the client and the context in which they are operating. The 
responsibility for the decision to make a loan resides with loan officers 
– the decision is not based on a tick-box approach in which head office 
has the final say.
Volterra’s investigation, which made use of computer simulations, 
concluded that it was probably SHB’s devolved operational model that 
allowed it to be more resilient during Sweden’s financial crisis of the 
early 1990s. This conclusion was soon put to the test in 2008 during the 
global financial crisis – SHB’s operational model once again proved itself 
resilient relative to its peers. 
If it is true that the British financial system is overcentralised, what are 
the policy implications? Should the government legislate to force a 
break-up of the banks? Interestingly, here the arguments for such a 
break-up are subtly different to traditional arguments based on ‘too big 
to fail’ and ‘too interconnected to fail’, which are about the systemic 
risk posed by single institutions. An important question here is whether 
banks will, in due course, see that devolved models, like that of SHB, 
make sense from a commercial point of view: the banks might get there 
by themselves. Personally, I am not convinced they will in anything 
but the longest term because the orthodox, machine-based view of 
organisations is so entrenched in the business and finance world. I 
therefore lean towards either forcibly breaking up the banks or creating 
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significant disincentives to scale. However, I would like to see a great 
deal more research done before we chose this route as a nation.
Conclusion
This chapter has included a whirlwind tour of some of the new thinking 
coming out of complexity and network theory, as well as the work of 
David Tuckett. Justice cannot be done here in such a short space to the 
depth and importance of these new approaches to understanding the 
financial system, and the implications for government policy.
An underlying theme of this chapter has been to suggest that it 
is questionable whether, in the presence of psychological effects 
highlighted by Tuckett, free markets should be the dominant 
means through which our society allocates capital. The theoretical 
underpinnings of free market theory involve the exchange of goods 
and services in one or two periods of time. This is some distance 
from decision-making about abstract investment products in dynamic 
systems, under conditions of uncertainty, involving (emotional) human 
beings and long time horizons. When we combine these issues in a 
conceptual framework, we can legitimately question the dogma of 
applying free markets to the financial system.
As a result of this analysis, I propose the following options for 
policymakers. One relates to the economics research profession, the 
rest to wider policy considerations. 
First, serious thought should be given to creating a UK Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (UKSWF). If the private financial system is inherently 
volatile and focuses on ‘less uncertain’ (that is, short) time horizons, 
there is an argument that society ought to find additional means 
to allocate capital. A fund could be set up that allocates savings to 
longer-horizon investment projects that are in the long-term interests 
of the UK including infrastructure projects such as a national ultra high 
speed broadband network, and investment in the sustainable power 
industries. This fund could also operate counter-cyclically, to add to the 
tools available for dampening the economic cycle.9 To stress again, any 
UKSWF should be sheltered from short-term political interests in the 
same way that the Bank of England is, while being held accountable to 
elected politicians.
Second, there is a need to expand and enhance the UK’s fledgling 
social investment market. Research by NESTA published in 201110 
indicated that there is demand among investors and potential borrowers 
for financial products that went beyond profit maximisation, which were 
9	 In	early	2011,	Lord	Skidelsky	called	for	the	creation	of	a	National	Investment	Bank,	to	act	counter-
cyclically.	The	core	purpose	of	a	UKSWF	would	be	to	ensure	society’s	capital	is	allocated	better	over	
the	long	term	but	it	could	also	play	a	counter-cyclical	role,	along	the	lines	suggested	by	Lord	Skidelsky.
10	 See	http://www.nesta.org.uk/home1/assets/features/new_research_maps_supply_and_demand_for_
social_finance	
IPPR  |  Complex new world: Translating new economic thinking into public policy60
pro-social and pro-environmental. This alternative market is unlikely to 
emerge incrementally; it would require support, notably in the regulatory, 
legal, and institutional realms. However, such a market is likely to 
facilitate capital being channelled to smaller projects, where society 
deems it most necessary, and away from large-scale mistakes.
Third, the government should convert the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
into a ‘local bank’ through a new corporate charter combined with a 
strong board and the state maintaining a ‘golden share’. As stated 
above, a devolved banking model appears more resilient and more 
sensitive to local conditions. RBS could be deliberately designed as 
a local bank along the same lines as SHB in part to demonstrate this 
model to other retail banks.
Fourth, retail banking institutions should be taxed on the basis of their 
size by making the current levy progressive (in other words, higher levy 
rates with greater size) and – given the size of UK banks at present – 
much bigger (it only raises about £2 billion at present). There are no 
strong arguments for having large retail banks in the UK. London’s 
comparative advantage is due to wholesale markets, investment 
banking, and investment management. Our position as a global financial 
centre will not be affected if the UK’s retail banking industry were made 
up of local and regional banks. Moreover, there are clear competition 
arguments for creating an industry made up of, say, 100 small and 
medium-sized banks rather than a handful of large banks. The best 
and most obvious way to achieve this is through taxation: tax size, 
progressively. 
Another way of looking at this policy idea is through the metaphor 
of insurance. Following the crisis, it is now blatantly obvious that 
the government will rescue large banks that get in to trouble (the 
government in effect plays an underwriting role). So why not force 
banks to pay a fair insurance premium? Smaller banks, which by their 
very nature will not be too big to fail, should not pay a premium (but 
they would still pay corporation tax). Any argument that suggests the 
UK’s retail banking industry would move offshore as a consequence 
is nonsense. The industry is immobile (which is not true of wholesale 
activities). Taking calculations from the Bank of England, the Vickers’ 
Commission report, and the Corporation of London, in its current state 
the banking system’s total levy would probably have to rise to around 
£20 billion. Importantly, this should be a tax on large retail banks, not on 
the whole City of London, and could reduce to zero if all UK retail banks 
were below a particular size, in line with the economics of the insurance 
provided.
Fifth, regulators should rethink the use of mark-to-market (MTM) 
accounting principles. The use of MTM in valuing assets (financial and 
real) presupposes that market prices are a ‘true and fair’ reflection of 
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their inherent value. The analysis set out above seriously questions that 
presupposition. It is questionable whether inherent value means anything 
when it comes to asset prices, which seem to be driven by emergent 
and volatile processes. We therefore need to soberly reassess whether 
MTM accounting should be used and, if so, under which circumstances. 
Finally, it is time to redirect research funding from orthodox approaches 
towards finance to work looking at the financial system as a dynamic, 
integrated network. This is directed at all those funding such research. 
We have looked at some of this new work in this chapter but there is still 
a great deal to be done. Most of the research in the financial sphere still 
uses a naïve form of ‘agent rationality’, which is some distance from the 
psychoanalytic work of Tuckett and most of it is based on mathematical 
models that seek analytical solutions, rather than computer simulations 
of dynamic networks. Research funders and policymakers ought to 
support a paradigm change that is struggling to emerge in economics 
and finance. The value in doing this is to assist the government and the 
financial system itself to help that system become more resilient and less 
risky for the economy.
Whatever caused the financial crisis needs to be better understood. We 
need to allocate more of the country’s resources to understanding what 
went wrong, and it seems reasonable that such research does not all 
come from the taxpayer. The City should create a pool of funding for 
new research into the financial system. I propose that the City of London 
creates an endowment of around £300 million, modelled on NESTA, to 
support this process.
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Evolutionary economics represents a broad stream of thinking. Although 
it lacks a single theoretical core or policy approach, it involves a large 
global network of researchers and constitutes one of the most important 
challenges to mainstream thinking, particularly in microeconomics. 
Evolutionary economists emphasise that modern economies are in 
constant change, and their dynamism is powered by technological 
and organisational innovation. They stress the complexity of modern 
economies, the radical uncertainty pervading economic life, and the 
limited computational and cognitive capacities of the human brain. 
Human agents are thus obliged to rely on habits or prevailing rules 
when making decisions. These standpoints are in stark contrast to 
assumptions in mainstream mathematical models of the economy such 
as the rational expectations hypothesis, which assumes unrealistically 
that all agents have a tractable understanding of how the system works, 
and there is no radical uncertainty concerning the future. There is also 
a divergence with the equilibrium orientation of mainstream economics: 
evolutionary economists instead emphasise continuous, complex 
processes of transformation and diversification. 
A seminal text for modern evolutionary economists is Richard Nelson 
and Sidney Winter’s An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
(1982). Earlier inspirations include Alfred Marshall (1890), Thorstein 
Veblen (see Camic and Hodgson 2011), Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 
1942), Edith Penrose (1959), plus Nobel laureates Herbert Simon (1957) 
and Friedrich Hayek (1967). While there is a common emphasis on 
continuous change, there is a diversity of policy as well as theoretical 
perspectives within evolutionary economics. 
Evolutionary economics differs from mainstream economics in style as 
well as theoretical substance. While there is a role for formal theoretical 
models, evolutionary economists place more stress on discursive (or 
what Nelson and Winter (1982) call ‘appreciative’) theory. For reasons 
outlined below, economic theory overall has to be more sensitive to 
historical and conjunctural specificities. 
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Given the diversity of theoretical and policy perspectives within modern 
evolutionary economics, I shall not attempt to review them all here. 
Instead I shall lay out some core ideas of the kind of evolutionary 
approach that I favour and show how they impact on current policy 
debates. I call my approach ‘Veblenian’ because – like the American 
economist of Norwegian descent – it emphasises the importance of: 
A. understanding human psychology in terms of ingrained habits 
rather than a rational brain of unrealistically immense computational 
and deliberative capacities 
B. understanding that habits and business routines act as repositories 
of knowledge, and that learning and knowledge are drivers of 
economic development 
C. understanding that human motivation is complex and context 
dependent, and it involves elements of moral motivation as well as 
self-interest (Hodgson 2012) 
D. understanding that legal and other diverse institutions make up the 
essential fabric of all economic interactions 
E. understanding that markets themselves are institutions and depend 
on contingent and historically specific institutional rules, as well as 
other social institutions 
F. the general suboptimality of economic arrangements, resulting from 
unavoidable institutional rigidities, imperfections and historical path-
dependence (North 1990) 
G. the impact of Darwinian thinking on our understanding of human 
capacities and evolutionary processes (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010). 
While the above ideas can be found in the writings of Veblen, they are 
also shared by other thinkers. Considerable additional inspiration is also 
taken from them, including the names mentioned above. 
Although the above stipulations are rudimentary, they break away from 
the tired old debate between socialistic central planning and neoliberal 
unfettered markets. The complexities of real economies alongside the 
limited deliberative capacities of the human brain greatly limit the scope 
of rational central planning. Obversely, the fact that modern economies 
are ingrained with typically suboptimal institutions means that there 
can be no such thing as a fully free and unfettered market system. Full 
appreciation of the seven points above, in the light of 20th-century 
experience, leads to some kind of mixed and internally diverse economy. 
The tired old debate is transcended: instead we address the institutional 
detail of feasible mixed economies, where there is demonstrably a wide 
range of choices and possibilities. 
This chapter compares an evolutionary approach to industrial and 
business policy with standard mainstream views. Using evolutionary 
ideas it outlines an alternative perspective, challenging the prevailing 
orthodox theories of the firm that place more emphasis on outside 
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market conditions than the internal organisation of the firm itself, and 
their focus on equilibrium outcomes which underestimates the existence 
and role of diversity in the real world.
Firms	and	industries	in	mainstream	economics
Mainstream economics typically has three major deficiencies in dealing 
with business firms and industries. First, with some important exceptions 
such as Ronald Coase (1937) and Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985), the 
firm is treated as a ‘black box’ or ‘nexus of contracts’, neglecting its 
internal organisation and often treating it as if it were a single individual 
or entrepreneur. Although, to their credit, Coase and Williamson opened 
this ‘black box’ to look at contracts within the organisation, they ended 
up blurring the boundaries between the firm and the market. Another 
problem is applying the same model of ‘opportunistic’ or self-seeking 
‘economic man’ to the different institutional and cultural contexts of 
the firm and the market, ignoring the way in which an institutional and 
cultural context can help mould individual cognitions and aspirations. 
Processes of structured, interactive and collective learning within 
organisations are also downplayed. 
Second, when analysing collections of firms in the same industry, 
mainstream economics often resorts to oversimplifications, such as 
assuming all firms are identical, or treating the industry as a whole 
through the singular device of the ‘representative firm’. Consequently, 
the importance of internal variety in an industry, and its consequences for 
competition, innovation and growth, is given insufficient attention (Penrose 
1959, Nelson 1991). In reality, firms and their products are hugely diverse, 
and although many products are substitutes, much of a business’ strategy 
involves the creation of distinctive products and new market niches. 
Third, mainstream analysis typically assumes fixed production functions 
that generate cost curves for firms, and then tries to establish (industry 
and firm) market equilibria. This overlooks the innovative dynamism 
and restlessness that is characteristic of much capitalist industry 
(Schumpeter 1934). By analysing unrealistically each firm as if it were 
facing slowly changing and non-turbulent market conditions, the 
constant energetic struggle of each organisation to adapt and survive 
is given limited importance. By treating each industry as if it were in or 
close to equilibrium, the core dynamic of modern capitalism is excluded 
from the script. The equilibrium orientation of mainstream theory implies 
a static world where relative inefficiencies have been eliminated. But 
in reality competition is more haphazard: many suboptimal firms can 
endure and turbulent market conditions can sometimes bankrupt 
relatively efficient firms. The haphazardness of competition ensures a 
surviving diversity of firms. 
To a large degree this is fortunate, because financial and product 
market conditions are everchanging, and firms that are fit for one market 
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environment are not necessarily as fit for another. If all firms were close 
to optimal for one set of conditions, then a small change of market 
circumstances might make them all much more vulnerable. By contrast, 
real-world diversity increases the chances of survival in varying conditions. 
These mainstream theoretical deficiencies distort industrial policies in a 
number of ways. First, there is an overemphasis on prices, costs and 
markets, which are really only part of the story. Cost-cutting is only one 
of several possible strategies for a firm. Many successful firms build 
up market share not by cutting costs but by diversifying or innovating 
distinctive products that outperform their rivals. Market competition 
based on prices cannot be relied upon to ensure the competitive 
selection survival of the more efficient firms. 
Second, there is often a primary focus on entrepreneurship and 
leadership in firms. The modern myth of the invincible entrepreneur 
has bloated a high-salary culture where new leaders are brought into 
organisations with expectations of performance as unrealistic as the 
towering scale of their remuneration. Although entrepreneurship and 
leadership are very important, managers often overlook the importance 
of ingrained and routinised knowledge in the organisation, and the 
dangers of destroying what has been learned through reckless 
restructuring from the top. The importance of team-building and 
collective effort can also be downplayed, as well as the way in which the 
organisation can use and enhance cooperative dispositions among the 
workforce. All successful firms rely on teams as well as individuals. 
Third, the individualist and market-oriented bias of much mainstream-
inspired policy underestimates the importance of the growth and 
adaptation of each firm. Every new firm must go through a complex and 
difficult process of organisation-building before it is able to compete 
fully and effectively in the market. It may require access to finance 
from a banking system with sufficient intimate industrial knowledge to 
appreciate the uncertainties, and to back suitable ventures. The firm 
itself requires a team of skilled management personnel that can organise 
and divide the tasks, while retaining a common and mutually understood 
purpose, rather than solitary entrepreneurs with plenty of untested 
vision but a deficit of interpersonal management skills. Furthermore, it 
is often the case that firms producing similar products cluster together, 
thus providing opportunities for inter-firm cooperation and knowledge 
exchanges, as well as competition for market share. 
The traditional economic approach often addresses policy questions 
through its concept of ‘market failure’. Due to externalities or other 
problems, the market is deemed to be a defective allocator of resources 
in some circumstances, and a limited role for state intervention is 
thus identified. Many evolutionary economists accept the reality of 
externalities but regard the ‘market failures’ approach as flawed and 
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incomplete. It overlooks the possibility of different kinds of market 
institution and the role of the state in guiding and buttressing market 
design. With its concept of equilibrium it concentrates on allocative 
rather than dynamic efficiency: the focus is on distributive adjustments 
to actual or possible equilibria, rather than creating the conditions 
for innovation and growth. And it ignores other possibilities for state 
intervention, such as shifting the system from one institutional or 
technological ‘locked-in’ situation or ‘equilibrium’ to another. For 
example, state legislation and guidance were crucial in shifting car 
production and use from leaded to unleaded petrol in the last part of the 
20th century, as they will be in the future development of the electric car. 
The role of the state is often to supplement and guide markets, and the 
choice of market and state involvement are not mutually exclusive. 
Much modern industrial policy has tried to overcome some of the 
deficiencies of orthodox economics, particularly by focusing on the 
importance of technological innovation. This is a welcome step forward. 
But technological innovation is only part of the story. Organisational and 
legal innovation are also vital. The firm has to be treated as an evolving 
social organisation, and not simply as a single entity or entrepreneur in 
possession of technology. 
Darwinian ideas have been used by both mainstream and non-
mainstream economists. Contrary to a widespread misperception, 
Darwinian theory does not support the notion of competition leading to 
the survival of only the fittest and more efficient firms. Darwin himself 
recognised that evolutionary selection is a haphazard process, and that 
organisms find or build niches to protect themselves from competition. 
Darwin also fully acknowledged that cooperation within groups among 
social species was as important as competition between groups and 
with other animals (Hodgson 2012). He did not endorse the caricature 
of selfish ‘economic man’. Furthermore, modern evolutionary theory 
puts as much emphasis on the development of individual organisms 
as on competitive selection between them. Evolution is a complex 
process involving both competitive selection and interactive individual 
development. Consequently, modern evolutionary theory inspires an 
approach that contrasts markedly with the mainstream ‘Darwinian’ 
caricature of reliably efficient competition and selection leading to an 
equilibrium, powered by solely self-seeking individuals with access to 
much relevant information. On the contrary, real-world evolutionary 
processes are typically much more haphazard and unreliable (Hodgson 
and Knudsen 2010). 
Towards	a	new	industrial	policy
Modern economies are highly complex and often unpredictable. 
Consequently, any approach to industrial policy has to be cautious, 
varied and experimental. Economies are complex systems in an 
uncertain and changing world. Systems theory teaches us that to 
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deal with a complex environment and possible environmental shocks, 
any micro- or macro-level organisation has to have ‘requisite variety’ 
(Ashby 1960). From the point of view of both policy experimentation and 
survival, some degree of variety within firms and states is essential. 
Much can be learned from comparative studies across industries and 
across countries, and such comparative and empirical approaches are 
often a better guide than ‘one theory fits all’ analyses. One lesson that 
emerges from comparative studies is that instead of reliance on the 
singular discipline of market competition, successful industrial economies 
involve a synergetic combination of competition and state intervention 
(Kenworthy 1995, Evans and Rauch 1999, Reinert 2007). The primary 
role of the state is not to ‘pick winners’ in some imaginary market com-
petition. The state is necessary to ensure that financial and industrial 
institutions mesh together and serve each other, to build up the educa-
tion system to meet skill requirements, and to ensure the development 
of a first-rate transport and telecommunications infrastructure, so that 
information, competitive markets and industrial dynamism can spread 
from advantaged to less-advantaged regions. The role of the state is as 
much one of institution-building as of financial expenditure. 
Access to finance is vital for all businesses. Small and medium-sized 
companies often have little alternative but to use the banks. Yet 
compared with other leading industrial countries, the UK banking system 
has a relatively more international than a local and industrial orientation. 
The state has a role to play in fostering the development of further 
banking institutions that are oriented towards local industry, throughout 
the British regions. These would ideally involve a combination of public 
and private finance. 
Another matter on the agenda is corporate reform. The modern 
corporation involves an implicit bargain between the state and the 
enterprise, where the state bestows the advantage of limited legal 
liability in return for the economic stimulus of corporate investment and 
employment. Yet over the last century the legal and popular discourse 
on corporate responsibilities has progressively put less stress on 
the social and public obligations of the corporation and more on its 
primary duty to maximize shareholder value. This shift has been much 
associated with the growth of a form of external finance in modern 
corporations that is focused on relatively short-term financial returns 
(Froud et al 2000). 
Reversing this deleterious corporate trend would require a mixture 
of legal and other interventions by government. Corporations have 
responsibilities both to society and to the natural environment. Their sole 
objective should not be maximising financial returns for institutional and 
other rich investors. While financial viability is vital, it has to be placed 
alongside other unavoidable objectives. 
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Part of the reform initiative of government should be to enhance and 
widen discussion about corporate and financial ethics in particular and 
of moral responsibilities in general. Two centuries of individualistic and 
utilitarian thinking in society, and among economists in particular, have 
sustained mistaken beliefs that people are entirely self-gratifying and 
self-interested (at least when it comes to money and business) and 
that morality is purely a personal and private matter. Against the grain 
of much of economics today, some prominent economists from Adam 
Smith through John Maynard Keynes to Nobel laureate Amartya Sen 
have stressed the vital importance of morality in economic as well as 
social life. Government not only has an obligation to raise the level of 
moral discourse and debate but also it is difficult to see how some 
policies – such as dealing with climate change – can be achieved without 
an appeal to moral values as well as a good measure of self-interest 
(Hodgson 2012). Human motivation is complex, and the moral and 
acquisitive sides to our personalities have to be recognised in matters of 
policy design. Corporate and industrial policies are no exception. 
Conclusion
Evolutionary economists emphasise that policymaking is itself an adaptive 
and learning process (Metcalfe 1994, Witt 2003). Policymakers are not 
omniscient. Policy design and implementation are complex processes 
involving multiple feedbacks and adjustments. One is reminded here of 
earlier evolutionary approaches to policy by the American philosopher 
John Dewey (1929) and the political scientist Charles Lindblom (1984). 
Dewey sought conditions and habits of public scrutiny and debate that 
led to both innovation and experiment. He exposed the futility of seeking 
absolute knowledge and certainty; for Dewey, knowledge is an active 
capability, rather than a fixed end or goal. In the context of uncertainty 
and complexity, he favoured an experimental, process-oriented and 
participative democracy: institutional design had to be cautious and 
experimental; the primary role of experts is to lay out the feasible policy 
alternatives and their likely consequences, and feed this information into 
informed public debate. Lindblom, some 50 years later, fully recognised 
the complexities and uncertainties in the policy arena and proposed an 
experimental approach of ‘muddling through’. 
This more humble spirit of open-ended and experimental inquiry is 
lacking in economics today as an academic discipline. Economists 
have attempted to ape physics and build up complete, explanatory or 
predictive models of economic phenomena. But while models may often 
serve as useful heuristics, there are limits to their predictive or explanatory 
capacities, given the complexities of economies in the real world.
Many of the models that have powered policy developments in both 
micro- and macroeconomics assume away the complexities and 
uncertainties. For example, models are constructed of markets where 
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participating agents have much of the needed information and are 
assumed to act as if they were capable of immense feats of calculation. 
Not surprisingly, these models of ‘efficient markets’ lead to policy 
recommendations that are disposed to market solutions. Economists 
have been led astray by their models. 
It is here that evolutionary economics offers a change of style and 
direction, as well as of substance. The foremost task is to understand 
the real world, rather than an imaginary world contained in a model. 
While models and simulations can be extremely useful, they are not the 
whole story. Economics must return to a style and set of wide-ranging 
approaches that it has seemingly abandoned in recent decades. 
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The history of economic thought shows economists have seldom agreed 
on how macroeconomic policy should be framed and conducted.1 
At various times in the post-war period, the consensus has been that 
policymakers should target full employment, low inflation or economic 
stability; that the focus should be on the target variable directly or on 
some intermediate variable, such as monetary growth or the exchange 
rate; and that the target should be achieved through an active fiscal 
policy, an active monetary policy, or some combination of the two. And, 
whatever the consensus, there has always been a substantial and vocal 
minority arguing for a different approach.
Currently, in some quarters attention is being given to the idea that the 
aims of economic policy should be broader than simply output growth 
and inflation: they should encompass environmental sustainability and 
wider measures of social progress. Three noted economists – Joseph 
Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi – led a commission on how 
best to measure economic and social progress, which reported in 2009 
(Stiglitz et al 2009) and the OECD is currently taking their ideas forward. 
At the same time, the UK government has asked the Office for National 
Statistics to develop a measure of national ‘well-being’.
This work could, ultimately, lead to significant changes in the way that 
macroeconomic policy is conducted. However, for the purposes of this 
chapter, I have assumed that policy will continue – at least for the next 
few years – to be framed with respect to the more traditional goals of 
output growth and inflation. I do so for a number of reasons. First, there 
is no sign that policymakers in any of the major economies are seriously 
considering an imminent shift to new policy goals. Second, until their 
economies are growing at a healthy pace and unemployment has fallen 
to close to its pre-recession levels, I would not expect any such change 
to occur. Third, introducing a discussion of the aims of economic 
policy would leave insufficient space to analyse the main topic of this 
chapter: what lessons might be drawn from the insights of complexity 
economics about the conduct of macroeconomic policies.
1	 Thanks	are	due	to	Greg	Fisher,	Adam	Lent	and	David	Nash	for	comments	on	an	earlier	version	of	this	
paper,	though	they	bear	no	responsibility	for	this	final	version.	
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And, to be clear, macroeconomic policies in this context are taken 
primarily to mean the overall stance of fiscal policy and monetary policy, 
whether framed by reference to monetary aggregates, interest rates or 
the exchange rate. It is, therefore, about policy manoeuvres designed 
to control the level of aggregate demand and keep output as high as 
possible without causing inflation. It is not about so-called ‘supply-
side’ policies – such as skills policy or tax credits for R&D – that aim to 
increase the economy’s long-run growth rate, important though they are.
The	current	policy	consensus
There are important differences of detail in the way that macroeconomic 
policies are currently conducted across OECD economies, but the broad 
frameworks are very similar. Except in countries facing a debt crisis, 
fiscal policy is set according to some medium-term rule for a measure 
of the budget balance. For the most part, discretionary fiscal policy is 
independent of the position of the economy in the economic cycle (and 
this was true even before the recent recession caused large increases 
in budget deficits in most OECD countries). Monetary policy – usually 
meaning the level of short-term interest rates – is set to keep inflation 
low, and often in line with a prescribed target, because it is believed that 
low inflation is the best guarantee of steady economic growth.
The UK is typical in this respect. Fiscal policy follows two rules:
1. To achieve a cyclically adjusted current balance by the end of a 
rolling, five-year forecast period.
2. To have public sector net debt (as a percentage of GDP) falling by 
2015/16.
Neither rule is varied by reference to the state of the economy. 
Discretionary fiscal policy is not, in theory, allowed to change even if the 
economy is in a boom or a slump. In practice, the first rule – because it 
is framed over a rolling five-year period – does allow quite a lot of leeway. 
Policy could be eased substantially in years one and two, as long as 
there were plans to tighten it again in later years. However, the second 
rule will eventually place a limit on such flexibility because the need to 
keep debt on a downward path will limit deficits after 2015/16. At that 
point, fiscal policy will be almost completely insensitive to the economic 
cycle and even the ‘automatic stabilisers’2 may not be able to work.
These rules were designed to deal with a particular problem: the largest 
budget deficit seen in the UK in the post-war period (excluding financial 
interventions, public sector net borrowing amounted to £159 billion, or 
11.3 per cent of GDP, in 2009/10). But fiscal policy followed a similar 
set of rules before the recession (aiming to achieve current balance over 
the economic cycle and a maximum debt-to-GDP ratio of 40 per cent). 
2	 Allowing	tax	receipts	to	fall	and	spending	in	areas	such	as	unemployment	benefit	to	rise	when	the	
economy	is	weak	without	taking	offsetting	discretionary	fiscal	action	(and	allowing	receipts	to	rise	
and	benefit	spending	to	fall	when	the	economy	is	strong).
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And at present it seems likely that fiscal policy will continue to be run in 
a way that is largely insensitive to the economic cycle once the deficit is 
eliminated.
Meanwhile, apart from one small change, the way monetary policy is 
conducted in the UK has been unaltered for 14 years: the government 
sets an inflation target3 and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of 
the Bank of England adjusts its short-term interest rate (bank rate) in 
order to meet this target. If inflation strays more than 1 percentage point 
from the target rate, the Governor of the Bank of England is obliged to 
write a letter to the chancellor of the exchequer setting out why this has 
occurred and what steps the MPC is taking to bring inflation back into 
line with the target.
‘Traditional	economics’	versus	‘complexity	
economics’
This monetary policy approach has its roots in what Eric Beinhocker 
(2007) calls ‘traditional economics’. Traditional economics is based on 
two key assumptions: individuals are rational (that is, they always take 
actions that will maximise their own utility) and the behaviour of the 
aggregate economy reflects the sum of the actions of all these rational 
individuals operating independently. Starting from these assumptions it 
is possible to build models that show the economy operates as a linear 
system; it can be subject to exogenous shocks but after these shocks it 
returns to equilibrium.
These models are referred to as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models and they purport to explain fluctuations in the economy 
and the effects of macroeconomic policy. They are enormously influential 
in policy circles. Bank of England economists regularly publish papers 
making use of them (see for example Millard 2011 and Theodoridis 
2011) and the Bank’s website also contains a ‘technical handbook’ 
showing how to set up and run a DSGE model (Zanetti 2010). And yet 
they appear to be completely useless when it comes to explaining in 
any satisfactory way developments in the real world (Ormerod 2000). 
This should come as no surprise, given the underlying assumptions. In 
particular, individuals do not act in the narrow rational way understood 
by traditional economics, but are influenced by their peers and prone 
to herd behaviour. As Barker (2011) notes, DSGE models are ‘largely 
unsupported by formal scientific observation and empirical data’, 
‘dependent on false assumptions about human behaviour and physical 
systems’ and ‘based on a rigid and ill-informed interpretation of utilitarian 
ethic’. They also ignore the fundamental uncertainty that is pervasive in 
the real world.
3	 Currently	2	per	cent	for	the	consumer	prices	measure	(the	small	change	was	a	switch	from	a	target	of	
2.5	per	cent	on	the	retail	prices	measure	at	the	beginning	of	2004).
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Recognising the inherent weaknesses in the approach of traditional 
economics, a new way of thinking about the economy has emerged, 
seeing it as a complex adaptive evolutionary system (Beinhocker 2007). 
Such complex systems are characterised by feedbacks, increasing 
returns to scale and network effects; they display emergent properties 
and non-linear dynamics; and are seldom, if ever, in equilibrium. In 
complexity economics, the behaviour of individuals is not always 
rational in the sense understood in traditional economics. For example, 
preferences may not be fixed and individuals can be influenced by, 
and can influence, the behaviour of others. Complexity economics 
recognises that individuals operate in highly uncertain environments 
and can be subconsciously guided by narratives and socially emergent 
values. The economy does not tend to settle in equilibrium. Instead, 
the economy is dynamically complex: ‘it endogenously does not tend 
asymptotically to a fixed point, a limit cycle, or an explosion’ (Rosser 
1999). Or, in plain English, even in the absence of external interference 
the economy will continually display periods of stronger and weaker 
growth and of higher and lower inflation, possibly punctuated by other 
periods of relative calm. Boom and bust will never be eliminated and 
controlling the cycle will prove difficult and at times impossible.
While the language of complexity economics may be new, the same is 
not always true of its insights. John Maynard Keynes – who is widely 
regarded as the founding father of modern macroeconomics – referred 
to ‘animal spirits’ to describe the swings in confidence that could affect 
households’ and companies’ spending habits and was aware that one 
person’s, or company’s, level of confidence was not independent of 
that of others. In 2009, George Akerlof and Robert Shiller developed 
Keynes’s insight in their book Animal Spirits, which sets out how human 
psychology drives the economy. Central to their theory is the argument 
that confidence is not just about pessimism and optimism, but also 
about trust and the willingness to make decisions. They also note 
the role of ‘stories’ – such as ‘it’s a new era’ or ‘we are in an age of 
austerity’ – in determining confidence, and how there can be feedback 
between confidence and the economy.
Hyman Minsky (1986) also anticipated some of the complexity 
economists’ critique of traditional economics, when he argued that 
periods of stability (equilibrium) would inevitably lead to increased risk-
taking and so to periods of instability; a conclusion that is completely 
counter to traditional economic thinking. For Minsky, financial trauma, 
inflation and unemployment are all to be expected and it is foolish to 
base macroeconomic policies on traditional economic theories when 
the very problem you are trying to solve – persistent instability in the 
economy – is unsolvable in those theories, which allow for external 
shocks but assume a quick return to equilibrium after them.
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A	brief	post-war	history	of	economic	instability	in	
the	UK
The period since the second world war provides plenty of evidence to 
back up Minsky’s theory; there is inflation, unemployment and financial 
trauma in abundance. In the UK, it can be conveniently divided into two 
periods, with a split in the 1970s.
In the first period, which for convenience is often called the Keynesian 
period, macroeconomic policy was concentrated on achieving a high 
rate of growth and a low unemployment rate. During this period, the 
UK economy experienced frequent short and shallow recessions and, 
particularly during the 1960s, an inflation rate that trended steadily 
higher. Eventually, following the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and a 
period of ‘stagflation’ (recession and high inflation combined), Keynesian 
remedies were abandoned.
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In their place came macroeconomic policies mainly concerned with 
achieving low and stable inflation – what is generally referred to as 
neoliberalism, which has persisted for over 30 years. Within this period, 
there have been two sub-periods in which inflation behaved very 
differently. From 1975 to the early 1990s, inflation tended to be high and 
volatile. Subsequently, it has been lower and relatively stable, though it 
remains to be seen whether the higher rates of inflation experienced in 
the last few years are just a ‘blip’ or the start of a period of renewed 
inflation volatility.
Figure 6.1 
UK real GDP 
growth, 1950–
2011 (%)
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This neoliberal period has also seen a change in the nature of the 
economic cycle. There have been just three recessions in this time, but 
each has been deeper and longer than those experienced in the 
preceding 30 years. So, although neoliberal policies have, for the most 
part, delivered low inflation, they have not delivered stable growth.
As a result, just as Minsky predicted, instability has not been eliminated 
from the UK economy. Even on the very narrow consideration of GDP 
growth and inflation (that is, excluding asset prices, financial debt and so 
on), two very different policy regimes – Keynesian and neoliberal, both of 
which derived from traditional economic thinking – have failed to solve 
the problem of delivering the desired macroeconomic outcome.
Why	have	traditional	policies	failed?
Macroeconomic policymaking in the post-war period, whether 
Keynesian or neoliberal in nature, has failed to achieve lasting economic 
stability because it has been based on the traditional idea that the 
economy can be forecast in the short-term, and that the effects of policy 
changes on the economy are predictable. Neither is true. As Diggle and 
Ormerod (2010) argue, the modern economy is made up of a complex 
array of interconnected actors, which makes it inherently difficult to 
predict. Furthermore, the response of these actors to stimulus – such 
as a change in tax levels or in interest rates – can vary over time. So the 
effects of policy changes are also unpredictable. 
In the Keynesian era, fiscal policy was adjusted to try to smooth 
fluctuations in the economy. So, when economic growth slowed, policy 
was eased in an attempt to boost growth; and when it increased, policy 
was tightened in order to slow it down. At least, that was the theory. In 
Figure 6.2 
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practice, despite the best efforts of policymakers, the economic cycle 
was not abolished and the economy suffered from periods of ‘stop’ 
and ‘go’. One problem was that by the time policymakers realised the 
economy had slowed down, they had secured the necessary support 
for a change of fiscal policy, had implemented that change and it was 
beginning to have an effect on the economy, growth had often picked 
up anyway. So a policy designed to be counter-cyclical, sometimes 
turned out to be pro-cyclical.
Economists for the most part look back now on these attempts to fine-
tune the economy through changes to public spending and taxes with 
something close to derision, but is the current policy regime any better?
At its heart is a belief that the Bank of England – or more precisely its 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) – can forecast what will happen to 
inflation over the next two years and can adjust interest rates so that 
inflation is on course to be in line with the inflation target (2 per cent for 
consumer price inflation) at the end of this period. To do this, the MPC 
looks at a range of indicators (which are detailed in its quarterly Inflation 
Report). Central to its analysis is a belief that inflation is dependent on 
the ‘output gap’ – the amount of spare capacity in the economy. If there 
is plenty of spare capacity – a large output gap – then inflation will tend 
to decline; if output is too strong, relative to its potential level (sometimes 
described as a negative output gap), inflation will increase. By changing 
interest rates, the MPC believes it can affect the rate of growth in the 
economy, thereby closing the output gap (or the negative output gap) 
and consequently ensuring inflation ends up at its target rate. Broadly 
speaking, the MPC believes a shift in interest rates will affect inflation 
roughly two years later, so it sets interest rates with a view to getting 
inflation in line with its target rate in two years’ time.
This approach is heavily reliant on the MPC’s ability to forecast inflation 
– something that is inherently difficult as the last few years have 
shown. For roughly a decade after the MPC was established in 1997, 
forecasting inflation in the UK appeared to be relatively easy. Domestic 
inflation pressures were muted and there were few external shocks, and 
those that did occur were relatively small. Inflation stayed close to its 
target rate. Consequently, forecasts, which tended to be conservative, 
in the sense of assuming things continued much as they were, turned 
out to be relatively accurate. However, the last five years have seen a 
series of shocks, particularly as a result of volatile oil and food prices. 
As these were largely unpredicted, so the accuracy of inflation forecasts 
declined. Inflation moved far from its target and was 3 per cent or higher 
throughout 2010 and 2011 (so triggering a series of letters from the 
governor to the chancellor).
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Another problem with this approach is its reliance on the output gap: a 
concept that is much easier to define than it is to measure. At certain 
times – at the height of an economic boom or in the depths of a 
recession – we can be reasonably sure about the sign of the output gap 
(whether there is pressure on resources or spare capacity), but it is 
never possible to be certain about its size. In addition, any relationship 
between estimates of the output gap and inflation in the UK in recent 
years is hard to discern. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), 
which needs a measure of the output gap for its calculation of the 
cyclically adjusted budget deficit, has published an assessment of the 
output gap since 1972 (Pybus 2011). This shows that the output gap in 
the UK was negative (that is, output was above its trend level) for most 
of the period from 1996 to 2007, yet inflation was trending lower from 
1996 to 2001 and stable for the next few years. Only towards the very 
end of this period did it move higher. In a similar vein, Diggle and 
Ormerod (2010) point out that unemployment (a measure of spare 
capacity in the labour market) fell in every year from 1993 to 2001, but 
inflation in 2001 was lower than it was eight years earlier.
Despite the inherent uncertainties over measuring the output gap, 
forecasting inflation and gauging the effect of policy changes, the MPC 
was initially prepared to attempt to fine-tune the economy to a greater 
extent even than the Keynesians in the 1950s and 1960s. In its first five 
years in existence, the MPC altered interest rates 24 times: that is, at 
40 per cent of its monthly meetings. However, by the mid 2000s it had 
Figure 6.3 
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become less active and in the five years from 2003 to 2007 policy was 
only changed 14 times (at less than a quarter of its meetings).
It is ironic that while the MPC could have been less active from 1997 
to 2002, when developments in the economy were about as close 
as they are ever likely to get to being ideal – decent growth, falling 
unemployment and low inflation – it should probably, with the benefit of 
hindsight, have been more active between 2003 and 2007. Although 
growth was healthy in this period and inflation remained low (until it 
began to creep up in the final year), excessive exuberance was breaking 
out in crucial parts of the economy, particularly in the housing market 
and the financial sector. Minsky’s view that stability inevitably bred future 
instability was about to be proved very right. The MPC was so focused 
on its traditional economic models and the relationship between interest 
rates, growth, the output gap and consumer price inflation that it failed 
to see the bigger threats to the economy.
Where	now	for	macroeconomic	policy?
The financial crisis and consequent double-dip recession have led to 
profound short-term changes in the way that macroeconomic policy 
is conducted. There has as yet, however, been no challenge to the 
broad framework in which macroeconomic policy is made – or even any 
serious questioning in policymaking circles of this framework.
Consequently, fiscal policy is now focused on eliminating the cyclically 
adjusted deficit and stabilising the ratio of government debt to GDP. 
This is to be achieved through a multi-year programme of tax increases 
and public spending cuts that will be implemented irrespective of 
developments in the economy. It is not clear at this stage what will 
happen when the deficit has been eliminated but it is a fair bet that 
policy will continue to be determined primarily by reference to largely 
arbitrary fiscal targets involving the level of debt and the size of the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance.
This is not necessarily the wrong approach. Studies have shown that, 
historically, a high level of government debt relative to GDP is associated 
with lower growth (see for example Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) and the 
debt ratio in the UK is already substantially higher now than it was five 
years ago, and is set to increase further in the next few years. What 
constitutes a ‘high level’ of debt is likely to vary from country to country, 
and probably over time too, so it is impossible to say what the danger 
level might be in the UK. But the current level leaves future governments 
with little room to manoeuvre should the economy fall into recession 
again. By setting the debt ratio on a downward path, eventually that 
room for manoeuvre will reappear.
Putting the cyclically adjusted current balance at the heart of fiscal policy 
is more problematic because there is no wholly satisfactory method for 
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making the cyclical adjustment. Most economists would probably agree 
that allowing the deficit to narrow and widen as a result of fluctuations 
in tax revenues and welfare benefit spending caused by the economic 
cycle is desirable. Otherwise, fiscal policy would tend to be pro-cyclical: 
if a recession caused tax revenues to fall and the deficit to widen, tax 
increases (or spending cuts), which would further weaken the economy, 
would be needed to rebalance the budget. In practice, though, 
calculating the cyclically adjusted balance is very difficult. The Office 
for Budget Responsibility, which is currently tasked with producing the 
official numbers, changed its estimate for 2011/12 between March and 
November 2011 from 3.2 per cent of GDP to 4.6 per cent, almost wholly 
as a result of new information on the economy, rather than changes in 
government policy (OBR 2011).
The fact that changes of this magnitude can occur within the space of 
less than a year is problematic for policymakers. They face a choice 
between two flawed alternatives: setting policy relative to a measure 
that is insensitive to the cycle, so risking exacerbating booms and 
busts, or setting it relative to a definition of the deficit that is impossible 
in practice to measure. One conclusion that might be drawn from this 
unenviable choice is that fiscal policy should only be used in certain 
limited circumstances – when monetary policy appears to be proving 
ineffectual.
Meanwhile, monetary policymakers have abandoned their models 
in the short-term in order to justify the maximum degree of policy 
easing. Despite inflation being more than 1 percentage point above 
its target level for two years, the MPC has held its bank rate at the 
record low level of 0.5 per cent since March 2009 and has embarked 
on a programme of quantitative easing that now stands at £375 billion. 
Avoiding a depression (the depth of the 1930s Great Depression is 
blamed by many economists on the failure of central banks to relax 
monetary policy aggressively when economies initially slid into recession) 
and trying to get the economy growing again has taken priority.
Yet the framework in which the MPC operates has not changed. The 
Governor is still writing letters to the Chancellor every three months 
explaining why inflation is so far above its target rate and why the MPC 
feels no action is needed to bring it down. The presumption is that once 
the economy has recovered, quantitative easing will be reversed and the 
MPC will go back to nudging interest rates up and down in response 
to its best guess about growth and the output gap. The fact that this 
framework did nothing to prevent the deepest recession for almost 70 
years and was thrown out in the crisis appears to count for nothing.
In 2006 and 2007, the MPC’s models told it that consumer price 
inflation was likely to stay close to its target rate if interest rates were 
nudged slightly higher, so they increased them from 4.5 per cent to a 
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peak of 5.75 per cent. Meanwhile, policymakers were turning a blind 
eye to a financial bubble that had been developing for several years 
– the unintended consequence of a period of low interest rates that 
was justified by an extended period of low consumer price inflation. 
At the very least, this suggests monetary policy needs to be set by 
reference to a broader consideration than just consumer price inflation. 
David Colander (2011) argues policymakers should consider a range of 
explanations for developments in the economy and a range of possible 
outcomes following any policy action. Computers are now powerful 
enough to allow them to carry out highly sophisticated simulations of 
policy actions (the use of quantitative easing by the Bank of England is 
one policy that would be informed by such an approach). Policymakers 
should also take into account, Colander suggests, a ‘solid knowledge of 
history, history of ideas, and macroeconomic institutions’.
In the UK context, over the next few years this suggests a more relaxed 
approach to domestic inflation pressures, since they seem to be largely 
absent, even when the economy is doing well. Instead, greater attention 
should be focused on asset prices, particularly house prices, and on 
the oil price. The UK has experienced four major recessions in the last 
40 years. Each one was preceded by a large increase in the oil price 
and a period of rapid gains in house prices. While there is not much 
that policymakers in the UK can do on their own about oil prices, they 
should at least be fully aware of when they pose a serious risk to the 
economy and so give them a more prominent role in their deliberations. 
Similarly, controlling house price inflation may not always be possible. 
But if policymakers could find a way to prevent future surges in house 
prices, for example through the imposition of maximum loan-to-value 
ratios, it would probably do far more to reduce the risk of a future 
recession in the UK than minor adjustments to interest rates designed 
to keep consumer price inflation close to 2 per cent. At the very least, 
house prices should be given the same weight in policy deliberations 
as consumer prices, and should be a central focus of the Bank of 
England’s Financial Policy Committee.
Conclusion
Traditional economic thinking has given policymakers a misleading sense 
of their ability to use macroeconomic policies to guide the economy. The 
complexity approach accepts that economies are dynamic, subject to 
endogenous change and contain relationships that shift over time: as a 
result the nature of the economic cycle will evolve in unpredictable ways. 
Policymakers cannot accurately forecast economic developments; nor 
can they be sure of the response of the economy to macroeconomic 
policy changes. As a general rule, therefore, they should do less.
This does not mean that they should never intervene in the economy, 
but when they do, their actions should be based less on formal 
models, particularly DSGE models, and more on their intuition and 
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common sense. As Geoff Hodgson argues in chapter 5, policymaking 
is a complex business and policymakers need to adapt and learn as 
they go along. History suggests narrow, rules-based approaches to 
macroeconomic policy do not work for long. Policymakers should 
acknowledge their own limitations, abandon their DSGE models and 
develop a better understanding of the impact of policy interventions and 
their limitations through the use of simulations and impact assessments. 
In addition, they should seek a better understanding of exactly when 
they should intervene, and when not.
Academic economists need to help policymakers make this transition 
to a new way of thinking and behaving. There is an urgent need for 
a better conceptual framework for the ‘macroeconomic problem’ 
to be developed: one that mixes complex systems with more 
accurate descriptions of individual behaviour. Without this framework, 
policymakers are likely to persist with their existing models, despite their 
many deficiencies and past failings.
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New or heterodox economics has a lot to say about innovation. Indeed, 
some important concepts in heterodox approaches were shaped by the 
desire to understand innovation better. And yet much innovation policy, 
and the debates surrounding it, reflects a more traditional understanding.
As a result, debate on innovation policy often rests on narrow economic 
foundations. In particular, the main aim of innovation policy is too often 
seen as mitigating market failures, especially the ‘failure’ of businesses 
to do ‘enough’ research and development. This paper reappraises the 
‘market-failure’ approach to innovation policy, and supplements it with 
three other concepts that have been informed by heterodox economics:
• the idea of technology as something interesting and important in 
its own right
• the idea of the entrepreneur as the driver of innovation
• the idea of the innovation system.
These ideas suggest we need an innovation policy that does more 
than mitigate obvious market failures, but also encourages innovative 
entrepreneurship and the evolution of a supportive innovation system.
This creates a challenge: this kind of public policy is difficult, both 
politically and in terms of public administration. It offers at best only 
cautious support for active industrial policy, not least because of 
the considerable uncertainties about what policies actually work. A 
more pragmatic option is to adopt an innovation policy based on 
experimentation, both on the part of businesses and policymakers.
Innovation	studies	and	the	‘new’	economics:	a	long	
relationship
The history of innovation tells us that backwardness has its advantages. 
The winners of the microcomputer revolution were start-ups like 
Microsoft and Apple with little to lose and much to gain, rather Digital, 
Wang or the other leaders of the previous age of computing. Decades 
earlier, war-ravaged Germany and Japan found their ruined factories and 
depleted capital stock gave them an opportunity to retool, refocus and 
surpass the productivity of the victorious UK. 
7. 
innOvATiOn And The new 
ecOnOmics: sOme lessOns 
FOr POlicy
sTiAn wesTlAke
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Something similar applies to the study of innovation. Because ‘orthodox’ 
economics fails to explain successfully many aspects of technological 
change, the study of innovation is better informed by the so-called ‘new’ 
economics than some other fields.
Innovation was not, for much of the 20th century, a favoured topic for 
mainstream economists. Nobel Laureates made their names elsewhere. 
In exogenous growth models, innovation was the great residual, a kind 
of magic smoke left behind when the measurable inputs of capital 
and labour had been logged and filed.1 When endogenous growth 
theory arrived on the scene in the late 1980s,2 it incorporated research 
and development and technological change, but in a way that looks 
strangely bloodless to those who study technological change itself 
(Nelson 1998).
In an age when national output is obsessively measured, reported 
and analysed, the accurate measurement of innovation remains 
problematic; so much so that in 2012, a serious debate is taking place 
among economists on whether innovation is slowing down calamitously 
or speeding up dramatically,3 and it is suggested that the value of 
some modern technologies from lighting to consumer electronics are 
miscounted in national output statistics by a factor of ten or more.4
So-called ‘heterodox’ economics, on the other hand, has long been 
of interest to scholars researching innovation: indeed, the problem 
of how innovation happens has been a spur to the development of 
several heterodox approaches. Joseph Schumpeter, the grandfather of 
the study of innovation, embraced an evolutionary view of economics, 
and the search for an effective way of explaining innovation helped 
encourage the resurgence of interest in evolutionary economics in the 
1980s and beyond (Nelson and Winter 1977). A ‘systems’ perspective 
on how innovation happens within an economy was well established 
by the 1990s,5 as was the idea that path-dependence and emergence 
were useful concepts in thinking about the economic impact of 
technology (Arthur 1987).
If it is true that the global financial crisis has created a need for new 
economic thinking, it is not unreasonable to suspect some of this will be 
found in the intellectually omnivorous field of innovation research.
1	 This	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	not	a	rich	20th-century	tradition	of	economics	focused	on	innovation	–	
indeed,	before	the	growth	of	first	the	Keynesian	and	then	the	neoclassical	orthodoxy	after	the	second	
world	war,	economists	including	Joseph	Schumpeter	and	Frank	Knight	set	out	many	of	the	core	
concepts	of	the	study	of	innovation	and	entrepreneurship.	Endogenous	growth	theory	found	a	means	
to	incorporate	innovation	into	its	analysis	of	economic	growth,	typically	providing	a	‘knowledge’	or	
‘research’	component	that	itself	boosted	productivity.
2	 See	for	example	Romer	1990
3	 The	pessimistic	case	is	expressed	in	Cowen	2011;	an	alternative	view	can	be	found	in	Brynjolfsson	
and	McAfee	2011.
4	 Nordhaus	(1998)	argues	that	even	carefully	constructed	deflators	underestimate,	perhaps	grossly,	
improvements	in	the	quality	of	goods	as	a	result	of	innovation.	
5	 See	Freeman	1988,	Lundvall	1988
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Orthodox	innovation	policy:	the	base	case
Although innovation studies have been informed by a range of 
heterodox approaches, much actual innovation policy is based on more 
mainstream economic thinking. In particular, it is based on two ideas: 
the recognition that innovation leads to economic growth, and the belief 
that businesses do not innovate enough if left to their own devices 
because of market failures. 
Belief 1: innovation matters – especially R&D
Policymakers on the whole have accepted that new knowledge, and 
in particular scientific and technological knowledge, is a useful thing: it 
can be exploited to produce new goods and services that make people 
richer and happier. Politicians may be divided on how the government 
can help this process along (if at all), but the underlying assumption is 
almost universally accepted.
This is of course backed up by economics: it has been known for over 50 
years that most – between 60 to 80 per cent6 – of productivity growth 
comes not from increasing the amount of labour or capital in the economy, 
but from getting more out of these inputs: that is to say, innovation.
The importance of science and technology to this vision of innovation 
is also widespread. Even though research and development makes up 
only around 10 per cent of intangible investments in a country like the 
UK,7 it has traditionally been seen by policymakers as the life-blood 
of innovation. Countries fret about their expenditure on research and 
development (R&D), and aspire either to catch up with the global big 
spenders (Finland, Israel, the US) or to reach arbitrary targets (such as 
the European Union’s target of spending 3 per cent of GDP on R&D 
under the Lisbon Strategy).
Belief 2: innovation is subject to market failures
Most policymakers also accept that government needs to encourage 
some investments in innovation. The money that businesses and 
individuals spend on developing new ideas has widespread benefits that 
are rarely collected in full by the person who lays out the investment.
If I make an investment in physical capital, let’s say buy buying a server 
for my office, I can reasonably expect to enjoy all the benefits of it: for 
someone else to do so is both illegal and difficult. But if I spend money to 
develop a new idea, it may well be rather easy for someone else to copy 
it, and, except under very specific circumstances, it will probably be legal.
Microsoft made billions from the graphical user interface. But Windows 
depended on earlier products and investments made by Apple, by 
6	 The Innovation Index	(Nesta	2009–12)	provided	the	60	per	cent	figure	for	the	UK	in	the	late	20th	and	
early	21st	century;	the	80	per	cent	figure	is	for	the	US	earlier	in	the	20th	century	and	comes	from	one	
of	the	first	growth	accounting	exercises,	see	Abramovitz	1956.
7	 Nesta	2009–2012
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Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center and by the US government (in the 
form of the DARPA-funded oN-Line System), none of whom had any 
right to be paid for their troubles. As Microsoft’s Bill Gates justified 
himself to Steve Jobs of Apple, ‘it’s ... like we both had this rich 
neighbour named Xerox and I broke into his house to steal the TV set 
and found out that you had already stolen it’ (Isaacson 2011).
Again, this intuitive insight has sound economic roots: investments in 
some types of innovation, especially R&D have positive spillovers. The 
idea that the public returns to investment in R&D exceed the private 
returns was observed by economists at much the same time that they 
realised the extent to which growth depended on innovation (Grilliches 
1958). Because investors in R&D do not receive all the benefits of their 
investment, economists immediately recognised a potential market 
failure: left to their self-interest, people and businesses would do too 
little research, since the chances are someone else would reap most of 
the benefit. 
These two insights give rise to two of the core orthodoxies of modern 
innovation policy: the idea that innovation is an important driver of 
growth, and the idea that the government should seek to increase the 
benefits of researching and innovating to offset market failures.
The policies this leads to are old standards: public funding of research, 
to encourage more of it to happen (especially basic research, whose 
benefits are least likely to accrue to the person who pays for it, along 
with funding for university technology transfer); intellectual property 
laws, so that (some) innovators are more likely to reap the benefits of 
their ideas; and R&D tax credits, to hand back to investors in innovation 
through the tax system some of the economy-wide benefits they create.
As well as being well-grounded in generally accepted economic 
principles, these policies are also convenient both politically and from the 
point of view of public administration. R&D tax credits and intellectual 
property laws do not ostensibly favour one sector over another, and 
so protect governments from the accusation that they are ‘picking 
winners’, a practice with a bad track record at least in the UK. Neither 
do they require great technological or commercial insight on the part 
of government officials. What’s more, funding basic research is popular 
with academics and scientists, who constitute a vocal constituency that 
is experienced at lobbying.
Like many orthodoxies, policymakers’ basic beliefs on innovation 
are accompanied by a variety of talismans and superstitions. It is 
often thought that entrepreneurship, or the existence of start-up 
businesses, is good for innovation,8 with the result that innovation 
8	 As	for	example	in	this	blog	post	by	the	Kauffman	Foundation:	http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/
kauffman-foundation-unveils-startup-act-proposal-to-boost-growth-of-new-businesses-and-add-
jobs-to-u-s-economy.aspx
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policy and entrepreneurship policy are often connected. Sometimes 
small businesses of all types are thought to be especially innovative.9 
Institutions and phenomena associated with innovation hotspots, such as 
Silicon Valley, are often thought to be a good thing: venture capital funds, 
incubators and university technology transfer operations (Hughes 2007).
But beyond this, it is generally held that the way to promote innovation 
is to follow the standard rules of economics: keep taxes and regulation 
as low as possible, encourage competition and liberal markets for both 
capital and labour, and innovation will flourish along with the rest of the 
economy.10
Beyond this, innovation policy has tended to be subsumed into 
the wider economic debates that play out along well-established 
ideological lines: the right asserts that economic ‘freedom’ is conducive 
to innovation,11 while the left argues for a larger role for the state in 
encouraging investment in innovation and in setting rules that encourage 
‘productive’ innovation.12
Three	new	‘characters’	in	the	innovation	story:	
technologies,	entrepreneurs,	systems
It may be convenient for policymakers to see market failure as the 
central fact in the story of innovation, and to shape policy accordingly. 
But this leaves three important characters out of the story. These three 
concepts have each been informed by the ‘new’ economics, and raise 
important questions for policymakers. They are:
1. technology and technological change as distinct concepts worthy 
of study rather than incidental or epiphenomenal aspects of 
economic activity
2. the entrepreneur, as an agent of change and innovation
3. the innovation system, as something more than a market in which 
one of the inputs happens to be R&D.
1. The nature of technology and technological change
Few policymakers or economists would disagree that technological 
change is an important part of economic growth. But the specifics of 
technology rarely take centre stage in mainstream economics – indeed, 
one of the virtues of economic analysis is that it takes the bewildering 
9	 The	website	of	the	Small	and	Medium	Business	Innovation	Alliance	contains	the	following	quote	from	
the	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry	that	is	difficult	to	trace	ultimately	to	any	actual	research:	‘Since	
the	second	world	war	95%	of	all	the	radical	new	inventions	have	come	from	businesses	employing	
less	than	5	people.	The	formation	of	those	businesses	is	critical	to	our	economic	success.’
10	 The	idea	that	innovation	policy	follows	the	contours	of	the	wider	economic	debate	tends	to	be	true	
even	for	those	who	believe	the	government	should	play	a	far	greater	role	in	encouraging	innovation.	
Keynesian	critics	of	current	government	policy	occasionally	argue	the	need	for	a	state-sponsored	
‘innovation	bank’	alongside	calls	for	infrastructure	banks	and	small	business	banks,	as	in	Hutton	
2010.	Active	state	involvement	in	innovation	tends	to	be	advocated	as	part	of	a	package	deal,	rather	
than	as	a	specific	response	to	the	peculiarities	of	innovation.
11	 See	for	example	Phelps	2009	
12	 See	for	example	Hutton	2010
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jumble of technologies that make up the modern economy and 
expresses them in the radically simple quantitative language of output 
and productivity. 
However, technology does not seem to be quite as smooth or 
predictable as this would imply. The economist Arthur Harberger (1998) 
once asked whether economic growth was more like mushrooms or 
more like yeast:
‘Yeast	causes	bread	to	expand	very	evenly,	like	a	balloon	being	
filled	with	air,	while	mushrooms	have	the	habit	of	popping	up,	
almost	overnight,	in	a	fashion	that	is	not	easy	to	predict.’	
A variety of research from outside the economic mainstream – from 
economic history to complexity theory – suggests that, on the whole, 
innovation is more mushroomy than yeasty.
At the heart of this are two related concepts. The first concept is based 
on Brian Arthur’s related observations that some technologies exhibit 
increasing returns to scale, and that all technologies are built from other 
technologies. The first part of this explains why some technologies, 
such as telephones, become increasingly useful as they are more 
widely adopted; the second part observes that some technologies 
are complementary to one another, and that bringing them together 
in new ways occasionally creates unexpected breakthroughs. (One 
consequence of this is that, unlike other sorts of investment, backing 
innovation may not exhibit decreasing returns to scale.)
The second concept is Timothy Bresnahan’s (1995) idea of the ‘general 
purpose technology’, a technology with the potential to change large 
parts of the economy in transformative ways. Steam power and 
electricity are often cited as examples of general purpose technologies, 
since they changed fields as diverse as transportation, manufacturing, 
communication and heating. One of the characteristics of these 
technologies is that they often take a long time to achieve an impact. 
Factories ran on electrical power for many years before it was widely 
realised (David 1990) that an electrified factory could be laid out in a 
completely different way (with power sources for each machine, rather 
than a single large engine driving all the factory’s machines through belts 
and chains). Opinions differ as to which technologies count as general 
purpose, but there is widespread agreement that information and 
communication technology (ICT) is an example (Field 2011). Some of 
those who have studied this question most closely argue that the impact 
of ICT on the economy is far from being fully realised and is, in fact, less 
than halfway through (Arthur 2011, Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011).
Building on Schumpeter’s work on ‘long waves’ of technological 
deployment, some authors have speculated that technological trends 
dictate economic activity. For instance, Carlota Perez (2003) has 
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argued that the current economic climate and its financial crises are 
a consequence of the build-out of ICT in the economy. Even if we do 
not accept such a strong form of technological determinism, it seems 
plausible that the specifics of technological progress will have an effect 
on the economy.
This means that one way or another, governments need to create 
the conditions for their economies to exploit these new technologies, 
and that doing so can unleash unusually high growth. Of course, the 
question is how.
One possibility is that government should play a role in identifying and 
promoting general purpose technologies (Hutton and Schneider 2008), 
and should direct its policy interventions accordingly. It seems plausible 
that government should take account of technological trends to the 
extent that they are knowable; although it is less clear that government 
is likely to be able to predict them.13
What we do know is that technological developments require non-
technological investments to make them pay off. In the UK, for every 
pound invested in R&D, businesses invest eight pounds in other 
intangible assets, from training to product design to branding (Nesta 
2009–2012). The process of combining these technologies and assets 
with one another, and then trying to see how they can be turned 
into things that customers find useful, is a central part of innovation. 
And it also seems to be the mechanism that helps general purpose 
technologies transform the wider economy (Brynjolfsson 2011).
The real question for policy, then, is how it can go with the grain 
of technological change to support new ideas – especially major 
technological breakthroughs like ICT – and old ideas coming together 
to change the economy. This is where the next two characters in the 
innovation story come in.
2. Entrepreneurs as drivers of innovation
Entrepreneurs have a curious position in innovation policy. Politicians like 
to talk about entrepreneurs and to be seen to promote them, but they 
often do this at one remove from innovation policy, which tends to focus 
on the more research-centred market failures discussed above.
Some heterodox economists, most notably the Austrians, have 
put innovation more squarely at the centre of their theory of 
entrepreneurship. Israel Kirzner, for example, argued that the ability 
of the entrepreneur to see and exploit new, innovative business 
opportunities sits outside the optimising calculus of classical economics. 
Whether or not this is theoretically true (Cowen 2003), entrepreneurs 
13	 There	are	a	number	of	heroic	failures	in	this	area.	Consider	for	example	the	1998	UK	Productivity	
Report,	commissioned	by	the	UK	government	from	McKinsey	&	Company,	which,	alongside	much	
insightful	analysis,	looks	at	trends	transforming	the	UK	economy,	but	makes	no	mention	of	the	
internet,	except	for	a	small	box	describing	in	passing	an	innovative	retailer	called	Amazon.co.uk.
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play an important role in the process of turning new technologies and 
knowledge into practically useful offerings – that is, the process of 
innovation (Baumol 2003).
Paying lip-service to the role of entrepreneurs in innovation, however, 
is not the same as designing effective public policy to promote it. If we 
define an entrepreneur as anyone who starts a business, then as Scott 
Shane (2008) has observed, most entrepreneurs are neither innovative 
nor particularly likely to succeed. There is nothing inherently innovative 
about new businesses per se: for every new Google or Facebook, there 
are thousands of me-too businesses that are less productive and no 
more inventive than existing firms. Only a small minority of firms are truly 
innovative and they are disproportionately likely to achieve high growth 
(Nesta 2009). However, because there are many small businesses in 
the UK and their owners and workers all vote, the political appeal of 
confounding innovative entrepreneurs with the much larger number of 
small businesses is clear.
The result of this is the mislabelling of small business or start-up policy 
as innovation policy. One example is the government’s ill-fated national 
insurance break for the first 10 employees of small businesses, a policy 
geared to helping all start-ups indiscriminately, and by limiting support 
to the first 10 employees, targeting money away from the high-growth 
businesses most likely to be innovative.
The role of innovation policy with respect to entrepreneurs should, 
instead, be as much as possible to encourage those entrepreneurs likely 
to be innovating. To the extent their businesses are likely to grow, this 
will include policies to encourage business growth such as improving 
access to finance for highly innovative firms or improving their access to 
skilled workers through the education and immigration systems. To the 
extent that their innovations are likely to disrupt business as usual, this 
means not putting in place policies to protect incumbents (Nesta 2010).14 
Other, more micro-scale policies can encourage the experimental 
entrepreneurship that leads to innovation: encouraging entrepreneurship 
among high-potential groups such as university students, co-sponsoring 
accelerators and incubators, or stimulating radical innovation through 
prizes can increase the feedstock of innovative entrepreneurs.And 
finally, the government should think of itself as a facilitator of innovative 
experiment. Encouraging innovative businesses to share knowledge 
through knowledge transfer networks is a cheap but valuable 
undertaking; providing funding for new business model development 
on the condition that lessons are widely shared (as, for example, in the 
Technology Strategy Board’s ‘digital testbeds’ programme for high-speed 
broadband) are a more ambitious version of this.
14	 Nesta’s	research	suggests	that	a	0.5	percentage	point	fall	in	the	number	of	rapidly	shrinking	firms	
(that	is,	less	creative	destruction)	reduced	productivity	in	European	countries	by	0.2	percentage	
points	in	the	last	decade.
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Entrepreneurs do not operate in a vacuum, however. The technologies 
on which they rely arise from a much more complex broth, the nature of 
which matters greatly for innovation. This is the innovation system.
3. The innovation system – business, government, research and more
For the past three decades, innovation scholars have pointed out that 
innovation happens in complex systems. Interest in innovation systems 
was sparked by the dramatic success of the Japanese economy in 
the 1970s and 1980s: observers noticed that something was going on 
in the interaction between the Japanese state, its businesses and its 
research base, and tried to understand more, extending the analysis not 
just to other Asian nations with explicitly interventionist states, but to a 
wide range of rich countries. 
This line of inquiry highlighted how the amount of innovation that 
businesses invest in is affected not just by straightforward commercial 
considerations, but also by institutions (the nature of the education 
system, or technological standards), culture (Japanese long-termism in 
investment decisions, for example, or American tolerance of business 
failure) and social ties (such as those between engineers of competing 
businesses) (Lundvall et al 2002: 213–232). An important aspect of 
this is the so-called ‘chain-link’ model of the supply of and demand for 
innovation (Kline and Rosenberg 1986), which argues that innovation 
depends on a subtle and frequently changing mix of demand pull (for 
example, customers demanding better products) and supply push (for 
example, research identifying ways to make products better).
If the amount of innovation that occurs in an economy is a function of 
many interconnected factors, it is plausible that the system linking all 
these factors – the innovation system – might have multiple equilibria. 
One implication of this is that the existence of the ‘wrong’ kinds of 
institutions (from regulation to schooling, culture to procurement) could 
lead to a country being stuck in an unfavourable equilibrium. This raises 
the question of whether government should play a role in helping set up 
the ‘right’ institutions.
Another implication is that policy choices might have effects that 
manifest themselves unevenly, like the proverbial ketchup bottle. 
Consider R&D tax credits, a standard tool of innovation policy. If the 
main problem they are meant to address is that businesses invest less 
than they otherwise would in R&D because they cannot capture all 
the benefits, then a tax credit needs to be permanent (if a government 
stops its tax credit programme, the old market failures will kick in and 
investment in R&D will fall again). What’s more, a small tax credit is 
better than no tax credit at all.
If, however, the aim of the credit is more generally to shift businesses, 
and the organisations with whom they work, from a way of working 
in which they do little R&D to one in which they do more, a shorter-
917: Westlake
lived but more generous credit may make more sense.15 A permanent 
but small tax credit may even have no effect at all, if it does not help 
overcome the institutional barriers to innovation. The idea of the 
‘behavioural additionality’ of policies like tax credits – the extent to which 
they change behaviour – has become an area of policy interest in recent 
years (OECD 2006).
Some commentators have argued that the systems perspective on 
innovation supports left-wing arguments for a much more active 
developmental state (Mazzucato 2011, Nesta 2009). After all, the idea 
of innovation systems has as its ancestor the work of Friedrich List, the 
architect of German and American protectionism in the 19th century 
(Lundvall et al 2002). This interpretation of innovation systems is true 
insofar as it casts doubt on a very extreme version of its right-wing 
counterargument: the idea that government policy is always inevitably 
hostile to innovation; that the government ‘should just get out of the 
way’. This is not borne out by the evidence of successful national 
innovation systems from Finland to Israel, or even the US, which as 
some scholars have noted has a large developmental state supplying 
everything from generous research funding to soft finance for start-ups 
(Block 2008).
One recent article (Aighion et al 2009) argues that remedying system 
failures requires sector-specific policies (for example, harnessing 
government procurement to increase demand for new solutions, 
or funding research in particular areas of technology). However, the 
importance of innovation systems throws up almost as many questions 
as it answers. On the one hand, the deep involvement of the state in 
quite specific ways in many examples of successful innovation suggests 
that encouraging innovation, especially innovation that requires big 
investments in time and research, requires supportive public policy that 
goes beyond broad research funding or tax credits.
Knowing that some policies worked to encourage some innovations 
in the past does not, however, mean that we know what policies 
will encourage other innovations in the future. Even in relatively well-
studied and limited areas of innovation system-building, the policy 
pharmacopoeia is patchy and unreliable. Take, for example, the 
promotion of effective markets for venture capital investment.16 Despite 
the successful and widely discussed example of Israel’s public–private 
Yozma fund in the 1990s, a range of similar policies have worked less 
well, and debate continues on the effectiveness of policies in the UK.17 
The question of which policies work is complicated by the fact that 
innovation systems are complex, and therefore that it is hard to isolate 
the effectiveness of individual policies. 
15	 Ongoing	work	by	Philippe	Laredo	is	investigating	this	idea.
16	 Reviewed	in	Lerner 2010
17	 See	for	example	Nesta/BVCA	2009
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Political implementation is also tricky. Active innovation policy costs 
money, which must often be found at the expense of popular causes. 
In its recovery from crisis in the early 1990s, Finland cut expenditure 
drastically in most areas of public spending, but not research.18 This was 
made easier by Finland’s relatively small and cohesive population and 
coherent political culture. It is harder to imagine such a response being 
politically acceptable in the UK, and it is interesting to note that most 
countries with strong, explicit, well-respected innovation policies – Israel, 
Singapore, Finland, Sweden – are relatively small and relatively cohesive. 
Active innovation policy also tends to be technocratic, requiring 
willingness to appoint technically competent (and therefore often 
highly paid) officials and to give them control over large budgets with 
little political interference. Neither of these things tend to be politically 
popular.
So the innovation systems literature allows us to eliminate one rather 
uninteresting question from political debate: ‘is an active innovation 
policy an unalloyed good or an unmitigated disaster?’ It makes it clear 
that in some instances in the past such activism has worked and has 
been valuable. Instead, it raises two important priorities for policy: first, 
developing a better understanding of what policies work to achieve 
specific goals in the context of the innovation system, and second, 
building the political case for implementing these policies.
Conclusion:	an	experimental	innovation	policy
This chapter has identified three themes, inspired by the ‘new’ 
economics, that take us beyond a market-failure-dominated view of 
innovation policy. Taking into account the importance of exploiting new 
technologies, the role of innovative entrepreneurship and the complexity 
of the innovation system should form the basis for a richer and more 
effective innovation policy.
However, such a policy is likely to be tougher to design than a hands-
off, market-failure-based approach. Promoting entrepreneurship is a 
tricky task for government. And shaping the innovation system requires 
more than sector-blind policies: it requires intervention that may vary 
from industry to industry and that therefore requires detailed knowledge 
to get right. Indeed, it is possible that in some, even in many, areas 
reliably making good sector-specific innovation policy may be beyond 
the ability of most governments, both in terms of political will and public 
administrative capability.
The solution to this is an experimental approach. On the one hand, 
policy with regard to entrepreneurship should seek to encourage 
an experimental approach with regard to new business models and 
ideas. The role of government as a broker of new ideas, encouraging 
18	 See	for	example	the	interview	with	Finland’s	then	prime	minister,	Esko	Aho,	conducted	by	the	OECD:	
http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3746,en_2649_33703_43098513_1_1_1_1,00.html
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partnerships to share knowledge and funding new ways of doing things 
should sit alongside a broader policy framework that encourages 
innovative entrepreneurs to set up and grow their businesses.
On the other hand, when it comes to the innovation system, 
policymaking itself should be explicitly experimental. We need to 
recognise that, although we do not know what works in many aspects 
of sectoral innovation policy, we know that in the past the right 
government policy has paid off, whether in the form of the US’s hidden 
developmental state or the more explicit innovation policies of Finland or 
Singapore. Trying new policies, gathering data and rigorously assessing 
what works is the most likely way to identify the right innovation policy – 
or conversely to identify the areas in which policy is likely to have limited 
impact.
All this will require political will to promote innovation on a scale not 
previously seen in the UK. Politicians should think not just about how to 
identify the best innovation policy, but also how to develop and describe 
it in ways that resonate with voters, otherwise innovation will lose out in 
the inevitable political battles with other spending priorities.
This is a timely approach. It is timely from the point of view of the 
business of innovation in that it mirrors the approach to technological 
change increasingly seen at giants like Google, Facebook and Amazon, 
who encourage entrepreneurship both among their staff and among 
constellations of related start-ups, and combine this with a resolutely 
experimental approach enabled by the richness of the data at their 
fingertips about their customers, what works and what doesn’t for their 
business.
More importantly, it is timely for the UK. If we care about our country’s 
economic performance over the next decade, and into the decade after, 
the biggest challenge we face is innovation.
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Energy is of fundamental importance for modern industrialised 
economies. Access to affordable energy is vital for the services we 
enjoy – from keeping warm to cooking our food, the ability to travel to 
providing entertainment. In recent years, policy concerns about the 
availability, security and affordability of energy have once again risen 
up the agenda. Energy prices have risen dramatically, and the UK has 
returned to the club of net energy importers after twenty years in which 
production exceeded consumption.
Since the early 2000s, climate change has been at the heart of energy 
policy debates. Unlike some industrialised countries (notably Australia 
and the United States), the UK’s energy and climate change policies 
have been underpinned by a strong degree of cross-party consensus, 
with all the main political parties in agreement that something must be 
done to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This consensus has been 
reinforced by the increasing strength of climate science and evidence 
to suggest that action on emissions is in the UK’s economic interest 
(Stern 2006). Armed with a comprehensive case for emissions cuts, the 
UK’s political parties have often competed with each other to propose 
tougher policies and laws. For this reason, the UK has some of the 
most ambitious targets for emissions reduction in the world, with legal 
backing through the Climate Change Act 2009.
While this background has given the UK’s drive to reduce emissions 
considerable momentum, climate and energy policies have started recently 
to encounter significant difficulties. The financial crisis and economic 
downturn have put huge pressure on government and household budgets 
and have led to cracks in the political consensus. Climate change has 
fallen down the agenda, though energy concerns remain strong due to 
persistently high prices and the need to replace ageing infrastructure. 
Pointed questions are being asked about the cost of cutting emissions, 
and whether the measures the government is pursuing are affordable, 
most notably by the chancellor, George Osborne. 
In the face of these challenges, what should be done? This chapter 
explores how new economic thinking can inform climate change and 
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energy policies. I argue that even before the crisis there were important 
shortcomings in the economic approaches used to underpin climate 
and energy policies; but now that the economic and political context has 
changed so fundamentally, these shortcomings need greater attention, 
not less. Evolutionary and complexity economics offer some important 
insights and lessons and, as I put forward here, could help make climate 
and energy policies more effective.
Beyond	carbon	pricing
It is no surprise that the neoclassical economic frameworks that 
dominate policy thinking in the UK have also formed the basis of 
responses to our climate change and energy policy challenges. One of 
the main modifications to the traditional neoclassical approach has been 
to impose a price on environmental ‘externalities’, namely emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. The rationale 
for this is that while emissions impose costs on current and future 
generations, for example through increases in average temperatures, 
changes in weather patterns and rising sea levels, these costs are not 
typically captured in market transactions. 
Provided these costs can be quantified, carbon pricing allows for them 
to be ‘internalised’ by putting an appropriate price on each tonne 
of greenhouse gas emitted. By making buyers pay more for goods 
and services in proportion to their climate change impact, there is an 
incentive for them to switch to lower-carbon alternatives – and for sellers 
or producers to reduce the carbon footprint of the goods and services 
they provide.
Carbon prices have been introduced in the UK through emissions 
trading – in essence, an artificially created market in which participating 
firms are allocated a fixed number of permits to emit greenhouse 
gases. These permits can be traded. In theory, firms will trade permits 
until the market reaches equilibrium: the point at which the desired 
emissions limit has been met at the lowest overall cost. An initial UK 
pilot trading scheme was quickly succeeded by an EU-wide emissions 
trading scheme (the EU ETS) in 2005. Emissions trading was described 
in the 2003 white paper as being ‘central to the future market and 
policy framework’ (Department of Trade and Industry 2003: 13). In a 
subsequent white paper published in 2007, it was estimated that trading 
would deliver the biggest share of additional emissions reductions by 
2020 (Department of Trade and Industry 2007).
While pricing carbon is important to internalise the external costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions, a number of criticisms can be made of an 
overreliance on this as a policy strategy. Some (but not all) of these 
criticisms stem from differences between real-world implementation 
of emissions trading and textbook theories. First, the price in the EU 
ETS has been too low to make much difference to investment (as 
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opposed to operational) decision-making by firms. At the time of writing 
EU ETS prices are below 10 euros per tonne of CO2. This reflects the 
fact that the cap on emissions was set too high, itself a reflection of 
political compromises that were made with lobbies that feared negative 
competitiveness impacts of high carbon prices. But just as important, 
the time horizon of the carbon price is short and prices have been very 
volatile. The UK government has acknowledged both of these problems, 
and have used them as a rationale to propose a Carbon Floor Price 
which will be implemented in April 2013 (DECC 2011b). 
But even if it were stable and high, a universal carbon price would not 
be a sufficient condition for decarbonisation. This leads to the second 
criticism. An important assumption behind policies such as emissions 
trading is that decision-makers – whether they be individuals or large 
firms – operate in a rational way. However, it has been clear for a 
long time that assumptions about rationality are oversimplified and 
inaccurate. It is many decades since Nobel prize winner Herbert Simon 
wrote about the ‘bounded rationality’ that is often at work, in which 
decisions are made using short cuts and ‘rules of thumb’ (Simon 1957). 
More recently, behavioural economists have shown in detail why such 
rationality is a nice ideal, but is rarely an accurate reflection of the real 
world (Ariely 2009).
Concepts such as bounded rationality start to explain why context is 
important in economic decision-making. For example, large power 
companies contemplating investment in offshore wind go through rather 
different decision-making processes to individual consumers wondering 
whether to insulate their lofts. These firms and individuals will respond 
differently to a given price signal or incentive. Furthermore, as Paul 
Ormerod explains in chapter 2, they will be influenced by others through 
‘social networks’. This contradicts the assumption in neoclassical 
economics that decisions are made by individuals whose preferences 
are fixed and independent from those of others. 
A good illustration of this complexity is road transport. An average UK 
car driver faces fuel taxes and VAT that are collectively equivalent to 
£300 per tonne of CO2. This extremely high implicit price of carbon 
has undoubtedly influenced behaviour, and has helped to reduce fuel 
consumption and emissions. However, it has not led consumers to 
switch to the most efficient models of vehicle or to buy alternatives to 
petrol and diesel. 
There are many good reasons for this. Alternative fuel vehicles are more 
expensive to buy and are hampered by a lack of infrastructure, such 
as electric charging points. But the fact that consumers are prepared 
to pay so much to drive their cars – including inefficient models – also 
reflects how much they value attributes such as status, style, safety, 
brand, performance, privacy and convenience. Only some of these 
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attributes can be captured by traditional frameworks that assume 
decisions are made by ‘rational’ individuals. 
Limitations to rationality also apply to the analysis of firms, where simple 
cost–benefit calculations about the ‘best’ investment are just one 
consideration among many – other issues such as financial and policy 
risks are important too (UKERC 2007). A good illustration is nuclear 
power. It has been claimed that nuclear power is the cheapest low-
carbon option available and even has lower costs than unabated gas 
power plants (Committee on Climate Change 2010). This is disputable 
given the major cost overruns that are affecting plants that are being 
built in France and Finland. But it is also striking that no investors are 
prepared to build new nuclear plants in the UK without significant 
additional government intervention – for example on sharing waste 
liabilities, long-term contracts for selling power and planning. In the 
meantime, gas-fired generation remains the technology of choice for 
new investments because it is seen as much less risky than most 
of the alternatives. This is because the principal risk associated with 
gas-fired plants is the level of gas prices. By correlating these prices 
with electricity prices, investors are able to hedge against this risk. By 
contrast, the current market arrangements do not provide a sufficient 
hedge against the main risks for nuclear investors, which are associated 
with capital costs. 
A third critical point to draw attention to is innovation. As evolutionary 
economists since Joseph Schumpeter have emphasised, innovation is a 
centrally important driver of economic growth and has been at the heart 
of many of the pervasive changes in our economy during the past two 
centuries (Freeman and Louca 2001). Examples include the role of the 
steam engine in the industrial revolution, and the pervasive impact of 
information and communication technologies more recently.
Innovation is likely to play a central role in the transition to a more 
sustainable economy. Policies to support innovation are important to 
develop new technologies through R&D, and to support emerging 
low-carbon technologies through demonstration and early adoption 
towards commercial deployment. A carbon price (or any other pricing 
mechanism) will be designed to incentivise the cheapest courses of 
action first. This is for a good reason: it minimises the costs to society 
of meeting a given environmental target. But on its own, it does little 
to encourage the development of the next generation of low-carbon 
technologies. It is a very weak signal to firms to take the risk of funding 
new technologies across the ‘valley of death’ from early prototype to 
full-scale deployment. As the Carbon Trust has shown, this is often the 
most capital intensive stage of the innovation process. Neoclassical 
approaches to climate and energy policy simply overlook these 
limitations (Carbon Trust 2006).
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Both the previous Labour administration and the current Coalition 
government have paid some attention to innovation. More nuanced and 
specific policies have been implemented to take into account the different 
stages of development of low-carbon technologies – for example through 
reforming renewable energy incentives so that further-from-market tech-
nologies receive more support. There has also been an explicit attempt, 
initially by former business secretary Peter Mandelson, to couple sup-
port for low-carbon technology deployment with industrial policy. While 
this re-emergence of industrial policy has not been problem free, it has 
brought the UK closer to many of the most successful countries – such 
as Germany – in terms of the stated approach to low-carbon innovation. 
A fourth issue is more pervasive, and is very difficult for standard 
economic models to deal with. The concepts of path-dependence and 
lock-in from evolutionary economics are very important, but little attention 
has been paid to them within UK policymaking. The term lock-in was 
originally coined by Brian Arthur to explain how some technologies 
become widely adopted due to increasing returns to scale, even though 
they may not, objectively speaking, be the best technologies for a 
particular application (Arthur 1989). Examples include the QWERTY 
computer keyboard and the VHS video format. This lock-in concept 
was subsequently scaled up to describe the pervasiveness of fossil 
fuels, and hence high-carbon emissions, within modern industrialised 
economies (Unruh 2000, Unruh 2002). This means that if markets are left 
to themselves, energy systems tend to change slowly. Transitions such 
as the historical shifts in the UK from wood fuel to coal, and from coal to 
other fossil fuels, have taken many decades ( Pearson and Fouquet 2006).
The key insight from the concept of lock-in is that it is not simply a case 
of making low-carbon technologies more attractive and cost effective. 
This is because many parts of our high-carbon energy system consist 
of long-lived capital assets including electricity grids, gas pipelines and 
buildings. Furthermore, these are supported by interacting systems 
of rules, regulations and institutions that coordinate energy flows, 
market relationships and investment decisions. Technologies and 
institutions co-evolve and are closely integrated (Geels 2004, Weber 
and Hemmelskamp 2005). As Paul Ormerod argues in chapter 2, the 
rigidities of these systems are reinforced by pervasive social networks 
between the actors and institutions involved. This can mean that when 
changes happen within such systems, they can ‘cascade’ through such 
systems in unpredictable ways (as was the case in the banking crisis). 
Therefore, in many cases, low-carbon technologies cannot simply be 
substituted for high-carbon technologies without some changes to 
these rules, regulations and institutions. While policymaking has made 
some reference to these more pervasive sources of high-carbon inertia – 
such as the lack of infrastructure to support electric vehicle charging – it 
has paid too little attention to this phenomenon.
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Infrastructures,	innovation	and	government	
entrepreneurship	
Given these critiques of the dominant approach to climate policy, and 
the deterioration in both public and private finances, what should be 
done now? In the face of these challenges, some organisations have 
advocated a pared-down version of climate change and energy policy 
(Less et al 2010). While retreating to the ‘simpler’ policies of the late 
1990s and early 2000s is superficially attractive, this chapter has 
already set out a number of reasons why carbon pricing alone will not 
be sufficient to do the job. Complementary policies are also required to 
reduce emissions effectively, and to break out of our lock-in to a high-
carbon energy system. To address this, we need smarter government 
intervention, including highly targeted policies to support innovation, 
low-carbon investment and make our use of energy more efficient. 
Contemporary debates about ‘rebalancing’ the economy present an 
opportunity to influence policymaking so that it supports growth that 
is cleaner and ‘greener’. There is significant support for this concept, 
but with large divergences of view. Some argue that growth itself is the 
main sustainability problem (Jackson 2009), whereas others do not 
have a problem with growth but want it to be much less carbon and 
resource intensive (Aldersgate Group 2011). It is not the intention to go 
into these arguments in detail here. The radical critics of conventional 
economic growth make some very important points about limits to 
resources, the unsustainability of current patterns of consumption, 
and the problems of using GDP as a measure of progress. They are 
less convincing when it comes to politically and economically feasible 
alternatives.1
One further thing they fail to explain is where the innovation required to 
‘green’ our economy will come from if we move away from growth. As 
innovation has been a key driver of the growth we have experienced 
and benefited from in the past, so, in the absence of growth, we might 
expect innovation to be less likely. 
It is important to be clear about what a low-carbon society means 
for the UK. It means radical cuts in our emissions, and meeting the 
legally binding targets in the Climate Change Act.2 It also means an 
equally important shift in the goods and services the UK economy 
produces in favour of cleaner technologies, and more economically and 
environmentally sustainable business models. Radical innovation and 
large-scale investments will be crucial to achieving this.
1	 See	for	example	critiques	by	Matthew	Lockwood,	http://politicalclimate.net/2011/03/25/the-limits-to-
environmentalism-4/	
2	 Of	course,	there	are	limitations	to	the	‘legally	binding’	nature	of	the	2009	act.	There	was	considerable	
debate	when	it	was	introduced	about	the	extent	to	which	it	is	legally	enforceable	in	the	courts,	or	
whether	the	main	impact	of	missing	targets	would	simply	be	damage	to	ministerial	reputations.
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Yet a recent report claims that the UK’s low-carbon investment is going 
in the wrong direction. Low-carbon energy investment in the UK fell from 
£7.1 billion in 2009 to £2.1 billion in 2010, rising only slightly in 2011 to 
£2.5 billion (Harvey 2011). While overall business investment has been 
hit by the economic crisis,3 the fall in low-carbon energy investment 
has been disproportionately large. This is not for lack of funds. Indeed, 
the private sector in the UK and some other countries has built up a 
substantial financial surplus. They are not spending this surplus out of 
concern over the sluggish state of the economy and because there is a 
lack of confidence that investment would generate a return. 
As Mattia Romani and colleagues at the LSE argue, there would be 
significant investment in low-carbon infrastructure if policy incentives 
were stronger and clearer (Romani et al 2011). Policies to kick-start 
growth need to provide clear incentives for investment to be low carbon. 
Waiting until the economic climate is brighter would not only mean 
higher greenhouse gas emissions in the short term, but could also 
strengthen our economy’s lock-in to high-carbon infrastructures. As the 
International Energy Agency argued recently (IEA 2011), the world could 
be locked in to an emissions pathway that is too carbon intensive for 
climate safety if current emissions trends continue beyond 2017.
What policies should be put in place to support growth that is more 
sustainable and leads to an economy that has lower carbon emissions? 
Overall, the government’s growth strategies place some emphasis on 
sustainability (HM Treasury and Department of Business, Innovation and 
Skills 2010). However, the policy prescriptions that flow from this do not 
make sustainability a central concern. 
The government recognises that it can help to stimulate growth 
by supporting infrastructure investment. The benefits of public co-
funding of infrastructures – and the positive impacts on private sector 
investment – are well documented in the literature (Infrastructure 
Transitions Research Consortium 2012). The revised National 
Infrastructure Plan (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK 2011) that 
accompanied the autumn statement offers some legitimacy for such 
investment. 
Some of the infrastructure projects that are being prioritised under the 
plan are designed to reduce carbon emissions. In the power sector, 
investment is being supported by far reaching reforms of the electricity 
market (DECC 2011b). While many criticisms can be made of the 
electricity market reform (EMR) process, such reforms are required 
if this particular sector is to be decarbonised on the timescales that 
are required. But they need to be complemented by support for other 
energy investments – to make energy use more efficient, to upgrade 
3	 See	Office	of	National	Statistics	for	data	on	UK	business	investment,	http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
taxonomy/index.html?nscl=National+Income%2C+Expenditure+and+Output	
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electricity grids so that they are smarter and can integrate low-carbon 
sources effectively, and to facilitate heat networks in densely populated 
areas.
This focus on the electricity sector can be contrasted with some other 
parts of the National Infrastructure Plan. Although the proposals it 
includes for investment in roads and increasing the capacity of UK 
airports can arguably make a positive contribution to growth, they make 
little sense if such plans perpetuate and strengthen our high-carbon 
lock-in. To overcome this lock-in, new or modified infrastructures will be 
needed that are lower carbon and more resource efficient, with changes 
in institutions and incentives to match. It may also mean rethinking the 
received wisdom that growth inevitably requires continual increase in the 
capacity of such transport infrastructures.
To help support this low-carbon infrastructure investment, an 
appropriate framework of targeted incentives will be required, alongside 
processes to learn from successes and failures. Green tax reform 
is potentially one element of this framework. As the Green Fiscal 
Commission argued in 2009, the UK could go much further in shifting 
taxation – so that, for example, polluting activities are taxed more, while 
labour is taxed less (Green Fiscal Commission 2009). However, as was 
argued earlier in this chapter with respect to emissions trading, the 
adjustment of prices through increased environmental taxes is unlikely to 
be sufficient to drive a low-carbon transition. Such taxes would also be 
subject to political trade-offs which may weaken their impact.
New institutions with a remit to focus specifically on low-carbon 
investments could also make a significant difference. The Green 
Investment Bank is a good example of the kind of institutional innovation 
that can help to overcome the UK’s high-carbon lock-in. It will focus 
on a number of priority areas, which is sensible given that resources 
are limited. However, the decision to delay full borrowing powers for 
the Bank until at least 2015 is a mistake. Without such powers, it will 
operate more like a green fund, which has a much lower potential 
impact on investment. 
In addition to supporting low-carbon investment, a suite of policies 
is also required to support low-carbon innovation. Most of the 
technologies required to deliver the dramatic reductions in emissions 
that are necessary already exist. The main innovation challenge, 
therefore, is to further develop, demonstrate and deploy existing 
technologies. A good example is the need to retrofit many of our 
public and private buildings to make them more energy efficient. 
Technologies to make substantial improvements have already been 
developed, but there is a need for stronger regulations and incentives, 
and the development of a skilled workforce of installers, to diffuse these 
technologies.
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Over the past decade, the government has paid more attention to low-
carbon innovation – for example, by supporting more R&D, setting up 
new institutions such as the Carbon Trust, and by funding demonstration 
programmes (Watson 2008). However, significant weaknesses remain 
in the government’s approach to innovation. These weaknesses 
are not just caused by constraints on public budgets, but also by a 
philosophical approach that dates back at least thirty years, in which the 
government is seen as having little competence in supporting specific 
areas of technology. This is a philosophy that is shared by governments 
in some other countries (for example Sweden), but not by many others – 
including those such as Germany, Japan (and perhaps even China) who 
are seen as successful in supporting the growth of greener industries. 
In the current UK debate, many still support the UK’s more ‘hands off’ 
approach (Owen 2012) and argue instead that ‘horizontal’ policies such 
as generic tax credits for R&D should be implemented. 
A key issue is that innovation requires experimentation and what 
evolutionary economists might call ‘learning by doing’. It is therefore 
necessary for those who support innovation to take risks – and to 
accept that some technologies may fail. This is problematic for public 
policy, where failures are seen in a very negative light. Furthermore, 
providing more specific support for particular technologies risks 
‘capture’ of government by vested interests. 
While acknowledging these difficulties, my colleague Mariana Mazzucato 
has argued the case for an ‘entrepreneurial state’ that is more suited 
to the realities of innovation (Mazzucato 2011). This entrepreneurial 
state works in partnership with the private and third sectors to foster 
innovation, and to underwrite the specific risks of developing and 
commercialising new technologies. She argues that there is a need 
for experimentation and learning. This means that the UK government 
needs to found new arms-length institutions with the necessary 
competencies and independence to be effective in this role. 
There are already some good examples of genuine low-carbon 
experimentation that have been supported by public agencies in the 
UK. The Low Carbon Communities Challenge initiated by the previous 
government was a small funding scheme that supported 20 communities 
to implement projects and programmes. The Low Carbon Networks 
Fund initiated by energy regulator Ofgem is supporting a range of smart 
network trials across the UK. To reap the benefits of these experiments, 
it will be important to evaluate their effectiveness – and crucially, to use 
these evaluations to develop more effective policies and programmes. 
There are also some less successful examples. The programme by the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to demonstrate 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies has made slow and 
painful progress so far. While the competition to support the first full-
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scale CCS demonstration in the UK was announced in autumn 2007, 
this has not yet led to a firm commitment to a specific project. The 
collapse of negotiations with Scottish Power and other companies 
intending to build a demonstration at Longannet is just the latest in 
a series of delays. In retrospect, the decision to specify which CCS 
technology should be demonstrated was a mistake. Given the large 
uncertainties about which CCS technologies might be the most efficient 
and cost effective, this decision left too little room for manoeuvre by 
private developers. Whie the government tried to micromanage this 
particular innovation process, a truly entrepreneurial state would have 
taken a more open approach – and would have invited interested 
companies to bid for public support using a range of technologies.
Ironically, this is precisely how DECC’s revised strategy following the 
collapse of Longannet is structured. This example is a very good 
illustration of an appropriate role for government. Although there is 
plenty of evidence that government support for particular ‘technology 
families’ like CCS is necessary to commercialise them (Sandén and 
Azar 2005, Jacobsson and Bergek 2011), this does not mean that 
governments should micromanage the process by backing particular 
technology variants or developers. This is where the last Labour 
government got it wrong, through their specific support for nuclear 
component supplier Sheffield Forgemasters and other firms.
To help strike this balance, a government agency is required that 
can maintain the appropriate distance from industries that are being 
supported, and has the capacity to foster experimentation and 
innovation. Existing UK institutions such as the Carbon Trust are a good 
place to start and lessons can also be learned from other countries 
(Mazzucato 2011). In recent years, the Trust has been joined by a 
plethora of other institutions supporting low-carbon innovation, including 
the public–private Energy Technologies Institute and the Technology 
Strategy Board within the Department of Business. Each has a rationale 
that makes sense, but taken together they form an overly complex and 
crowded institutional landscape. It therefore makes sense for one or 
more of these institutions to be given a specific remit to fulfil this role – 
with the financial resources to match. 
Engaging	consumers	and	communities
An important aspect of the economics of the shift to low carbon has not 
yet been covered in this chapter. So far, the discussion has focused on 
relatively centralised and ‘top down’ policies and institutions. But this 
will not be enough. The shift to a low-carbon economy needs to engage 
with the concerns of consumers, citizens and communities. Prices, 
not carbon reduction, dominate contemporary energy discussions. 
Average household energy bills rose from £605 to £1,060 between 2004 
and 2010, or by 75 per cent in nominal terms (Committee on Climate 
Change 2011). 
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Some of the costs of investment in low-carbon technologies and 
infrastructures have started to appear on consumer bills. This has 
generated significant debate and inaccurate claims that the costs of 
the low-carbon agenda are largely responsible for energy bill increases. 
Recent reports by both DECC and the Committee on Climate Change 
show that this is not the case (Committee on Climate Change 2011, 
DECC 2011a).4 
What is often missing from the highly charged political debates is the 
counterfactual scenario – that is, what might happen to energy costs 
if low-carbon investments were not supported through bills. While the 
consequences of this counterfactual world are very difficult to pin down, 
the risk is that consumers would be much more exposed to high and 
volatile fossil fuel prices. There is also a wider question of principle here: 
to what extent should the costs of the low-carbon transition be passed 
on to energy consumers in this way? In the current economic climate, it 
is hard to argue that more of these costs should be funded via general 
taxation. However, this is a more progressive way to meet the costs of 
a transition to low carbon while mitigating some of the negative impacts 
on poorer consumers.
This battle over costs reinforces the need to focus on the demand side 
as well as the supply side of the energy picture. A key weakness of the 
EMR process is that it neglects the demand side. For example, it would 
have been possible to include contracts for energy saving in the reforms 
alongside contracts for low-carbon generation (Benton 2011). There 
is some recognition by government that a ‘step change’ is needed to 
progress on energy efficiency. But to put this aspiration into practice, 
there is a need to rethink standard economic conceptions of consumer 
behaviour. 
In analysing the possible impact of energy saving policies such as the 
Green Deal, the government needs to take full account of insights 
from psychology and sociology as well as economics (Willis and 
Eyre 2011). This means taking seriously the full range of factors that 
influence people’s purchasing decisions and patterns of behaviour. As 
noted earlier, neoclassical frameworks assume that people will respond 
rationally to prices, drawing on all of the information available about 
costs and benefits. But in practice, they do not usually have such 
knowledge, and their decisions are influenced by routines, habits and 
rules of thumb. They are also constrained by what Tim Jackson has 
called ‘forces outside their control’ which place practical limits on the 
choices that can be taken (Jackson 2005: x). 
There are signs that limitations to the rational model are acknowledged 
within government. Broader analyses of behaviour and some innovative 
4	 The	Committee	on	Climate	Change	concludes	that	80	per	cent	of	the	rise	in	bills	between	2004	and	
2010	was	due	to	factors	unrelated	to	low-carbon	policies.
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experiments have been carried out by teams in DECC, Defra and the 
Cabinet Office. It is unclear yet whether their work will have a significant 
effect. Traditional economic analysis still dominates evaluations of the 
potential impacts of energy and climate policies. 
A final important issue to consider is that we don’t simply operate as 
individual consumers. We also engage with each other in networks 
and communities. Much emphasis has been placed recently by all 
political parties on variants of the localism agenda. Devolving power and 
decision-making to the local level has been emphasised most by David 
Cameron in his vision of the Big Society. To translate such rhetoric into 
action requires resources, which is where the Big Society ideal often 
runs into trouble. This is as true of the low carbon agenda as it is in 
other areas like health and social care. Community energy has become 
very popular in the UK – with large numbers of groups and projects 
springing up. As noted earlier, this route for low-carbon investment has 
received some funding from government which has helped to foster 
local innovation and learning. But more recently, the government has 
been less helpful to communities. The recent changes to solar feed-in 
tariffs have reduced a source of finance that community projects can 
use – and has led to the cancellation of many plans.5
This risks choking off a genuine source of innovation and 
experimentation that has the potential to make a significant contribution 
to the low-carbon economy of the future. Furthermore, it also risks 
undermining public support by taking away one of the ways in which 
individuals and communities can participate directly in the low-carbon 
transition. It is initiatives like community energy that could, if done 
correctly, epitomise a complexity-friendly approach to this transition. 
But simply decentralising planning (for example through the Localism 
Act) while failing to decentralise other aspects of governance (such as 
resources and funding) may backfire and could make it harder for low-
carbon infrastructures to develop.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that significant changes to the UK’s climate and 
energy policies are required if insights from evolutionary and complexity 
economics are to be taken seriously. In particular, there is a need for 
a greater emphasis on public policy experimentation and learning. 
This lesson applies at all levels of governance (local, national and 
international) and does not apply only to government itself. 
This emphasis does not mean that national and international targets for 
emissions reductions are unwarranted or unnecessary. Such targets, 
5	 In	autumn	2011,	the	government	announced	that	the	rate	of	feed-in	tariff	payable	for	each	unit	
of	electricity	generated	by	small-scale	solar	installations	would	be	reduced	earlier	than	planned.	
Following	court	challenges,	this	decision	was	partly	reversed.	Tariff	rates	have	been	reduced	
substantially	from	early	March	2012.	
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and the discussions they generate about our future energy pathways, 
play a crucial role in ensuring that energy policies are on the right track. 
The government is right to be reticent about exactly what a low-carbon 
economy will look like, particularly in the medium to long term (2020–
2050). Although the language of planning has made a comeback – for 
example in the government’s annual Carbon Plan – it is important that 
this does not lead to monolithic, inflexible plans which are bound to 
come unstuck. 
To reinforce targets, broad-based economic instruments such as 
emissions trading also have an important role in influencing decisions 
by individuals, firms and communities. However, this chapter has 
suggested that such instruments are not enough. They need to be 
complemented by more specific, tailored policies for particular sectors 
and groups of investors to speed up technical, social and institutional 
innovation. Furthermore, such policies need to rely less on neoclassical 
textbook models, and to recognise that investor and consumer 
responses are more complex than these models assume. 
Examples of such tailored instruments already exist. Others, such as the 
Green Deal and Electricity Market Reform, are at an advanced stage of 
development. Their effectiveness will partly depend on whether learning 
is embedded within their implementation. This means a conscious effort 
by government to resist the temptation to micromanage outcomes. 
It also means signalling from the outset that regular reviews and 
adjustments will take place. At a time when climate change action is less 
politically salient and public budgets are tight, arbitrary interventions that 
damage confidence in low-carbon investment need to be avoided. 
Above all, it is crucial that UK policy develops a much better 
understanding of the UK’s lock-in to high-carbon infrastructures and the 
associated institutions and practices. To break this lock-in will require 
risks to be taken by both the public and private sectors. There will 
be policy failures along the way, and vested interests wedded to the 
status quo will need to be challenged. Government will need to develop 
better ways of accepting and learning from these failures as well as the 
success stories that the low-carbon transition will bring. 
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In his lament for the decline of craft skills, Richard Sennett (2009) notes 
the irony of what he calls the emergent ‘skills economy’ in which the UK 
government has boosted the supply of skills in an attempt to address 
an underperforming economy. Just as thinking on the economy 
has begun to change in recent years, so too must policy thinking 
about skills. In this chapter we outline how skills policy is evolving to 
take account of the more complex reality of skills development and 
deployment, but argue that greater clarity is still needed if that policy is 
to be made more effective.
With government aware that the UK economy has relatively low skill 
levels compared to other OECD countries, boosting the supply of skills 
has long dominated UK economic policy. This approach to skills is part 
of a long-term assumed trend about how, through technology, work 
and products are becoming more complex and therefore require more 
educated, more highly skilled workers. It is an approach that underpins 
the different versions of the ‘knowledge-based’ or ‘creative’ economy 
around which policy is now focused in the UK. Both these economies 
are projected as ‘high skill’ economies in which intangible, ideas-
derived new products are created by highly educated workers who 
have acquired ‘analytical’ and ‘thinking’ skills through higher education 
– which, of course, has expanded massively over recent decades in 
the UK. 
This policy thinking is underpinned and legitimised by reference to 
economist Howard Becker’s (1964) human capital theory. This theory 
posits that human capital is similar to ‘physical capital’ such as land and 
machinery in that it can be enhanced through investment. In the case of 
human capital that investment comes most obviously through education 
and training. Becker, awarded the Nobel prize in economic services in 
1992, argued that more sophisticated technology increases the value of 
human capital and that to a large extent economic growth now depends 
more on human than physical capital: ‘increases in education and 
training have accompanied major advances in technological knowledge 
in all countries that have achieved significant economic growth’, he 
states (Becker 2008: 250). 
9. 
lOsT in TrAnslATiOn?  
skills POlicy And The shiFT 
TO skill ecOsysTems
PAUline AndersOn And chris wArhUrsT
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According to this theory, government investment to boost human 
capital, for example through expanding higher education, offers a win-
win-win opportunity: workers with more and better human capital earn 
more; firms with more human capital are more productive; and the boost 
of skills makes the economy more competitive by driving firms up the 
value chain. Following this orthodoxy, economic policy in the UK has 
come to rest on supply-side interventions in the labour market to boost 
skills: as illustrated by the 1998 white paper Our Competitive Future (DTI 
1998), which was followed six years later by the pre-budget document 
Skills in the Global Economy (HM Treasury 2004) and more recently by 
the Coalition government’s Skills for Sustainable Growth (BIS 2010).
Yet, as with other economic orthodoxy, policy based on human capital 
theory has failed to deliver. It is now clear that supply-side intervention, 
particularly in higher education, has not had the desired effect. 
Productivity and competiveness have not markedly improved (Leitch 
2006, UKCES 2009) and there are even concerns about having an 
overeducated workforce (Felstead et al 2007). The problem is that this 
one-stop, quick-fix approach resting on static, rationalist assumptions 
about human capital acquisition and its utility maximisation by workers 
and employers is not borne out in practice. 
The failure of skills policy to deliver reflects broader concerns about the 
efficacy of orthodox economic thinking more generally. Four years after 
the banking collapse and with an economy that limps along it is clear 
that the old economic orthodoxies are discredited and are not, and 
perhaps never were, fit for purpose. New economic thinking is required. 
A more heterodox economics is emerging, encompassing evolutionary 
and complexity theories, which recognises the need for more holistic 
approaches to the economy in which there is a dynamic interaction 
between various actors and institutions, and which conceives of the 
economy as constantly changing. 
If the old skills policy was indicative of the problem with orthodox 
economics, more recent thinking about skills could be part of the 
solution, and might even be said to be indicative of the new economic 
thinking. What is required are broader ‘system’ changes to help the UK 
break out of its low-skill trap. Although it has long been advocated by 
some academics (for example Keep and Mayhew 1999) it is a message 
that is beginning to penetrate policy thinking in the UK (UKCES 2009). 
This new thinking rejects static notions of equilibria and centres on 
the concept of ‘skill ecosystems’ – which are akin to dynamic living 
organisms with interconnected parts, actions and needs. 
Unfortunately, while policymakers have started to embrace skill 
ecosystem thinking, the concept has been lost in its translation to policy. 
In this chapter we clarify the concept and argue that policy based on 
it resonates well with new economic thinking and can help push along 
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its implementation in the UK. We start by outlining the shift in thinking 
from skill equilibria to skill ecosystems and indicate how the concept 
has been lost in its translation into policy initiatives. We then re-present 
the concept so that understanding of it and its relevance to the new 
economic thinking is clearer. The final section of the chapter uses skills 
to raise some broader issues about the implementation of the new 
economic thinking into policy. 
The	shift	from	skill	equilibria	to	skill	ecosystems
Orthodox economics treats the economy as either in equilibrium or 
heading to equilibrium (Dennis 2012). However, non-equilibrium in the 
economy seems more usual and is what the new economic thinking 
tries to capture. As Richard Nelson (2008: 10) says of evolutionary 
theory for example, it ‘sees the economy as always in the process of 
change, with economic activity almost always proceeding in a context 
that is not completely familiar to the actors, or perfectly understood by 
them’. Likewise, complexity economics assumes that the economy is a 
complex adaptive system featuring dynamic networks of relationships 
and interactions that are mutually reactive to changing needs, inputs 
and outputs. The shift in academic and policymaking thinking from skill 
equilibria to skill ecosystems mirrors this attempt to shift away from the 
equilibrium-based assumptions underpinning orthodox economics to 
one that accepts change as interactive and normal. 
The shift in thinking about skills and economic competitiveness was 
first stimulated by David Finegold’s (1999) seminal paper on high-
skill ecosystems. The key arguments in this paper directly link to and 
address some of the arguments he and David Soskice set out in a highly 
influential paper 10 years earlier (Finegold and Soskice 1988). Both 
papers appeared in special editions of the Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy: the first was a collection of articles by leading academics on the 
UK’s failure to invest in skills; the second reflected on education and 
training policy in the decade since the first publication. If the 1988 paper 
kick-started thinking about skills in terms of skill equilibria, the second 
paper marked a sharp shift to embrace the more dynamic concept of 
skill ecosystems. 
The starting point was an awareness that the stocks of high, 
intermediate and lower-level skills in the UK lagged behind other OECD 
countries – all compounded by the general absence of retraining and 
upskilling opportunities for all of the UK workforce, including managers. 
By failing to invest in skills, Finegold and Soskice’s original paper claimed 
that the UK was trapped in a low-skill equilibrium in which low-skilled 
workers were producing low-quality, cost driven goods and services. 
They argued that the fear of free-riding (Stevens 1996) – where firms do 
not invest in skills because they know that other companies can use the 
money they save by not training to ‘poach’ skilled workers with higher 
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salaries, which in turn leads to universal underinvestment in skills – could 
not on its own explain why the UK’s skill record was so poor. 
This poor record of investment in skills was a problem. Finegold 
and Soskice argued it seriously hindered UK competiveness. 
Underinvestment in skills, they suggested, was both the product and 
cause of this lack of competitiveness:
‘A	product,	because	the	ET	[Education	and	Training]	system	
evolved	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	world’s	first	industrialized	
economy,	whose	large,	mass-production	manufacturing	sector	
required	only	a	small	number	of	skilled	workers	and	university	
graduates;	and	a	cause,	because	the	absence	of	a	well	
educated	and	trained	workforce	has	made	it	difficult	for	industry	
to	respond	to	new	economic	conditions.’
Finegold	and	Soskice	1988:	22
This low skills equilibrium was self-reinforcing, they said: sticking to the 
‘low road’ meant that there was no requirement for well-trained workers, 
meaning that the UK could not respond to new economic opportunities. 
As Rob Wilson and Terrence Hogarth (2003: viii) later pointed out, there 
is nothing wrong with some companies choosing the low road. However 
long-term difficulties arise for the country as a whole when significant 
numbers choose this option. 
The solution, argued Finegold and Soskice, was to shift to the 
production of higher value goods and services. The result would be a 
‘high skill equilibrium’, with firms having workforces with higher skills. 
However, companies choosing to produce higher-value-added goods 
and services and invest in skills was not enough; they pointed out that 
getting the best out of the workforce required significant changes in 
work organisation and management to support flexibility and innovation. 
They also argued that the UK’s education and training system would be 
best thought of as an integral part of a larger system (a ‘set of political-
economic institutions’) which includes the organisation of industry; 
firms and the work process; the state and political structure; industrial 
relations systems; and financial markets. What they were essentially 
saying was that education and training systems needed to be firmly 
embedded within a much larger configuration of institutions and that all 
institutions in this configuration were to be interdependent.
It was the way in which this system uniquely evolved in the UK, 
they suggested, that meant there were few incentives to encourage 
individuals and employers to invest in skills and, under these 
circumstances, opting for the low road was a rational choice on the 
part of employers and individuals. As a result, the UK was said to be 
stuck in a low-skill equilibrium – defined as ‘a self-reinforcing network 
of societal and state institutions which interact to stifle the demand for 
improvements in skill levels’ (1988: 22). Other countries with different 
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institutional configurations have different, typically better, skill outcomes, 
as Germany illustrates (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
This explanation for the UK’s poor economic performance and related 
failure to invest in skills challenged prevailing class-based (‘us vs them’, 
‘management vs workers’) explanations for the country’s economic 
problems. It suggested an institutional, system-based, explanation of 
failure – what Ewart Keep and Ken Mayhew (1999: 4) call a ‘systems 
failure’. It threw down a serious challenge to policymakers about what 
needed doing to improve the UK’s economy. 
As might have been expected when faced with a bit of complexity, 
they failed to rise to the challenge. Instead they opted to continue to 
tinker with the one part of the system that was easiest to influence – 
supply. Finegold later noted in his 1999 paper that although he and 
Soskice suggested that increasing skills supply might act as leverage 
for movement, in the absence of broader system changes, such 
interventions would not work. He even pointed out that the mass 
expansion of higher education had actually hampered the UK’s capacity 
to produce cutting-edge research and development. 
Finegold also noted that it had become apparent that skill equilibria 
thinking did not do justice to the continual evolution and relative 
unpredictability of the system. The sheer pace of developments in 
technology and the global economy meant that ‘static frameworks’ were 
clearly inadequate. Understanding skill ecosystems was a much better 
way to make sense of what was now happening and to highlight that it 
was not always possible to predict how systems would evolve. 
Elements of the old approach were kept, principally the need to 
conceive of the system as a configuration of institutions, but it was felt 
that these needed to be concerned not just with skills supply but also its 
development, demand and use. Above all, while both ways of thinking 
focus on the interconnectedness and interactions within the system, skill 
ecosystems thinking emphasises the system’s dynamism and continual 
evolution (Finegold 1999). 
Finegold’s 1999 paper was an attempt to develop a framework for 
understanding the conditions that help grow and sustain high-skill 
ecosystems. His framework was based on world-leading, fast-moving, 
knowledge-intensive hi-tech and biomedical industries in California. 
Companies tended to be clustered tightly together geographically and 
Finegold realised that these areas had turned into ‘self-sustaining high-
skill ecosystems (HSEs), that once started, generate a positive, mutually 
reinforcing dynamic that fuels ongoing knowledge creation and growth 
and adaptation to changing competitive conditions’ (1999: 61). 
Although he never explicitly used the term, Finegold’s concept of 
skill ecosystems resonates with ‘new economic thinking’, ticking all 
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of its essential criteria boxes (see Dosi and Nelson 1994). Using the 
analogy of biological ecosystems, Finegold demonstrated that industrial 
ecosystems mirror natural ecosystems in the following ways:
• they need something to act as a catalyst to create and grow them 
• they need fuel or nourishment to sustain them 
• they need a supportive host environment to help them thrive 
• they cultivate a high degree of interdependence between 
organisms
• they need the adaptive capacity to respond to changing 
conditions.
By maintaining the idea of systems as institutional configurations, 
Finegold’s concept of skill ecosystems not only resonates with new 
economic thinking, but arguably has the capacity to add to it. For 
example, as Richard Nelson suggests with evolutionary economics: 
‘As	a	result	of	bringing	institutions	under	the	umbrella	of	
evolutionary	theory,	evolutionary	economics	now	has	the	
capability	to	provide	a	broad,	coherent	and	useful	theory	of	
economic	growth	as	experienced	in	the	advanced	industrial	
economies.’	
Nelson	2008:	38
The industries on which the concept was based were often breaking 
new ground, spearheading developments in science and technology 
and constantly innovating and evolving. For instance, Finegold pointed 
out that skills development in high-skill ecosystems tended to be 
through a mix of informal learning on-the-job, mentoring, being given 
‘special assignments’ and visiting suppliers and other companies. 
Formal education and training systems, he suggested, could not keep 
up. When workers did take part in formal learning, it was mainly through 
part-time evening or distance learning. To emphasise how skills can be 
developed in many different ways and contexts, he and other academics 
increasingly favoured the term ‘systems of skill formation’ rather than 
‘education and training systems’ (see for example Brown et al 2001, 
Crouch 2005, Thelen 2004). 
More recently, in Australia, the concept has been extended beyond 
discussion of purely ‘high-skill’ ecosystems. Here, skill ecosystems are 
defined as ‘clusters of ... competencies in a particular region or industry 
shaped by interlocking networks of firms, markets and institutions’ 
(Buchanan et al 2001: 21). While high-skill ecosystems can be an 
important source of job and wealth creation, the number of high-skill 
jobs in any economy may be relatively small and likely to remain so 
(Crouch et al 1999). However, there are spin-off jobs. On the one hand, 
intermediate-level skilled jobs are created through high-skill ecosystems. 
Engineers, for example, are needed to maintain the production 
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equipment of the new hi-tech and biomedical industries, while sales 
staff are needed to market and retail the goods produced by these 
industries. On the other hand, cash rich and time poor ‘knowledge 
workers’ need the support of a large number of lower-level service jobs, 
what Richard Florida (2002) has called the ‘service class’ (see also 
Warhurst 2008). For this reason John Buchanan and his colleagues 
extend the use of the concept to the two other main skill categories – 
intermediate and routine skills – and show how it can be used to identify 
problems in different skill ‘bundles’ across high, intermediate or low skill-
level jobs (Buchanan et al 2001). 
Skill ecosystems policy initiatives in Australia and Scotland 
The work of John Buchanan and his colleagues set a new direction 
in skills policy in Australia that promotes skill ecosystems as part of a 
broader workforce development agenda (NSW DET 2008). One example 
was the skill ecosystem programme in New South Wales which funded 
research and partnership projects between trainers and industry to 
improve workforce capacity and the use of skills at work. As well as 
education and training development, the projects addressed aspects 
of the workplace and industry environment that influence the continual 
development and use of skills. The key requirements for funding 
partnership projects were that they addressed skill supply/development 
and use, and set out to improve business performance and achieve 
‘positive outcomes’ for individuals (ibid: 9). Projects involved multi-
stranded interventions that have led to changes to work organisation, 
employment contracts and business strategy, as well as training design 
and delivery. 
In other words, the projects sought to improve the whole ‘skills 
ecosystem’ – not just the provision of training. John Buchanan and 
Richard Hall (2005: 2) argue employer calls of skills shortages or even 
skills crises tends to focus policymakers’ attention on the skill supply 
‘problem’. In contrast, skill ecosystems thinking compels them to 
address the problem of skill demand and skill use – and might lead them 
to reach different conclusions, for instance that it is poor work design or 
low pay that often results in recruitment problems, not a lack of workers 
with the right skills.
Examples of funded projects include redesigning the role of, and 
employment contracts for, trackwork riders in the racing industry 
to deal with skill shortages and make these jobs more attractive; 
brokering relationships in the water industry between researchers, 
small enterprises and training providers; and improving inter-health 
cooperation and joint-working in mental health services. The Australian 
case shows just how policy can shift from a narrow focus on skill supply 
and look at things more holistically.
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As with the rest of the UK during most of the 1990s and 2000s, 
Scotland overdosed on skill supply initiatives, ignoring the level of 
demand for skills by employers and use of skills by workers in the 
workplace (Felstead 2007). Changing policy tack, the new Scottish 
government began to embrace skill ecosystems thinking – drawn to 
reports of the Australian successes. The Scottish government’s (2007) 
skills strategy emphasised the importance of skill deployment – or to 
use the new policy vernacular, ‘skill utilisation’. The Scottish Funding 
Council has invested £3m over a five-year period to fund 12 skills 
utilisation projects. Examples of funded projects include management 
and leadership training in the social care sector; developing a vocational 
route from an apprenticeship to a master’s degree; and delivering 
training, workshops and online learning to identify and develop unused 
workplace skills in the life science sector.
Leading the policy shift in the UK, the Scottish government is to be 
commended on its efforts on policy innovation – certainly, the UK 
Commission for Employment and Skills has praised these efforts and it 
too is now advocating skill ecosystems thinking (UKCES 2010a). 
However, one glance at the examples of projects in Australia and 
Scotland immediately reveals that, in practice, Scottish policy initiatives 
do not really adopt the holistic approach advocated by skill ecosystem 
thinking. In Australia there were problems in getting all the key actors on 
board with projects. Similarly, Jonathan Payne’s (2011) interim evaluation 
of the Scottish skills utilisation projects points out that colleges and 
universities tend to lead projects as education and training suppliers. 
He re-emphasises the need for the involvement of a broader range of 
actors, with employer involvement a priority. Unfortunately UKCES seem 
to have swung too far in this direction by suggesting that the next step 
should be employer-only networks (UKCES 2010b). It is fair to say, 
therefore, that in the UK skill ecosystems thinking has become lost in 
translation (Payne 2008). Even in Australia, where policy acceptance of 
the skills ecosystem approach is advanced, it is acknowledged that it 
can be a ‘messy’ concept (NSW DET 2008: 30). 
Making	sense	of	a	messy	concept
Evidence from Australia and Scotland, and the UK more generally, 
suggests that the skills ecosystem concept has been lost in translation, 
with its policy application partial and, in the UK, being dragged back 
to supply-side actions. It is better, however, to recognise that making 
skills work for the economy requires more than just having a supply of 
skills, these skills have to be developed – and as Finegold has noted, 
higher education is only one and may not be the best site of skill 
development. Furthermore, there needs to be a demand for these skills 
by employers. But, as one of us has already pointed out in an article 
with Patricia Findlay (Warhust and Findlay 2012) there are two types of 
employer demand – Type 1 at the point of hire, and Type 2 at the point 
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of use. At present, employers seem to be hiring workers with more skills 
than these workers then use at work (Felstead et al 2007). It is better 
therefore to disentangle ‘demand’ at the point of hire and ‘deployment’ 
at the point of use. Stripped back, skill ecosystems are made up of, and 
are concerned with, four main areas of skill: 
• the development of skills 
• the supply of skills 
• the demand for skills
• the deployment of skills.
These areas are embedded in a configuration of institutions – some 
of which are proximate, some background, for example the firm and 
financial markets respectively. Within this configuration, actors with 
different roles, interests, needs and resources are interconnected and 
interact, and, by so doing, interdependently affect the nature and 
dynamics of the system. All of the skill areas, institutions and actors 
form part of the whole skill ecosystem and all are interrelated. What 
is important to remember too, is that skill ecosystems overlap with 
other skill ecosystems (see Anderson 2010). For example in Scotland, 
the skill ecosystems of the oil and gas industries, and those of new 
green industries centred on wave and wind technologies, overlap with 
pressures and developments in one affecting the other.
To summarise then, a skills ecosystem (as depicted in figure 9.1 over) is: 
‘a dynamic network of interdependent institutions and actors 
which through their various interactions, roles, interests, 
needs and resources is in a constant process of change – 
evolving in ways that cannot always be predicted – but which 
shape the development, supply, demand and deployment of 
skills in any given industry or region.’
We argue that by placing skill development, supply, demand and 
deployment centre stage, we can begin to overcome a policy preference 
for boosting skill supply through the formal institutions of education and 
training. This framework lends itself to posing clear and important policy 
questions, such as: what is happening with skill supply, skill demand, 
skill development and skill deployment and how are changes in one 
area affecting others; who are the main actors and institutions in each 
of these skill areas and how are they shaping what is happening; and in 
what ways does this whole skill ecosystem seem to be evolving?
It also leads us to inquire about what skills are developed, where are 
they developed and how are they developed; what skills are employers 
recruiting and selecting from the labour market, why and how; and what 
skills are needed to be deployed in the workplace and what are the 
conditions by which they are best deployed?
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Perhaps most importantly, it allows us to ask what policy and other 
measures or interventions best nourish this skills ecosystem and how 
we ensure that these policies and interventions can adapt as the 
ecosystem evolves.
Conclusion
The current Coalition and previous Labour governments stressed 
the importance of skills for creating and maintaining economic 
competitiveness in the UK. While it is true that too much weight has 
been placed on the shoulders of skills over recent years – they are 
misguidedly offered as a cure for a range of disparate economic and 
social ills (see Keep and Mayhew 2010) – they rightfully remain a key 
part of any economic strategy. The issue is how best to frame skills 
policy and practice so that skills work best for the economy. 
Old thinking about skills as with orthodox economic thinking generally 
has run into the sand. This chapter has outlined the concept of skill 
ecosystems and its relevance to new economic thinking. Adoption of 
this concept requires a broader shift in economic policy thinking that 
jettisons assumptions of equilibria and one-stop, quick fixes. The shift 
from skill equilibrium thinking to skills ecosystem thinking has not been 
an easy one. However, there is plenty of evidence from Australia and 
Figure 9.1 
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Scotland to suggest a willingness to innovate with skill policy, even 
if the adoption of skill ecosystems has become lost in translation. 
To overcome this problem a clearer understanding of the concept is 
needed and we have sought to provide that clarity. 
We recognise that for this better understanding to be implemented 
effectively requires governments to not only change their thinking but 
that the interface between government and the other key institutions 
and actors needs to be improved. Colin Crouch (1998) has already 
noted the current weaknesses in the relationships and understandings 
among government, practitioners and researchers around the issue of 
skills. This poor nexus needs to be addressed: indeed, it is fundamental 
for the effective operation of any skills ecosystem. It might also help if 
government becomes more open to alternative policy thinking – one 
based on empirical evidence and what works in practice rather than 
what might work in econometric models (Dennis 2012).
There should be no doubt that policy built on skill ecosystems thinking 
will be more complex and dynamic than one-stop, quick-fix, supply-side 
focused policy. However the real economy is more complex and more 
dynamic than single intervention strategies assume. Real economies are 
rarely at or heading for equilibrium as orthodox economics assumes. So 
too it is with skills: the development, supply, demand and deployment of 
skill constantly changes. 
The concept of skill ecosystems enables policymakers to understand 
why and how these changes occur. Our belief is that it can go some 
way to improving skills policy thinking and inform wider economic 
development strategies in the UK. It is a choice between simple 
economic thinking that is often wrong or a new type of economic 
thinking that is admittedly more difficult to implement, but more likely to 
deliver what works.
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This chapter reflects on how regions, sub-regions and cities fare in the 
public policy system as it currently operates. It asks questions about 
whether these sub-national parts of the economy would fare better 
in a world which was better able to deal with the complexity of the 
interlocking nature of social, economic and political factors which impact 
on regional development.
I examine the shifting balance between localism and centralism in 
how the public policy system operates, and argue that many social 
and economic policy aspirations, especially those concerned with 
prosperity at the regional and sub-regional level, cannot be met 
where power and authority are located in a highly centralised set of 
governance institutions. Under such conditions and because of scale 
factors, the centre is compelled to employ mechanistic approaches to 
achieve results. However, the returns generated by this approach tend 
to be limited to mere compliance, and do not lead to the potentially 
innovative achievements that could be realised if an approach was 
adopted which took account of the inevitable complexity of local 
systems. It is one thing, for example, to set targets for getting long-
term unemployed people back into work; it is another thing altogether 
to create the conditions whereby a galvanised local economy takes 
on the responsibility for ensuring that all citizens can make a work 
contribution.
An examination of the recent history of the British state demonstrates 
that over time different points of balance between centralism and 
localism have been struck, but that for most of the last 30 years the 
push towards centralisation has been the stronger, whether this has 
been under the avowedly neoliberal governments of the 1980s or under 
the third way approach of New Labour. Despite their rhetoric about the 
small state, the governments of Margaret Thatcher centralised power in 
order to change the paradigm of public policy. Similarly, New Labour’s 
pathway to power was through establishing centralised dominance of 
the Labour party, and it was easy to regard the core competences that 
consequently developed as skills transferrable into government.
10. 
regiOnAl POlicy And 
cOmPlexiTy: TOwArds 
eFFecTive decenTrAlisATiOn
sUe richArds
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The institutions of governance are not neutral mechanisms but living 
systems with embedded ideologies and vested interests. They are not 
static. While institutional theory suggests that such deeply embedded 
entities have the capacity to reshape and deflect attempts to change 
them, they are not immutable either. New forces and factors may 
emerge that undermine the old certainties and establish new ways of 
doing things which carry their own legitimacy.
New thinking about complexity offers ideas and arguments to help 
us understand these issues. Older theories based on reductionism 
emphasise the similarities of change in different places. Complex systems 
emphasise the idiosyncrasies of particular circumstances. Adopting this 
approach, any policy ideas need to be tailored more than we thought 
pre-complexity. This suggests devolving decision-making to ensure it is 
tailored. Additionally, complex systems evolve unpredictably, requiring a 
more resilient system than we currently have. Authority and responsibility 
ought to be closer to the action, so policy can be more nimble.
If we look in more detail at how the public policy system has operated 
we will find evidence of some moves towards a decentralised approach, 
which is better able to recognise complexity, but these steps have 
remained subordinate to centralising tendencies. The overall picture is, 
therefore, complicated but worth disentangling for the light it throws on 
where we are now and where we might need to go to create the right 
conditions for regional and sub-regional development.
In order to develop this analysis, the chapter will focus on:
• the increased centralisation within the British state – particularly 
(and contrary to popular assumption) during the neoliberal moment 
of the 1980s and 1990s
• the continuation of the dominant theme of centralisation under 
New Labour, particularly after the first term
• the periodic emergence of different responses, such as steps 
towards a coherent urban programme and the development of 
institutional responses such as devolution to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and regional government offices
• the rapid development of ideas towards the end of the Labour 
government about reconfiguring the relationship between central 
government and locality.
Regional	policy	dilemmas
In the first industrial revolution, mass migration from the countryside to 
new urban industrial centres took place, and public policy decisions 
about the infrastructure which made urban living tolerable – for example, 
better housing, water and drainage, public health – all followed on from 
what were essentially economic drivers. Institutions of city governance 
took the initiative in creating these new social policies.
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While landless and voteless farm labourers had little choice but to up 
sticks and move, once there was political representation it was easier to 
contemplate using the power of the state to ameliorate the work of the 
markets, and to seek to find ways of bringing work to the people rather 
than people to the work. 
The policy dilemma will be apparent from the above potted history. How 
far should government intervene in the process of economic change 
to sustain the areas which were once highly productive but which have 
become less so and therefore provide fewer jobs, and how far should it 
allow market forces to operate without constraint? Recent disclosure of 
cabinet papers under the 30-year rule reveals exactly that discussion, 
when the then chancellor of the exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe, argued 
that Merseyside should be allowed to wither away rather than receive 
public funding to arrest its decline. This stark suggestion highlights the 
dilemma in question – while some might argue that ‘going with the flow’ 
of the market is the best way of assuring economic success even if that 
means resources and development move elsewhere, the sunk investment 
in major cities and the local public backlash that will invariably follow at the 
ballot box (at least, by those members of the local population who choose 
not to vote with their feet by leaving) require a different solution.
Until the 1980s, public policy in the post-war era involved a commitment 
to full employment, with nationalisation a key instrument for ensuring 
that this happened. While there was still a drift towards the south 
east, these policies led to the retention of relatively buoyant regional 
economies. But comparative national economic decline made it less and 
less possible to cushion ‘uncompetitive’ production, and contributed 
in the 1970s to the emerging public view that ‘we could not go on like 
this’, a sentiment which led to the Conservative victory in 1979.
It is the wave of change which followed the 1979 election which sets 
the context for this discussion of how we can best support regional 
development. Floating the pound, by now an oil-backed currency, 
together with freeing up capital markets, privatisation and the 
subsequent restructuring of industrial enterprises: all of these led to a 
rapid collapse of the core industries in the regions of the UK. The further 
liberalisation of capital markets following the 1986 ‘Big Bang’ reforms of 
the UK financial services industry accelerated the split which Will Hutton 
has drawn attention to between the global finance elements of the 
economy, predominantly based in London and the south east and the 
de-industrialised regional centres (Hutton 1995).
Hutton argued that the neoliberal ideology swept over not only those 
working in global financial markets, but also public policymakers, both 
elected and permanent, who went with the flow rather than focusing on 
how the UK economy as a whole could increase its competitiveness and 
achieve more prosperity. 
IPPR  |  Complex new world: Translating new economic thinking into public policy124
The next section of this chapter examines a shift in the way that the 
public policy system operated and went in tandem with neoliberal 
economic policies. The shift was towards a much more centralised 
distribution of power, reducing the power and influence of regional 
interests and focusing on the untrammelled operation of market forces.
The	balance	between	centralism	and	localism	within	
the	British	state
This section will give an account of how the power of the central state 
was increased, how this was related to a particular set of economic 
policies, and how it was intended to de-privilege the voices of those 
with opposing views. As we shall see, the legacy of state centralisation 
remains, even though the support for many of the policies with which it 
was linked has melted away.
Pre-1980s
Social policy in the UK has its roots deep in localism, through the 
emergence of charitable bodies as a response to the urban problems of 
the 19th century and the development of municipalist leadership, which 
used the institutions of local government to deal with the pressing issues 
of populations living in close proximity and without traditional support 
mechanisms. The new factors posed by the 20th century, including the 
need to mobilise for a major war, triggered national involvement in social 
policy, with the post-second world war welfare state establishing a new 
paradigm of central state involvement. 
The Attlee government’s approach was underpinned by the intellectual 
and ideological framework of Fabian socialism, focusing on the directive 
use of state power to achieve change. Nevertheless, this approach 
was rooted in local institutions and processes. Three measures in the 
1940s – the establishment of national assistance, the 1944 Education 
Act and the creation of the NHS in 1948 – form model cases of a new 
relationship between centre and locality. 
For all the rhetoric surrounding minister of health Aneurin Bevan’s claim 
that he would hear about the details of service failures in his ministerial 
office (see the famous bedpan in Tonypandy), while a National Health 
Service was created and funded through the exchequer, governance 
was shared through local and regional board structures, involving both 
local elected representatives and the leaders of clinical professions. 
The Education Act 1944 created a service which was, in its own words, 
‘centrally determined and locally administered’ – a form of words which 
beautifully expressed the power sharing that characterised the relation-
ship between centre and locality. Local education authorities in effect 
shared power with the teaching profession and with central government. 
National Assistance was far more centralised, with benefit systems 
and finances decided in the centre and the notion of nationally based 
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entitlements related to the contribution of national insurance by 
individuals. This centralised position was consistent with the view that 
unemployment would be a short-term problem for individuals and not an 
endemic feature of local economies, requiring complex local solutions.
In effect, we had, in Karl Weick’s phrase, a ‘loosely coupled system’, 
with centre and locality, each able to operate within the logics 
appropriate to their sphere, the former creating a national narrative 
surrounding the services in question and the latter getting to grips with 
the messy reality of crafting change and making things happen on the 
ground (Weick 1976). This is a power-sharing accommodation, rooted in 
social solidarity.
On the economic policy side – or rather its key component, industrial 
policy – here, too, power sharing was the order of the day. Defunct 
infrastructure companies had been nationalised as part of the 
mobilisation for war, and the question of how the relationship with 
government should be structured post-war was resolved by the 
establishment of the public corporation as the dominant form. Power 
was shared with the professional, managerial and technical elite, who 
negotiated high-level strategy and finance with ministers and their civil 
servants but otherwise ran the show. 
On both the social policy and industrial policy aspects of this paradigm 
there was a respect for knowledge rooted in experience, tacit 
knowledge that was conveyed through craft apprenticeship and learned 
through doing the job. Shared goals and values were the glue that kept 
this relationship between centre, region and locality and other interests 
in place. No one used the term complexity, but actually this was 
complexity theory in action.
This history has been set out at some length because there is now a 
generation of policymakers who have no direct experience of it, and who 
may believe that the centralised state which accompanied the last 30 
years of neoliberalism, was an eternal verity rather than a dysfunctional 
aberration. 
Post-1980s
It became common in the 1980s to talk about the ‘hollowing out’ 
of the state, a phrase that became synonymous with the period of 
privatisation which divested government of enterprise (Rhodes 1997). 
However, a process of centralising state power within the UK national 
state was proceeding at the same time. The Thatcher government may 
have been centralising in order to decentralise, as they claimed, but 
it was the centralisation which is the lasting memorial (Metcalfe and 
Richards 1987). 
In education, Thatcher oversaw a gradual weakening of influence of 
locally elected education authorities through ‘Local Management in 
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Schools’; devolving school budgets to head teachers; and the creation 
of Ofsted, which would judge school performance based on national 
criteria and league tables. Further education colleges were removed 
from local authority control and given corporate status, while the 
representatives of local further education boards were appointed by 
ministers and directed through national funding arrangements.
In health, local authority members were removed from local and regional 
health bodies and replaced by ministerial appointees. The creation of a 
purchaser/provider split served to de-privilege local professionals, while 
strategic commissioning bodies became accountable to the secretary 
of state and were granted the power to oust local managers and chairs 
for non-achievement of central targets, something which occurred with 
great frequency.
Income support is a more complicated example. The National 
Assistance Board was established as a highly centralised insurance-
based system providing financial support for unemployed people in the 
immediate post-war period. Unemployment was viewed originally as 
a short-term phenomenon where people needed funds to tide them 
over until they got their next job. The system had been devised to suit 
post-war industrial policy. The de-industrialisation of the early 1980s 
created endemic long-term unemployment where a more holistic 
approach, which involved not only benefits but also work and life skills 
development, was needed to make inroads into the problem. The 
income support system, however, remained resolutely centralised.
These developments remained in various guises during the tenure of 
successive Conservative and Labour governments; although under 
Labour, centralisation was often cushioned by the provision of more 
resources for service improvement, for example through investment in 
the development of head teacher leadership capability, more funding for 
further education, and schemes to ease the passage for people formerly 
dependent on benefits back into work. 
Furthermore, it is possible to view the first term of the New Labour 
government as an attempt to row back from centralisation – examples 
could be cited to support this, particularly in health. But after the 2001 
election the policies pursued by the Labour government were nearly as 
centralist as those of its predecessor. It is interesting that Tony Blair in 
his biography refers to the first term as a wasted opportunity.
If instead of policy and service instruments we look at the way in which 
the state itself was organised, once again we see a set of changes 
which resulted in centralisation. This included:
A. the abolition of elected bodies at regional and sub-regional level 
(GLC and the metropolitan counties) which were alternative centres 
of strategic state power
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B. capping of local authorities’ capacity to spend independently
C. creation of the Audit Commission to reduce local variance and 
enforce compliance with national targets
D. atrophy of cabinet government, with the tacit knowledge and 
judgment of individual departments and their secretaries of state 
less influential than the positivist research-based knowledge 
possessed by the Number 10 policy unit
E. a relative weakening of the independence of and the capacity to 
‘speak truth unto power’ by the permanent civil service, where over 
a working lifetime civil servants could acquire a rich appreciation of 
the policy issues they dealt with; civil servants were often seen as 
a brake on change by governments of both parties and therefore 
marginalised
F. decentralisation was offered to those who were able to press their 
case politically, in what became the devolved administrations. 
The devolved administrations may ultimately constitute a natural 
experiment which demonstrates the importance of smaller scale 
in dealing with the complex issues of development, but in the 
short term it removed important voices from the discourse about 
regional devolution.
The picture is clear: what was once a state system which was based on 
a partnership between centre, region and locality increasingly became 
tightly centralised in Downing Street, tightly coupled through a system 
of performance targets, measurement and monitoring that reduced the 
overall level of intelligence available to policymakers, which arguably 
impoverished the way that decisions were made. The system was 
justified by castigating local players and professionals as the enemies 
of change, the ‘forces of conservatism’ who must be defeated, but the 
overall impact of centralisation was to make policy more mechanistic, 
less able to deal with experiential and tacit knowledge, more alienating 
for those outside the charmed circles, and those within having a thinner 
appreciation of the diverse fabric of the regions that make up the UK.
What was beginning to happen towards the end of this period is that 
the model of tight centralised control was beginning to collapse under 
its own weight. The transaction costs of targeting, inspection and 
monitoring were reaching unsustainable proportions. Rethinking began 
under the Labour government, but actually the political capital of the 
critique accrued to the then opposition and fed into their narratives 
about localism and the Big Society.
Post-2010
It is still too early to tell how the Coalition government will ultimately fare 
on the centralisation question, but the phrase ‘lipstick localism’1 neatly 
sums up the scepticism felt by some observers. David Cameron has 
1	 See	http://www.ippr.org/articles/56/9031/going-metro	
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certainly looked to learn from the mistakes of the previous administration 
and the widespread perception that it had been overly prescriptive, 
but it has become apparent since the election that there is a great deal 
of hesitation about handing power back to the local state. Instead of 
seeing local government as the natural convenor of the Big Society, 
which is how many local authorities see themselves, the view has 
prevailed that this is just one more arm of the state and therefore it 
needs to be rolled back (Richards 2011). Localism for the government 
is predominantly defined as seeking to strengthen the hand of citizen 
groups vis-á-vis local government.
Perhaps the most promising lines of development lie in proposals for 
decentralisation to city sub-regions through the City Deal initiative. 
Cities have been promised more autonomy, provided they first jump 
through the hoop of holding a referendum for an elected mayor. What 
will happen to this policy now that the idea of the elected mayor has 
been resoundingly rejected remains to be seen. The referendum 
results reveal that the public has little patience with tinkering with 
political management arrangements, possibly influenced by the 
views of local political leaders who were on the whole profoundly 
irritated by Whitehall’s perennial promise to devolve more, if only... An 
acknowledgement that the problem lies at the centre rather than in the 
locality would be a big step forwards.
Emergent responses
You can treat a complex adaptive system as though it is a tightly 
coupled machine, but you cannot turn it into one. During the whole 
period since the start of the 1980s there is evidence of groups coming 
together and creating networks to try to influence a system that 
was seen to be unhelpful to the development of the regions. De-
industrialisation and consequent unemployment formed the spur in 
many areas to create relationships, across political lines and across 
sectors, which aimed to find a better way for their locality.
The Toxteth and Brixton riots sent alarm bells ringing in government 
and led some to question the public’s willingness to bear the social 
costs of the great neoliberal experiment. Toxteth marked the start of 
the career of Michael Heseltine as an urban and regional development 
actor. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as a minister he was involved 
in one scheme or another aimed at using marginal funding to ameliorate 
conditions in the worst affected urban and regional areas. Local players 
channelled their energies into bidding competitively against each other 
for central funding to do worthwhile things, through such schemes as 
City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget. This had the further 
advantage for central government in that some of the cost could be 
recouped from European Union grants.
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A key finding from evaluations of these early interventions was that 
building new factories or offices was not enough in itself to trigger 
development. What worked best was a combination of appropriate 
economic and social initiatives building the social capital of interlocking 
networks through partnership working. 
In recognition and pursuit of this holistic approach, Heseltine sponsored 
the notion of the single government office for the region, which would 
be a one-stop shop providing an integrated service across the whole 
of government. This grew into the government offices for the regions 
(GOR) system in the mid-1990s, which was said to be the eyes and 
ears of Whitehall in the regions and the voice of the regions in Whitehall. 
Over time, this system snowballed, with more and more departments 
posting staff into the system to create a coherent regional presence. 
Government offices organised themselves on a sub-regional basis and 
saw their role as facilitating network creation and development between 
sub-regional actors and others who had something to offer the sub-
regional economy.
Unfortunately one of the first acts of the 1997 Labour government was 
to pull the economic development function out of the GOR and instead 
set up the regional development agencies (RDAs), a plan developed 
in opposition and not well grounded in an understanding of what had 
been learned in the 1990s. There was thus a GOR and an RDA in each 
region, with not-so-creative tension between them – tension that was 
nevertheless reduced over the years by careful relationship building. 
Both organisations were then abolished by the Coalition government in 
the name of ‘localism’.
Meanwhile, the Treasury sought to reform the expenditure planning 
process. The intention behind Public Service Agreements, begun in 
1998, was to focus on the achievement of outcomes and reduce the 
burden of ‘targetry’ and monitoring. Institutionalist theory focuses on 
how the established norms of a given institution may shape the way 
that purposive action actually transpires, and there could not have been 
a clearer example of this than Public Service Agreements (March and 
Olsen 1989). Instead of reducing burdens, it actually led to an increase 
and at one time in the early 2000s local authorities were subject to 600 
separate performance targets. 
However, the sheer absurdity of this situation did trigger more radical 
change, which accelerated after the change of prime minister, with a 
real shift towards greater decentralisation through the establishment 
of Local Area Agreements jointly negotiated between central and local 
government. This development in turn paved the way for Total Place, 
an experiment conducted right at the end of the Labour administration 
which operated at the sub-regional and local level, allowing local 
government and local public service bodies to pool budgets to achieve 
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better value for money in achieving common goals. This idea was 
continued, albeit on the narrower field of children’s services, by the 
current government’s Community Budgets initiative. What we are seeing 
demonstrated here is a partial loosening of the tightly coupled system.
Localism is becoming a concept in good currency. The Lyons review of 
local government in 2008 articulated the significance of the concept of 
‘place’, re-evaluating the spatial dimension of wellbeing. The incoming 
coalition government also pitched a strong narrative around localism, 
although their interpretation of this idea in government has been more to 
do with marketisation and cost-cutting than decentralisation of decision-
making. 
What	lessons	can	be	drawn	for	the	future?
It is not possible here to set out a working template for a public 
policy system which will be better able to handle regional and local 
complexities and provide an approach to regional development which 
has some chance of making a contribution to the rebalancing of the 
economy away from London and the south east. However the above 
account of key design features over the last 30 years and beyond does 
allow us to set out certain parameters.
First, strategic leadership is needed from central government, 
not micromanagement. This phrase comes from a far-sighted white 
paper entitled Excellence and Fairness produced in 2008 by the Cabinet 
Office. In it can be found the thinking of people in the previous Labour 
administration who realised that the old centralised control approach 
had gone too far and needed to be counterbalanced by an approach 
based on dialogue and persuasion. The central maxim of the paper 
can be summarised as ‘you are only a leader if people choose to follow 
you’, a reverse on the old ‘Number 10 knows best’ mentality. The term 
‘strategic’ implies that there is a need for overview and oversight at the 
level of the nation state, not micromanagement.
Second, scale factors are important. Many of the countries which 
have the most effective public policy systems have smaller populations 
than the UK. Finland and Singapore both come to mind as delivering 
public services of the highest standard, achieving results well in 
advance of the UK. In neither case can this success be ascribed to 
beneficial natural endowments, but I would argue that their size enables 
a connectivity and the growth of a sense of common purpose which 
underpins their development. UK city sub-regions are around the same 
population size. Other larger more successful public policy systems 
– such as Canada and Germany – illustrate the importance of federal 
systems where sub-national policy systems have the scope to make a 
difference.
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The low level of esteem in which government is held by the British 
public means that it would be unproductive to go down the route of 
a formal constitutional convention to work out how to organise things 
differently, as happened in Scotland before devolution. The rejection 
of the proposal for a north east assembly in a referendum three years 
ago illustrates a general unwillingness to contemplate new layers 
of government. However, continuing the process of re-creating the 
metropolitan counties does make sense – it has already been done in 
London, and in Greater Manchester and the Leeds City Region new 
arrangements under the Coalition government’s City Deal initiative are 
being made to all these groupings of authorities to function as one. This 
is clearly a process which could be extended to other conurbations, 
which like Greater Manchester could overcome local rivalries to reach 
out for the bigger prize.
Third, join up government at the sub-national level. The Total Place 
programme, introduced in 2008, has demonstrated clearly that giving 
local bodies the power to pool budgets, or at least part of their budget, 
to work for purposes, or for service users, that they share, gives benefits 
both in cost-savings and in capacity for innovation in complex policy 
and service areas. This programme of work put local bodies in the 
lead, with a group of high-level officials in Whitehall whose job it was to 
knock over central government obstacles to joint working. One example 
is Croydon, where the local authority and the health service joined 
together to achieve more with less for local children and young people 
by successfully improving early intervention, creating multi-professional 
teams able to view issues holistically, and by building social partnerships 
with community networks, thereby engaging them in solving the 
problems (Hughes and Richards 2011). 
Regrettably, despite its localism narrative, the current government’s lack 
of a coherent public service strategy leaves it vulnerable to the service 
silo mentality which is the standard operating procedure in Whitehall. It 
is pretty clear that neither the current health reforms nor the proposed 
direction of school policy are much influenced by the need for holistic 
working at the local level.
Fourth, devolve budgets for higher and further education and skills 
to city sub-regions. Many areas of public service which are highly 
relevant to regional economic policy lie outside the traditions of regional 
funding. Universities exist within a national (and now consumer) funding 
framework, where more funding has gone to universities with high 
scores on a research assessment framework and more international 
academic publications. This probably has a pay-off in terms of attracting 
foreign students and in the development of fundamental science-based 
enterprises, but there are wider areas where the application to practice 
is not helped by this framework. City sub-regions which are working 
towards improving their knowledge economies, which must mean most 
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of them, will be missing a vital ingredient if universities are driven away 
from them, rather than towards them.
The same argument applies, without the countervailing factors, to further 
education and skills. The Skills Funding Agency is seeking to reorientate 
itself so that it gives colleges more space to be local innovators, but the 
legacy of the past means that there is a long way to go.
Fifth, by the same token, the budget for the Work Programme 
should be devolved to city sub-regions. It will be clear from the 
sections earlier in this chapter that the system of benefits started life 
as, and has continued to be, highly centralised. In the case of benefits 
available as of right to all citizens, this remains an appropriate structural 
choice but in the area of work-related benefits, where there is some 
administrative discretion, it does not make sense for that discretion to 
be exercised within a Whitehall silo, divorced from the mainstream of 
economic and social development activity. The recent award by the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) of prime contracts for the 
Work Programme on a sub-regional basis is recognition of the need 
to work at the appropriate scale. Unfortunately, the fact that these 
contracts were won by private companies rather than a local public 
development body means that the integration of this work within the 
wider context is not likely to happen. Transferring work-related benefits 
to a city sub-region would be a big step but the development challenge 
which faces regions of the UK is of similar magnitude.
Finally, regional policy practitioners should note the hidden wiring 
of public accountability. It is sometimes said that the UK does not 
have a constitution, but it does have constitution-like practices which 
are deeply embedded and carry strong legitimacy. One such practice 
is the notion that public money must ultimately be under the control 
of a properly constituted public body run by elected representatives 
and that those who are charged with spending public money may be 
held accountable for what they do with it. Accountability and therefore 
political risk cannot be shuffled off to third parties. The recent problems 
faced by the secretary of state for work and pensions over practices in 
the company A4E (Action for Employment) illustrate the point.
The history of public administration in the last 30 years is littered with 
examples of central government politicians seeking to ‘decentralise’ to 
non-elected bodies which they themselves appoint rather than to local 
elected bodies. The health service boards from the early 1990s onwards 
are one example of ministers trying in vain to avoid accountability for 
local action, but failing to do so. Both proponents and opponents of 
the recent health bill were aware how crucial was the retention of the 
secretary of state’s responsibility for ensuring the provision of a National 
Health Service, with some notion of common entitlements rather than 
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non-elected local bodies (even if run by GPs) having full discretion to 
spend public money as they see fit.
To sit discretion and the accountability which goes with it at the level 
of the local economic development footprint, likely to be a city sub-
region, there is little alternative but to use elected local government to 
anchor it in public accountability. If central government is going to adopt 
a strategic leadership role it needs a locally grounded partner who will 
ensure that the buck stops at the right level rather than returning to the 
centre. 
This will involve discarding the outdated myths about local government 
purveyed by the metropolitan elite. Among both political and officer 
elites, local government is clearly at least as well able to provide effective 
leadership as those who operate in central government. The fact 
that the new head of the civil service is a former local authority chief 
executive should say it all.
Conclusion
This chapter has drawn attention to the linkage between issues of 
regional policy and the way the public policy system operates. In 
particular, the degree of power centralisation is seen as a significant 
factor in enabling the full flowering of neoliberal economic policies in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The legacy of centralised power was adopted by 
New Labour and only belatedly seen as problematic when the system 
of targetry reached epic proportions. The reputation thus gained for 
top-down bossiness was one reason for the espousal of the principle 
of localism by the current government, but this commitment is being 
derailed by the greater commitment to marketisation.
If we wish to rebalance the economy by building regional prosperity 
we need to recognise that this cannot be done through a mechanistic 
approach from Whitehall. Instead, there needs to be a focus on regional 
development as a complex adaptive system, facilitated and empowered 
to adapt according to circumstances.
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Economic ideas matter. The writings of Adam Smith over two centuries 
ago still influence how people in positions of power – in government, 
business, and the media – think about markets, regulation, the role of 
the state, and other economic issues today. The words written by Karl 
Marx in the middle of the 19th century inspired revolutions around the 
world and provided the ideological foundations for the cold war. The 
Chicago economists, led by Milton Friedman, set the stage for the 
Reagan/Thatcher era and now fill Tea Partiers with zeal. The debates of 
Keynes and Hayek in the 1930s are repeated daily in the op-ed pages 
and blogosphere today. 
The thesis of this book is that economic thinking is changing. If that 
thesis is correct – and there are many reasons to believe it is – then 
historical experience suggests policy and politics will change as 
well. How significant that change will be remains to be seen. It is still 
early days and the impact thus far has been limited. Few politicians 
or policymakers are even dimly aware of the changes underway 
in economics; but these changes are deep and profound, and the 
implications for policy and politics are potentially transformative.
For almost 200 years the politics of the west, and more recently of 
much of the world, have been conducted in a framework of right versus 
left – of markets versus states, and of individual rights versus collective 
responsibilities. New economic thinking scrambles, breaks up and 
re-forms these old dividing lines and debates. It is not just a matter 
of pragmatic centrism, of compromise, or even a ‘third way’. Rather, 
new economic thinking provides something altogether different: a new 
way of seeing and understanding the economic world. When viewed 
through the eyeglasses of new economics, the old right–left debates 
don’t just look wrong, they look irrelevant. New economic thinking will 
not end economic or political debates; there will always be issues to 
argue over. But it has the promise to reframe those debates in new and 
hopefully more productive directions.
An	economics	for	the	real	world
The term ‘new economics’ is both vague and broad. It is easiest to 
define by what it is not. New economics does not accept the orthodox 
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theory that has dominated economics for the past several decades that 
humans are perfectly rational, markets are perfectly efficient, institutions 
are optimally designed and economies are self-correcting equilibrium 
systems that invariably find a state that maximises social welfare. Social 
scientists working in the new economics tradition argue that this theory 
has failed empirically on many points and that the 2008 financial crisis 
is only the latest and most obvious example.
Defining what new economics is provides a greater challenge. As of yet 
there is no neatly synthesised theory to replace neoclassical orthodoxy 
(and some argue there never will be as the economy is too complex a 
system to be fully captured in a single theory). Rather new economics 
is best characterised as a research programme that encompasses a 
broad range of theories, empirical work, and methods. It is also highly 
interdisciplinary, involving not only economists, but psychologists, 
anthropologists, sociologists, historians, physicists, biologists, 
mathematicians, computer scientists, and others across the social and 
physical sciences.
It should also be emphasised that new economics is not necessarily 
new. Rather it builds on well-established heterodox traditions in 
economics such as behavioural economics, institutional economics, 
evolutionary economics, and studies of economic history, as well as 
newer streams such as complex systems studies, network theory, and 
experimental economics. Over the past several decades a number of 
Nobel prizes have been given to researchers working in what today 
might be called the new economics tradition, including Friedrich von 
Hayek, Herbert Simon, Douglass North, James Heckman, Amartya 
Sen, Daniel Kahneman, Thomas Schelling and Elinor Ostrom.
The common thread running through this broad research programme 
is a strong desire to make economic theory better reflect the empirical 
reality of the economy. New economics seeks explanations of how 
the economy works that have empirical validity. Thus behavioural 
economists run painstakingly crafted experiments to explain actual 
human economic behaviour. Institutional economists conduct 
detailed field investigations into the functions and dysfunctions of real 
institutions. Complexity theorists seek to understand the dynamic 
behaviour of the economy with computer models validated against 
data.
In my book The Origin of Wealth (2007: 97) I offered a table to 
summarise the contrast between traditional economics and the new 
economics perspective. I provide here an updated version.
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Traditional economists often respond that the limitations of orthodox 
theory are well recognised and there is much work being done to 
relax restrictive assumptions, introduce more realistic behaviour, 
heterogeneity, institutional effects, dynamics, endogenous innovation 
and so on. They are correct and this work is a very positive development 
for the field. However, much of this work introduces just one element of 
realism to an otherwise standard model – a bit of behaviour here, a bit of 
institutional realism there, and so on. It is very hard or even impossible 
to relax all of the assumptions at once without throwing out the whole 
structure of the model – in particular without abandoning the core idea 
that the economy is an equilibrium system.
The radical challenge the new economists have accepted is to relax all 
of the unrealistic assumptions at once, move to the right column of the 
above table, and create an economics that has much greater fidelity to 
the real world. It is an enormous challenge and it requires a new toolkit 
and methodologies. But there is growing evidence that it is possible. 
That evidence comes from work in economics itself, but also from 
other fields that successfully model highly complex distributed systems 
that have many similarities to the economy – for example climate and 
weather, biological ecosystems, the brain, the internet and epidemiology.
Table 11.1 
Traditional 
economics and 
new economics
Traditional economics New economics
Individuals Perfectly rational, use deductive 
reasoning, have access to perfect 
information
Use both inductive and deductive 
reasoning, rely on rules of thumb, 
subject to errors, capable of learning, 
access to local, imperfect information
Networks and 
institutions
Network relationships don’t matter, all 
interactions that matter are through 
price system
Network structures matter, non-
price interactions matter (eg social 
relationships, trust, reciprocity)
Institutions Institutions are rational optimisers and 
thus efficient – details of institutional 
design can be ignored (eg no banks in 
most macro models)
Institutions are imperfect, often 
inefficient, and constantly evolving 
– details of institutional design can 
matter (eg fragility of banking system)
Dynamics Economy automatically goes to 
equilibrium where social welfare is 
maximised
Economy is a highly dynamic system 
that can go far from equilibrium and 
become trapped in suboptimal states
Innovation Innovation is a mysterious, 
unpredictable, external force
Technological and social innovation 
are evolutionary processes that are 
central to economic growth and 
change
Emergence Macro phenomena (inflation, 
unemployment, bubbles) result 
from the linear addition of individual 
decisions – heterogeneity doesn’t 
matter
Macro patterns emerge non-
linearly from dynamic interactions of 
heterogeneous agents, small changes 
can have big effects and big changes 
can have small effects
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Thus what has come to be referred to as new economics is not a single 
theory, or even a coherent body of work. It is a broad research programme 
best characterised by its unifying desire to embrace the messy reality of 
the economy. To accept human behaviour, imperfect institutions, and the 
complex interactions and dynamics of the economy as they really are 
rather than what an idealised model says they should be.
As policymakers and politicians often rely on the advice of economists 
and use their theories and ideas to frame their views and debates, this 
move towards realism in economics should be a good thing. If one 
thinks of economists as like biologists and policymakers as like doctors, 
then just as better biology has led to more effective medicine, so too 
should a more realistic economics lead to more effective policy.
In the rest of this chapter I will outline three ways in which new 
economics may impact policy and politics. First, new economics may 
offer better tools for policy development and analysis – I will discuss 
an example from the financial crisis. Second, new economics has the 
potential to change the way we think of the role of government and 
policy itself, yielding new ways of designing policies in general. Third, 
new economics offers the intriguing possibility of developing new political 
narratives – this is the least developed aspect of new economics, but 
perhaps the one with potential for greatest long-term impact.
New	tools	for	policy	–	examples	from	the	crisis
‘…Uncertainty	has	increased,	but	generally	inconsistent	with	
the	perception	of	a	“bubble,”	the	implied	risks	do	not	seem	
particularly	tilted	to	the	downside…’
US	Federal	Reserve	2006
In 2006, economists at the US Federal Reserve conducted an analysis 
of what would happen to the US economy if house prices suddenly 
dropped by 20 per cent. Officials at the central bank had noted the 
unprecedented run-up in house prices and become concerned. They 
ran the analysis on their state of the art macroeconomic model and the 
answer that came back was ‘not much’. Growth might soften, or there 
might even be a mild recession, but nothing that a few small interest rate 
cuts couldn’t handle. The model had done exactly what such traditional 
models are designed to do. It assumed everyone would behave 
rationally, markets would function efficiently, and the system would 
smoothly self-correct back to full-employment equilibrium.
At around the same time, Fed chairman Alan Greenspan was repeatedly 
asked by the media, congressmen, and others whether there was a 
housing bubble.1 Greenspan, a devotee of efficient market theory and 
1	 For	examples	see	US	Fed	International	Finance	Discussion	Paper	no	841,	September	2005	
and	Finance	and	Economics	Discussion	Paper	no	2006-32,	October	2006;	and	Paul	Krugman,	
‘Greenspan	and	the	Bubble’,	New	York	Times,	29	August	2005.	
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fan of Ayn Rand’s libertarian philosophy, consistently replied that the run-
up in prices must have good rational reasons, there was little evidence 
of a bubble, and even if there was, the Fed should not intervene to 
burst it as the markets would eventually self-correct and government 
intervention would likely do more harm than good.
We all know what happened. The bubble burst and it triggered a 
catastrophic financial collapse, almost instantly wiped out $10.8 trillion in 
wealth in the US alone, nearly led to a second great depression, and we 
are still dealing with the consequences, most notably the ongoing euro 
crisis. In late 2008, Greenspan gave his famous mea culpa saying, ‘I have 
found a flaw’ in orthodox free-market theory, ‘I don’t know how significant 
or permanent it is. But I have been very distressed by that fact.’2
Might new economic techniques and models have given a different 
view? Might they have helped policymakers avoid such a disastrous 
outcome? A team of researchers led by John Geanakoplos at Yale, 
Robert Axtell at George Mason, my colleague Doyne Farmer at 
Oxford and Peter Howitt at Brown think so. They have constructed 
(Geanakoplos et al 2012) an agent-based model of the housing market 
that gives new insights into what caused the bubble and the model 
could eventually become a tool to assist policymakers in designing 
strategies for preventing or managing future bubbles.3
Their model is radically different from the kind of models the Fed used 
in its 2006 analysis. Rather than look at the economy top-down and 
in aggregate, they model the system bottom-up. Their model has 
individual households in it, and for those owning houses rather than 
renting, individual mortgages backed by houses of a certain value. This 
population of households is heterogeneous – some have mortgages 
they can easily afford, some don’t, and the terms of their mortgages 
may differ. The households are assumed to behave in ways consistent 
with how behavioural economists tell us real people behave. Rather 
than doing elaborate calculations the agents in the model use rules of 
thumb (for example one shouldn’t take on a mortgage more than three 
times one’s annual income) but individuals vary in their use of such rules 
(some might be more conservative, others more risk taking). They also 
introduce institutional realism, for example if interest rates drop you 
might consider refinancing, but you might not automatically do it if the 
hassle factor is too high.
The initial version of the model uses detailed mortgage and household 
data from a single metropolitan area – Washington, DC. The team 
eventually plan to calibrate it with data from other major cities, and 
possibly the whole of the US and other countries such as the UK as 
2	 Alan	Greenspan	testimony	to	the	Government	Oversight	Committee,	US	House	of	Representatives,	
23	October	2008.
3	 This	work	is	supported	by	the	Institute	for	New	Economic	Thinking	(INET)	with	which	the	author	is	
affiliated.
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well. Their preliminary findings reproduce the dynamics of the bubble 
building up and then bursting. Unlike traditional analyses, the model 
doesn’t gently self-correct, it crashes (see figure 11.1a). They then run 
policy experiments on the model, asking what policymakers might have 
done to prevent the bubble forming, or at least stopped it building once 
it was clear there was one. Analyses using traditional models have 
tended to blame the bubble on overly loose monetary policy from the 
Fed. So the team tested scenarios where policymakers raise interest 
rates. The bubble is indeed moderated, but not eliminated (figure 11.1b). 
But interest rates are a blunt instrument and such tightening would also 
have slowed growth in the rest of the economy. So the team also tried a 
regulatory intervention – preventing banks from loosening their loan-
to-value ratios. During the heat of the bubble, banks competed with 
each other to give loans, loosening their standards. The team’s model 
shows that by intervening to prevent these standards from slipping, 
policymakers might have eliminated a key dynamic in the bubble’s 
formation, prevented the subsequent bust, and done so more effectively 
and without the collateral damage caused by a big interest rate hike 
(figure 11.1c).
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There are also efforts to use similar approaches to go beyond the 
housing market and look more broadly at the relationship between the 
financial sector and the macroeconomy. When the crisis hit in 2008 
many senior policymakers were shocked by how little help they received 
from the formal theories and models of traditional economics. Reflecting 
on this later, European Central Bank (ECB) president Jean-Claude 
Trichet said: ‘As a policymaker during the crisis, I found the available 
models of limited help. In fact I would go further: in the face of the crisis, 
we felt abandoned by conventional tools.’4 
Central banks, finance ministries, and economic regulators all have large 
staffs of well-trained economists, fancy models and vast quantities of 
4	 Speech	to	ECB	Annual	Central	Banking	Conference,	November	2010.
Figure 11.1 
Agent-based 
model of the US 
housing market, 
1998–2010 
(index 1 = 
first period)
(a) Case–Schiller
(b) Case–Schiller:  
constant interest rates
(c) Case–Schiller:  
constant loan-to-value ratio
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data. But when the crunch came, their theories and models could not 
describe what they were experiencing. The Economist reported that 
the Bank of England’s large macro model wasn’t much help because 
it didn’t have banks in it. It is hard to make policy in the middle of a 
banking crisis if one’s economic model doesn’t have banks in it.
The reason these models and formal theories were of limited use is they 
were built on assumptions that people are rational, markets always clear, 
bubbles can’t form, and that banks are just boring bits of plumbing 
that shuffle money from one part of the system to another and can be 
safely ignored. It is therefore not surprising that when people started 
panicking, markets were not clearing, a massive bubble had just burst, 
and the banking system was on the verge of collapse, that models with 
such assumptions were not that helpful. It is a bit like building a flight 
simulator where it is impossible for the airplane to crash. 
Yet a crisis is exactly when a model should be at its most helpful. The 
crisis was something beyond the experience of most of the participants; 
it was highly complex and moving very fast. Intuition and ‘mental 
simulation’ can be unreliable in such circumstances. Models can be 
very helpful in augmenting and informing judgment. They can keep track 
of lots of variables, enforce logical relationships, and search spaces of 
possibility more rigorously and quickly than the human mind can alone. 
If policymakers had had better models, they might have been able to run 
more and different policy scenarios and gained different insights into the 
crisis. Politics and judgment will always play a key role in major policy 
decisions – but better models might have given the policymakers better 
options to choose from.
Andrew Haldane (2011), executive director for financial stability at the 
Bank of England, has teamed up with Lord Robert May, one of the 
world’s pre-eminent mathematical ecologists and applied ideas from 
network theory, epidemiology, and food webs in ecology to look at the 
problem of financial contagion in the banking system. Their work has 
potentially significant implications for structural reform of the banking 
system. Doyne Farmer, Domenico Delli Gatti and I are leading an effort 
supported by the European Commission called Project CRISIS, which 
is a consortium of researchers building an agent-based model of the 
interlinked banking system and macroeconomy to provide a simulation 
platform for policymakers to develop and test policy ideas.5 While the 
work is at an early stage and there are many challenges to building a tool 
policymakers can rely on, there has been significant interest from central 
banks, finance ministries, regulators, and other economic policymakers.
While the examples cited draw from behavioural economics, network 
theory, experimental economics, complex systems thinking and use 
computer simulation, there is also new economic work with direct public 
5	 See	http://www.crisis-economics.eu	
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policy relevance going on in economic history, institutional economics, 
evolutionary economics, and a variety of other traditions and toolkits. 
And there is work going on not only on the financial crisis, but also 
on topics such as climate change, inequality, poverty, economic 
development, innovation and growth, and other policy-relevant topics.6 
The challenge is bringing this promising, but still early-stage work, into 
the policy environment. 
Policymaking	in	an	uncertain	world
In addition to providing new models and tools for specific issues like 
the financial crisis, new economics offers a potentially different way of 
thinking about policy more broadly.
Traditional economics views the economy in a fairly mechanistic way. 
If people are rational and we want to change their behaviour then we 
just need to change their incentives. Thus, a lot of policy is conducted 
through tinkering with the tax code or subsidies, for example if one wants 
more innovation, give an R&D tax credit; if one wants less smoking, tax it 
heavily. Of course people aren’t immune to such incentives, but often the 
response is far less than policymakers would like.
Likewise, traditional economics views the economy as naturally being in 
a state of efficiency, and so by definition any interventions move it away 
from that state, making it less efficient. Thus, interventions are justified 
by market failures, the need to create some public good, or the need to 
avoid some negative spillover effects or externalities. For example, state 
support of R&D might be justified if there are market failures, or taxing 
smoking might be justified to reduce the externalities smokers create for 
non-smokers.
Finally, policies are evaluated through the lens of cost–benefit analysis, 
where future benefits and costs are projected and compared. For example, 
much of the debate on climate change policy has been over competing 
forecasts of future costs from climate damage and their likelihood of 
occurring, versus the potential benefits of action to avoid those costs.
These mechanistic approaches to policy and regulation are still what are 
taught in most undergraduate and graduate university programmes, and 
they pervade the civil service and the pool of advisers and experts that 
governments rely on for policy development and assessment.
Both economists and policymakers have also ignored what George 
Soros calls the ‘reflexivity’ of the economy. Actors in an economy 
take actions which change the economy, those changes then change 
the actors’ perceptions of the economy, which then changes their 
actions, and so on. But as humans are fallible and our perceptions 
and interpretations may not always match reality, the two-way interplay 
between perceptions and actions can send the economy off on a course 
6	 See	for	example	Geyer	and	Rihani	2010	and	Room	2011
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far from the optimal path predicted by orthodox economic models. 
Bubbles are a prime example. Soros has also pointed out that these 
reflexive interactions can create ‘predator–prey’ dynamics between 
regulators and those being regulated. Regulators take an action to 
address a perceived problem, that changes the perceptions and actions 
of market participants, which in turn creates a new set of problems 
triggering further regulator actions, and so on. Over time this infinite 
chase between fallible regulators and equally fallible market participants 
leaves a trail of rules, structures, and institutions that has a major effect 
on shaping the evolution of the economy.
So how might new economics move us beyond the mechanistic view 
of policy and regulation, and towards a view that takes into account the 
complexity, unpredictability, and reflexivity of the economy?
My view is that we must take a more deliberately evolutionary view 
of policy development. Rather than thinking of policy as a fixed set of 
rules or institutions engineered to address a particular set of issues, we 
should think of policy as an adapting portfolio of experiments that helps 
shape the evolution of the economy and society over time. There are 
three principles to this approach:
First, rather than predict we should experiment. Policymaking 
often starts with an engineering perspective – there is a problem 
and government should fix it. For example, we need to get student 
mathematics test scores up, we need to reduce traffic congestion, or 
we need to prevent financial fraud. Policy wonks design some rational 
solution, it goes through the political meat grinder, whatever emerges 
is implemented (often poorly), unintended consequences occur, and 
then – whether it works or not – it gets locked in for a long time. An 
alternative approach is to create a portfolio of small-scale experiments 
trying a variety of solutions, see which ones work, scale-up the 
ones that are working, and eliminate the ones that are not. Such an 
evolutionary approach recognises the complexity of social-economic 
systems, the difficulty of predicting what solutions will work in advance 
and difficulties in real-world implementation. Failures then happen on 
a small scale and become opportunities to learn rather than hard to 
reverse policy disasters. It won’t eliminate the distortions of politics. 
But the current process forces politicians to choose from competing 
forecasts about what will and won’t work put forward by competing 
interest groups – since it is hard to judge which forecast is right it is 
not surprising they simply choose the more powerful interest group. An 
evolutionary approach at least gives them an option of choosing what 
has been shown to actually work.
One area where evolutionary experimentation on policies has been tried 
explicitly is in development economics, where different interventions 
are tried across a portfolio of villages or regions, the results measured, 
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and successful interventions scaled up. Michael Kremer at Harvard has 
conducted field experiments on issues ranging from policies to improve 
teacher performance, to getting farmers to use fertiliser.7 David Sloan 
Wilson (2011), a leading evolutionary theorist, has tried an evolutionary 
approach in a fascinating case study of improvement efforts in his city 
of Binghamton, NY. The individual states in the US also provide such 
a natural evolutionary laboratory on issues ranging from healthcare to 
education. Other initiatives where there is a diversity of approaches, 
such as charter schools, end up creating an evolutionary portfolio of 
experiments, though more could be done to harvest those experiences 
and scale-up the successful experiments.
Second, policies and institutions should be made as adaptable 
as possible. The predator–prey dynamics between regulators and 
participants mean there is a never-ending battle between regulators trying 
to draw rules as tightly and specifically as possible, taking into account 
all possible contingencies, and armies of lawyers and accountants 
trying to find ways around them. This often leads to very rigid regulatory 
structures overlaid on highly dynamic markets. A better approach is to 
create rules that provide general frameworks, but then adapt to specific 
circumstances. One example is how California’s building codes have 
succeeded in reducing energy consumption. Rather than try to predict 
the state of energy efficiency technologies in future years, the regulators 
created a set of general performance standards that automatically 
ratchet-up as the state of technology improves – the standards are 
set by whatever the best developers are doing at the time. And rather 
than specify how those standards are to be achieved, developers are 
offered a choice of pre-approved practices, or experimenting with new 
ways of meeting the standards. Some developers are happy to go with 
the pre-approved practices, but others who are competing to meet 
the standards in less costly or more aesthetic ways have incentives 
to experiment and innovate. Thus the regulations and state-of-the-art 
building practices co-evolve with each other.
One could imagine similar approaches being applied in areas such as 
health, transport and education where general performance standards 
could be set, incentives created for experimentation and innovation, and 
then have the standards automatically adjust as the system evolves.
Third and finally, policymakers need to think of themselves less 
as social engineers and more as ‘system stewards’. As Michael 
Hallsworth from the Institute for Government (IFG) explains in chapter 3, 
rather than engineering specific outcomes, government’s role as 
system stewards is to create the conditions in which interacting agents 
in the system will adapt towards socially desirable outcomes. Policy 
design and implementation are thought of as integral rather than 
7	 See	http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/papers_kremer	
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separately, and mechanisms for feedback and continuous learning 
and improvement are built-in from the beginning. The IFG recognises, 
however, that such an evolutionary approach may not be suitable for all 
circumstances. In some situations, for example emergency disaster relief 
or national security situations, a traditional top-down approach may be 
required when speed is of the essence, where clarity and consistency is 
critical, or when the capacity of actors further down the chain is limited 
(Hallsworth 2011).
A major challenge for these more adaptive approaches to policy is the 
political difficulty of failure. Learning from a portfolio of experiments 
necessitates that some experiments will fail. Evolution is a highly 
innovative, but inherently wasteful process – many options are often 
tried before the right one is discovered. Yet politicians are held to an 
impossibly high standard, where any failure, large or small, can be used 
to call into question their entire record.
Likewise, politicians are always expected to have clear plans, and simple, 
easy to understand answers in which they have unshakeable confidence. 
You would never hear a politician give a speech where she or he says ‘It 
is a complex problem, we’re not sure what to do. But we have several 
good ideas that we’ll try on a small scale. We’ll then ramp up the ones 
that work and close down the ones that don’t, and then have a good 
shot at solving it.’ For some reason we don’t mind such an approach 
when it is used by doctors looking for new drugs, energy companies 
looking for oil, or venture capitalists looking for the next big idea. But we 
seem to prefer politicians who tell us the world is simple and predictable, 
even though we know it to be complex and unpredictable.
So an explicit, widespread use of new economic approaches to 
policymaking may require some education of citizens, the media and 
politicians themselves on the risks of overconfident top-down solutions, 
and the importance of small-scale failure as a way to learn and prevent 
large-scale disasters.
Politics	–	neither	left,	right	nor	centre
Perhaps the most intriguing, but least developed, potential impact of 
new economic thinking could be on politics itself. The tradition of splitting 
politics into left and right camps dates back to the layout of the French 
National Assembly in the Revolution of 1789. Over the two and a quarter 
centuries since, both left and right have seen their political narratives 
evolve. The left has travelled an arc from Marx and Rousseau, through 
Victorian social reformers, to Keynes, the New Deal and to modern 
European notions of social democracy. Meanwhile, the right has travelled 
from Smith and Hume, through the Austrians, the Chicago revolution, 
Thatcher-Reagan, and to today’s European centre-right parties and 
America’s radicalised Tea Partiers. At the heart of both narratives have 
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been differing views on the nature of the economy, the roles of the 
individual and the state, and notions of freedom and social justice.
New economics has the potential to significantly reframe these debates. 
It isn’t merely a matter of centrist compromise, of just splitting the 
difference. Rather it is a different frame that agrees with the right on 
some things, with the left on others, and neither on still other areas. 
For example, new economic work shows that Hayek was ahead of his 
time in his insights into the power of markets to self-organise, efficiently 
process information from millions of producers and consumers, and 
innovate. But new economic work also shows that Keynes was ahead 
of his time in his concerns about inherent instabilities in markets, the 
possibility that markets can fail to self-correct, and the need for the 
state to intervene when markets malfunction. Likewise, new economics 
research shows that humans are neither the selfish individualists of 
Hume nor the noble altruists of Rousseau, rather they are complex 
social creatures who engage in a never ending dance of cooperation 
and competition. Humans are what researchers such as Herb Gintis 
and Sam Bowles (2005) call ‘conditional co-operators and altruistic 
punishers’ – our cooperative instincts are strong and provide the basis 
for all organisation in the economy, but we also harshly punish cheaters 
and free-riders, and compete intensely for wealth and status.
Traditional economics tends to frame things in terms of market efficiency 
versus market failure, and those on the right emphasise the efficiency 
part and those on the left the failure part. This leads to differing views 
on the justice of market outcomes. The right generally believes that 
if markets allocate resources in the most societally efficient way then 
any interference in that process is morally suspect. Market outcomes 
may be unequal, but that is because the distribution of talent and hard 
work in the economy is also unequal – in general people get what they 
deserve. The left on the other hand tends to see unequal outcomes 
as an injustice in and of itself, and emphasises how powerful interests 
use markets to their benefit and can abuse or leave behind the less 
powerful. People often don’t get what they deserve and the state must 
intervene to protect the vulnerable, and correct both unfair processes 
and unfair outcomes.
To date there has been very limited work on questions of inequality, 
social welfare, and social justice from a complex systems or evolutionary 
economics perspective. But there are hints of a different view. Even 
models that start with perfectly equal or random distributions of income 
or wealth can produce unequal outcomes statistically similar to what is 
observed in the real world.8 These outcomes emerge because small, 
random differences can lead to self-reinforcing feedbacks that pull apart 
the tails of the distributions. For example, two people might start off 
8	 See	for	example	Epstein	and	Axtell	1996
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with equal ability and starting circumstances, but by chance one gets 
an early lucky break and the other doesn’t leading to compounding 
differences in income over the rest of their lives. Thus even with equal 
initial endowments and a fair process, inequality may emerge. The 
right might be wrong in that inequality might not be merely the result 
of unequal distributions of talent and hard work and therefore justified. 
But the left might also be wrong in that inequality might not necessarily 
be the result of unfair processes. At the same time, the right might 
be correct that unequal outcomes are a natural and difficult to avoid 
outcome of market interactions, while the left might also be correct 
that a growing body of evidence shows that unequal outcomes are 
strongly associated with a number of social pathologies justifying state 
intervention to ameliorate those outcomes. In other words, a new 
economics perspective might not just split the difference on debates 
such as inequality, it might rescramble the terms of such debates.
Finally, new economic thinking may also provide the foundation for new 
political narratives. Eric Liu and Nick Hanauer, in their 2011 book The 
Gardens of Democracy, explore the possible shape of such a narrative. 
They liken the narratives of traditional economics to ‘machine-thinking’ 
and advocate a shift to ‘garden-thinking’ that emphasises the dynamic, 
constantly evolving nature of the economy and the interconnectedness 
of society. The state then plays the role of gardener helping create the 
conditions in which the garden of society can flourish. 
It took traditional economics decades to move from academic theory 
to providing a foundation for policymaking and a basis for our political 
narratives. New economic thinking still has some distance to go to 
mature as a body of economic theory, and no doubt it will take time to 
fully develop the policy and political implications of these ideas. This 
journey might not end our political debates, but it has the potential to 
make them far more productive for society.
References
Beinhocker E (2007) The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of 
Economics, London: Random House
Epstein J and Axtell R (1996) Growing Artificial Societies, Cambridge, MA: Brookings Institution 
Press and MIT Press
Geanakoplos J, Axtell R, Farmer DJ, Howitt P, Conlee B, Goldstein J, Hendrey M, Palmer NM and 
Yang CY (2012) ‘Getting at Systemic Risk via an Agent-Based Model of the Housing Market’, 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 2012, 102(3): 53–58 
Geyer R and Rihani S (2010) Complexity and Public Policy, Abingdon: Routledge
Gintis H and Bowles S (2005) Moral Sentiments and Material Interests, Cambridge MA: MIT Press
Haldane A and May R (2011) ‘Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems’, Nature, 469: 351–355
Hallsworth M (2011) ‘System Stewardship: the Future of Policymaking?’ Institute for Government 
working paper, April, London
Liu E and Hanauer N (2011) The Gardens of Democracy, Seattle, WA: Sasquatch
Room G (2011) Complexity, Institutions and Pubic Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
US Federal Reserve (2006) Finance and Economics discussion paper no 2006-32, October, 
Washington, DC
Wilson D (2011) The Neighborhood Project: Using Evolution to Improve My City One Block at a 
Time, New York: Little Brown and Company
14712: Gal
The continuously evolving economic crisis that hit the UK in 2008 and 
has occupied our public discourse ever since, has not only exposed 
structural fault lines within the financial system, but also the hidden 
ruptures and unsustainable tensions in the wider global economy. With 
attention focused on rebuilding the financial infrastructure, paying down 
deficits and tackling inflation, many of the deeper shifts in our economic 
environment have yet to be fully grasped. Yet, as suggested by new 
theories explaining the nature of economic transformation – such as 
those explored in this book – it is these deeper shifts that potentially 
harbour the seeds of the next crisis. Unless they are dealt with, such a 
crisis is likely to spread beyond the economic system and jeopardise our 
political and social ecology as a whole.
One of the key sources of risk lies in the unsustainable pressures that 
have been building up against what we might describe as the backbone 
of the market ecology – the middle classes.1 Since the industrial 
revolution, it has been the middle classes that have provided the anchor 
for emerging economic and political orders; by supplying social deposits 
of labour, entrepreneurship, and political checks and balances.2 While 
the expansion of western markets and growing globalisation since the 
1970s have significantly improved the lives of most ordinary citizens in 
western and emerging economies alike,3 it is these same forces that are 
now converging to undermine the very fabric of the middle classes and 
with it our current political-economic order. 
1	 There	are	various	ways	to	define	the	middle	classes.	In	economic	terms,	some	prefer	absolute	
income	indications,	while	others	use	the	threshold	of	one-third	disposable	income	after	shelter	and	
food	expenses.	In	social	terms,	meanwhile,	the	middle	classes	have	been	defined	by	aspirations	
rather	than	income.	The	2008	Pew	report,	for	example,	suggested	such	aspirations	as	home	
ownership,	college	education	for	children,	health	and	retirement	security,	and	family	vacations.	See	
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/04/09/inside-the-middle-class-bad-times-hit-the-good-life/	
2	 Even	non-democratic	regimes	tend	to	cater	to	this	moderate	core.
3	 While	growing	voices	in	the	west	have	recently	echoed	the	question	of	‘what	has	globalisation	ever	
done	for	us?’	we	must	not	forget	its	contribution	to	our	modern	wellbeing.	Individual	self-realisation	
through	more	flexible	job	opportunities,	technological	breakthroughs,	the	proliferation	of	higher	
education,	human	rights,	and	women’s	role	in	the	marketplace	–	to	name	but	a	few	–	all	can	be	
attributed	to	the	forces	of	globalisation.
12. 
UndersTAnding glOBAl 
rUPTUres: A cOmPlexiTy 
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Whereas the specific combination of undermining forces varies across 
different societies, the initial tangible manifestations in response to 
them have been strikingly similar.4 Across the developed world, we find 
anxious demonstrators in Athens, Madrid and Rome protesting against 
government austerity plans. In New York, Washington and London, 
people have taken to the street under the banners of ‘occupying Wall 
Street’, ‘occupying London’ and ‘the 99%’. Even in developed countries 
with relatively stronger economic climates such as Israel, unprecedented 
waves of demonstrations against rising costs of living have shown this 
crisis is a global one with far-reaching ramifications.
Similar manifestations can be found across emerging markets as well. 
In India hundreds of thousands have joined Anna Hazara’s campaign 
against public corruption, while in China the authorities are anxiously 
aware of the continuing rise in the number and scale of ‘mass incidents’. 
The most dramatic upheavals have occurred in countries where tensions 
have been at their most extreme, such as Tunisia and Egypt, where 
persistent demonstrations fuelled by socioeconomic malaise brought 
down governments and spread like wildfire to neighbouring countries in 
the region during the ‘Arab spring’. 
Notwithstanding the wide differences in context, the connecting theme 
in all these cases is their leading players: it is not the impoverished 
masses, nor budding ideological movements that have taken to 
the streets, but the educated middle classes, frustrated by their 
governments’ inability to ensure their future. The question is should such 
events be seen within the context of cyclical economic patterns and the 
inevitable frustration with which economic downturns are met? In other 
words, are they an uncomfortable but passing phenomenon that will 
wane once our economic system recovers? 
This chapter suggests otherwise. It argues that such events imply 
deeper structural transformations in our economic system which 
requires equivalent conceptual and operational shifts in our public 
policies if we are to comprehend these transformations fully and 
respond adequately. In what follows, we begin with a brief discussion 
of how new approaches to economic development based on insights 
from complexity science shed a different light on our understanding of 
economic environments. We then proceed to discuss the main forces 
and trends fuelling the emerging ‘middle crisis’ before finally introducing 
some ideas that will be required to develop crisis-averting policies.
New	economic	thinking:	towards	‘complexity	
polinomics’
Analysing and dealing with any challenge begins with our fundamental 
view of its nature: namely, how we define the challenge and its context; 
4	 See	also	the	recent	article	by	Joseph	Stiglitz,	‘From	Tunisia	to	Wall	Street:	the	globalization	of	
protest’,	Daily Star,	10	November	2011.
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our assumptions regarding the causes and effects of the challenge; and 
the tools we use to influence it. Over the past three decades, we have 
witnessed a gradual emulation of new theories, which centre on the 
concept of ‘complex adaptive systems’. 
As Amna Silim makes clear in chapter 1, the neoclassical theories that 
still dominate our economic policymaking assume a system geared 
towards a state of equilibrium. From a complexity perspective, economic 
systems are not geared towards equilibrium or any state of rest but 
remain dynamic at all levels. This dynamism generates accumulated 
shifts from within the system, driving change endogenously rather 
than exogenously. For example, consumer preferences, product 
innovation and new forms of organisation are all driven by interactions, 
tensions and gaps between agents and forces, rather than by external 
processes. The behaviour of agents within the system is not assumed 
to be ‘rational’ – that is, full knowledge and a priori sets of preferences 
– but is shaped by cognitive short cuts, partial pattern recognition 
and network effects such as swarm behaviour (see Ariely 2010, Fisher 
2009). Furthermore, the nature of the system itself is also perceived as 
transforming over time. The level of complexity – the connectivity and 
velocity of interactions within the system – becomes a key differentiating 
factor between different types of systemic change that occur.  
Systemic change results from innovation in what Eric Beinhocker (2007) 
defines as ‘technological and social technologies’. This occurs as new 
solutions are deployed by local agents for local challenges (from stock-
holding companies to credit swap derivatives; from water canals to fibre-
optic cables). Their introduction into the economic environment creates 
new potential for increased productivity, as well as new organisational 
structures that best harness this potential. These productivity 
opportunities will be exploited and new systemic challenges will emerge 
to undermine the system once more, leading to the development 
and deployment of new technological and social innovations and the 
emergence of a new state. As the state of the system is path-dependent, 
each phase builds on previous ones, with new innovations allowing for 
much wider reach and better communication between agents – and so 
we see increased levels of complexity with each new systemic state.5 
Complexity economics has made significant strides in bettering our 
understanding of the dynamic processes through which economies 
transform – that is, the ‘how’ question. However, a further step is needed if 
we are to provide answers for the ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions. If economies 
are to be understood as complex ecologies rather than complicated 
machine-like systems, then the traditional conceptual boundaries of these 
systems must be reconsidered as well (see DeLanda 2006). 
5	 The	only	periods	in	history	during	which	complexity	was	not	on	the	increase	are	those	associated	
with	systemic	collapse	rather	than	bifurcation	(that	is,	moving	from	one	state	to	another).	In	which	
case	a	completely	new	system	gradually	emerges	and	complexity	begins	to	build	up	again.	
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Most social science disciplines share the same epistemological 
framework of neoclassical economics, essentially viewing society as 
a collection of systems (an economic system, a political system and a 
cultural system) which are connected though separate nonetheless. Yet 
once we start to view the economy from an evolutionary or complex 
systems perspective, these systemic boundaries not only become 
irrelevant, but also detrimental to our understanding.
Economic activity cannot be understood without consideration of its 
political elements. Politics determine the main rules and structures 
within which economic activities play out: even the simplest form of 
trade is predicated on the need for trust and therefore some form of 
governing structure. Just as institutional structures cannot be seen as 
exogenous to the system, they also cannot be perceived as merely 
another dimension or by-product of economic activity. Indeed, the 
politically defined rules by which economic activities are conducted 
are counterparts to the same ecology. From a complexity perspective, 
analysing economic systems without their politics would be like 
analysing the food chain in a pond without any consideration of its 
vegetation or water. Taking this analysis a step further, we also know 
that economics and politics are action-driven and, therefore, can be 
assessed and affected in tangible ways, but at a deeper structural level 
we also find longer-term cultural structures. These reflect and infuse 
economic-political patterns. 
The trends and structures we find across societies are thus the product 
of ongoing co-emergence (DeLanda 2000), with different processes 
interacting at differing temporal frequencies and evolving over time. 
Exploring and affecting the multidimensional and interplaying dynamics 
that emerge within a given system requires a new synthesising (but 
non-reductionist) approach that can integrate economic and political 
knowledge into coherent frameworks from which strategies and 
policies can then be derived. This new synthesising approach, what 
we might call ‘complexity polinomics’, provides the starting point for 
understanding both the sources and potential ramifications of the 
‘middle crisis’. 
What	is	fuelling	the	‘middle	crisis’?
Like every social emergence, the ‘middle crisis’ has been long in the 
making, and while this chapter cannot hope to explore it in full depth, 
it can lay out its main systemic drivers. Overall, the forces fuelling this 
fault line can be clustered into three interdependent groups: economic 
pressures emanating from the structural fractures of globalisation; 
social pressures driven by a false sense of social levelling which inflated 
throughout the first decade of the 21st century (what can be referred to 
as a ‘levelling bubble’); and political pressures generated by the growing 
inconsistencies between international interdependency and sovereign 
authority. 
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While these key driving trends are presented separately, it is important to 
stress their co-evolving nature, none could have emerged the way they 
did without the permissive environment provided by the others. Their 
overall impact and policy implications, therefore, need to be assessed 
within a comprehensive polinomic framework.
Economic pressures – the structural fractures of globalisation
Globalisation, while responsible for the extensive expansion of the 
middle classes,6 has also helped to generate the very forces that are 
now undermining them.7 Over time the evolving patterns of global 
trade, integrated production chains and currency manipulation have 
created deep structural attributes that constrain the economic basis of 
the middle classes and alter social expectations to an extent that might 
make the current model of globalisation unsustainable. 
From the perspective of the western middle classes, three key structural 
shifts have gradually built up economic pressures. 
The changing nature of ‘boom and bust’ cycles: Recurring phases 
of expansion and contraction are a known phenomenon in market 
economies. However, over the past two decades, the nature of the 
recoveries has changed. A recent report by McKinsey Global Institute 
(Manyika et al 2011) points to a worrying and exponentially growing 
disparity between recoveries of growth and recoveries of jobs. From the 
late 1940s to the 1980s, job levels in the US economy tended to recover 
within six months of GDP reaching pre-recession levels. However, a 
shift occurred in the early 1990s with jobs recovering only 15 months 
later. In the 2000/01 recession this time lag leapt to 39 months, while 
projections for the current recession expect job recovery to last over 60 
months. The report suggests structural changes in global competition 
have led to growth recoveries which are efficiency-driven (using fewer 
resources to achieve the same outputs) rather than innovation-driven 
(advancements that allow new niches to emerge across the market) as 
firms take advantage of new technologies, global out-sourcing and off-
shoring to recover production levels with fewer resources.8 This trend 
has had major ramifications for public policy making in general, and the 
political use of economic tools such as setting interest rates in particular. 
The mismatch of skills in the labour market: Generally speaking, as 
emerging markets progressed, developed economies were also able to 
6	 According	to	some	indicators	making	them	a	majority	among	the	global	population	since	2005	(see	
Parker	2009).
7	 A	complexity	perspective	helps	better	explain	how	economic-political	systems	can	reach	a	tipping	
point	in	which	some	of	the	same	forces	that	have	previously	converged	to	stabilise	the	system	
become	its	own	disrupters.	This	is	an	important	distinction	from	more	traditional	policy	approaches,	
which	when	faced	with	new	dynamics	tend	to	reconsider	past	assumptions.	For	example,	take	the	
current	debate	regarding	the	advantages	of	global	liberalisation	during	the	1990s.	From	a	complexity	
perspective	its	usefulness	continues	to	hold	merit;	however,	it	is	also	confined	within	a	certain	set	of	
systemic	conditions.	Once	those	conditions	shifted,	policies	should	have	adapted	as	well.	
8	 See	also	Brian	Arthur’s	analysis	of	the	systemic	effects	of	new	technologies	(Arthur	2011).	
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develop new niches for jobs and services by moving up the value chain 
from labour-intensive to skill-intensive products. However, patterns of 
job creation reveal that as the demand for skills evolved, national skills 
bases did not adapt quickly enough. This means that many of the job 
losses can be attributed to a structural mismatch of skills rather than 
the recent downturn.9 In the UK, recent research suggests seven out 
of 10 firms blame lack of skills for lack of hire.10 Continuing the shift 
towards a higher skills base requires both employers and employees 
to have better knowledge of what the market needs in the mid- and 
long-term. Unfortunately, the market itself is unable to develop adequate 
mechanisms for providing this knowledge while effective institutional 
solutions have yet to be developed. 
Restricted access to emerging markets: The success of emerging 
economies has been mostly attributed to their export-led strategies – a 
development approach in which governments play an intervening role 
in supporting certain industries and firms which are deemed highly 
competitive in the global market. Over the 1980s and 1990s, the 
structural implications of these export-led strategies for western citizens 
were inconsequential, due to the relatively small size of emerging 
economies as well as their continued reliance on western technology 
and finance. However, over the last decade emerging economies have 
become significant players in the global economy and less reliant on 
western technology.11 At the same time, the underdevelopment of 
and lack of competitiveness in their own domestic markets has left 
western economies holding the short end of the stick as far as access 
to markets is concerned, contributing to their balance of payment and 
current account deficits. Chinese reliance on restricting exchange rates 
has only further intensified this structural asymmetry.12 
From an emerging world perspective, the structural patterns of 
economic development have also created increasing pressures on their 
countries’ new middle classes. Specifically these relate to two growing 
concerns: first, mounting levels of local corruption; and second, limited 
public services.
Institutional deficits: The same export-led strategies that have 
successfully lifted millions of people out of poverty become a domestic 
constraining factor once the emerging middle classes are the dominant 
9	 Between	2000	and	2007	the	US	showed	its	weakest	employment	growth	period	since	the	1930s,	see	
Manyika	et	al	2011.
10	 Research	by	Alexander	Mann	Solutions,	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/hr-news/8286397/
jobs-vacancies-Firms-struggling-to-recruit-as-war-for-talent-returns.html
11	 However,	it	has	not	been	all	positive	for	emerging	economies.	As	a	result	of	focusing	their	
developmental	strategy	on	foreign	instead	of	domestic	demand,	these	countries	are	still	
characterised	by	underdeveloped	local	economies	with	domestic	inefficiencies,	limited	internal	
competition	and	weak	institutional	frameworks.	This	has	created	a	structural	asymmetry	described	by	
Raghuram	Rajan	(2011)	as	a	major	fault	line	in	the	current	global	economy.
12	 Export-led	strategies	correspond	to	the	‘mercantilist	model’,	viewed	by	many	as	a	parasitic	strategy	
that	is,	by	definition,	not	scalable	to	the	whole	system.
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civilian force. As these emerging new classes begin to develop 
compatible tastes and social expectations they, too, experience the 
downside of underdeveloped domestic markets and institutions. Across 
China and India, corruption affects the middle classes across a wide 
array of economic and social interactions: from housing to policing, 
education to job opportunities. Domestic institutional underdevelopment 
is not only the by-product of an export-led growth strategy, but also 
of the speed of economic development where the latter outpaces the 
former. Institutional maturation is a much more complex and lengthier 
process than market expansion. Between the two lies an underlying 
political tension that could prove hard to contain.  
Climbing without safety nets: Institutional weakness and lack of public 
services implies much higher levels of personal risk and uncertainty. 
In practice, this requires people in the emerging world to save much 
more of their available income. Paradoxically, with growing expectations 
for reaching more comfortable standards of living, the pressures and 
anxieties to maintain them only increase. In China for example, the 
absence of social safety nets means even high earners must save up for 
all contingencies – from job loss to blood transfusion.13 At the structural 
level, this necessity to save not only limits personal consumption, but 
also creates a major distorting financial pattern for the global economy 
as a whole.14 Without a real change in the personal risks experienced by 
the emerging middle classes, the global asymmetry in saving/spending 
patterns will remain. 
Social pressures – the bursting of the ‘levelling bubble’ 
While the structural fractures discussed above reveal some deep shifts 
that are occurring across the economic landscape, it is the manner in 
which people personally experience these shifts that mostly influences 
their attitudes and political choices. This especially resonates among 
western middle classes, who over the past decade have experienced 
a growing chasm between individual expectations and their day to day 
realisation. From a complexity perspective, it is these inconsistencies 
between micro patterns of behaviour and emerging macro patterns 
of structure that gradually build up unsustainable tensions within the 
system.
From upward mobility to stagnation: Two key principles that are 
culturally embedded within the middle classes are first, forward 
progression – children expect to be better off than their parents; and 
second, individually driven social mobility – with some talent and lots 
13	 Out	of	pocket	spending	on	healthcare	in	China	is	said	to	have	increased	by	more	than	100-fold.	For	
an	in-depth	account	of	internal	Chinese	ruptures	see	Dodson	2011.
14	 It	is	important	to	note	that	China	has	started	addressing	this	challenge;	the	12th	five-year	
plan	announced	in	2011	includes	measures	to	support	internal	rebalancing	towards	domestic	
consumption	and	inward	investment.	However,	the	scope	of	the	organisational,	financial	and	political	
challenges	involved	suggest	a	lengthy	process	at	best.	
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of hard work individuals can achieve wealth and success.15 Over the 
last decade this perception has strengthened thanks to popular culture 
depicting routes in which instant access to fame and fortune can 
be achieved, access to cheap credit enticing spending beyond our 
means, as well as a sense of consumer levelling thanks to shrewd high 
street retailing and ‘bagonomics’.16 In other words, a false perception 
of material levelling has emerged among western consumers. 
Unfortunately, such shared perceptions have continuously masked much 
harsher individual realities. 
Research in the UK has shown that real social mobility has been falling 
persistently, with levels of income becoming more highly dependent on 
those of parents (Blanden et al 2005). In the US, meanwhile, median 
family income has stagnated since the 1980s and, more importantly, 
has become disconnected from the rise in productivity (White House 
2010). In the UK, while median income has seen moderate rises it 
also lagged behind productivity (IFS 2011, Lansley 2009). During the 
boom years, this dissonance was personally and collectively mitigated 
through access to cheap credit and even cheaper goods that created a 
perception of prosperity. But as the credit crunch hit, together with the 
rise in food and energy prices, this unsustainable tension was brought to 
the forefront for what has been dubbed the ‘squeezed middle’. 
Growing inequality and the re-emergence of ‘fairness’: In 1976, 
the top 1 per cent of American households accounted for 9 per cent 
of income; by 2007 their share had climbed to 24 per cent – that is, 
almost 60 per cent of three decades of growth went into the pockets 
of the top 1 per cent. The last time America experienced such levels of 
inequality was on the eve of the Great Depression (Rajan 2011, Sachs 
2011). While the US and the UK hold the lead in wage differentials 
among western countries (National Equality Panel 2010), increasing 
income inequality within countries is a global trend. With the bursting of 
the levelling bubble described above, social tolerance for such inequality 
has eroded; a trend that is further exacerbated by distorted tax systems 
under which Warren Buffet, for example, finds himself paying a lower 
percentage of his income in tax than his secretary (Buffett 2011). The 
personal anxieties of job insecurity and rising costs of living, together 
with the onset of government austerity measures and the use of public 
funds to prop up the financial system, have served to reignite the public 
discourse on fairness, responsibility and accountability. Amongst the 
middle classes, this frustration has been channelled with equal vigour 
towards the richest and poorest echelons of society, with accusations 
of inherent unfairness within the tax system on the one hand and the 
benefit system on the other. 
15	 Rather	than	the	institutionally	restricted	social	mobility	within	traditional	societies.	
16	 The	term	‘Bagonomics’	refers	to	the	strategy	of	luxury	brands,	previously	catering	only	to	the	super	
rich,	to	promote	labelled	accessories	as	fashion	essentials,	thereby	successfully	entering	into	the	
mass	market.	
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Political pressures – between interdependency and accountability
The role of political leadership is to mitigate economic and social 
pressures, while harnessing their potential in order to create a better 
future: in other words, to operationally manage the social contract. Alas, 
the challenge of state leadership has never been harder, as globalisation 
has brought to a head the inherent tension between economic 
interdependence and democratic accountability. Global market forces 
have created new pressures which are weighing down citizens, leaving 
decision-makers with ever diminishing policy levers and faced with 
ever increasing demands. Their policy choices have created a number 
of underlying tensions whose systemic effect culminated and became 
visible when the financial crisis erupted.
Consumption as the path of least resistance: Throughout the 
2000s, the economic and social pressures described above created a 
permissive environment within which politicians could too easily opt for 
low interest rates.17 Initially these were aimed at re-energising corporate 
investment still traumatised by the bursting of the dot.com bubble, but 
most corporates remained risk-averse. Instead, the cheap credit on offer 
was quickly swept up by consumers (who were experiencing stagnant 
incomes) and used for extensive shopping sprees from shoes to houses. 
From a political perspective, this diversion was rationalised by both 
economic and political arguments – it provided an alternative demand-
driven economic stimulus, while promoting the wider political vision of 
the affluent ‘property owning democracy’ (Ferguson 2009).
The pre-emptive narrative: One pillar of the implicit social contract 
between government and the middle classes has been the idea of 
sacrifice and shared burden today in order to deliver collective gain 
tomorrow. While this remains an inherent part of the social-political 
DNA, an equally central and repeating theme over the last decade 
reflects a fundamentally different discourse: sacrifice and shared burden 
today so as to avoid calamity tomorrow. This pre-emptive narrative is a 
polinomics convergence and manifests itself in a number of ways: from 
launching pre-emptive wars to prevent terrorism; to reducing carbon 
emissions to avoid climate change; and to implementing austerity 
measures to avoid financial meltdown. This overarching transformation 
in discourse between governments and the middle classes has become 
an additional undermining force weakening social resilience. The 
lack of a positive and collective political vision prevents cooperation 
and unravels elements in the embedded ‘social contract’, inevitably 
concentrating populist debates on ‘who’s to blame’ and ‘who should 
pay the most’ (the greedy bankers? the inflated public sector? the idle 
people on benefits? the immigrants?) rather than on how to restructure 
the social economy towards a shared vision for a national future.
17	 For	the	full	discussion	see	chapter	‘Let	them	Eat	Credit’,	in	Rajan	2011.
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The conceptual void: Since the 1990s and the ushering in of the 
‘post-ideological’ world, highly charged debates between left and right 
have gradually wound down into cordial discussions on the tactics 
of economic management. Similarly, globalisation has challenged 
mainstream economic paradigms, having introduced new economic 
patterns and generated political distortions, while the recent recession 
was greeted with surprise by the majority of supposedly ‘oracle’ 
economists, denting their standing in the process. We face, therefore, a 
conceptual void. This void also contributes to the pre-emptive narrative 
and lack of political vision described above. Despite its increasing 
influence, new economic thinking, such as complexity economics, 
has yet to produce an alternative policy doctrine. The ramifications 
of these trends are highly significant as leaders require conceptual 
frameworks both for decision-making and for justifying these decisions 
to their voters. In the absence of new conceptual frameworks, political 
pressures and public insecurity may continue to spiral.
Overall, it is the interdependency between all the key driving trends 
outlined above that have created the problems underpinning the 
emerging middle crisis. The added value of a complexity approach 
rests in the manner in which we are able to follow a wide multitude of 
dynamic trends and synthesise them, thereby detecting potential shifts 
in the system as well as the meeting points for policy intervention. As 
figure 12.1 suggests, while each of these forces has been shaped by 
the others, they have also enabled them. From a policy perspective, 
we would therefore argue that one should treat the crisis as a complex 
adaptive system rather than a collection of policy challenges.
Implications	for	policymaking:	averting	systemic	
risks
Complexity theory teaches us that major events are the manifestation 
of maturing and converging underlying trends: they reflect change that 
has already occurred within the system. In that sense, it would be futile 
for policymakers to try to undo the co-evolving political-economic trends 
described above. Rather, they should focus their efforts on assessing 
and mitigating the main risks and challenges emanating from them. 
The objective of policymakers in general, and in the UK in particular, 
should therefore be two-fold: negotiating new international governing 
mechanisms that could proactively transform certain structural 
weaknesses in the current globalisation model; and developing new 
tools for recession management. 
At the international level, it is fair to assume that under current 
circumstances, the ability of world leaders to formally reconfigure 
international economic governance is quite limited. However, whatever 
international forum is engaged, one strategic theme that should cut 
across all efforts is the need to broaden the economic discourse to 
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Between the social contract and frameworks for delivery
Between interdependence and sovereignty
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include institutional arrangements and the provision of public goods, 
the lack of which has been responsible for some of the structural 
weaknesses fuelling the crisis. Issues such as transparency, corruption, 
and welfare, which have previously dominated international aid doctrines, 
should now be fully integrated into international trading frameworks. 
At the moment, any discussion about these interrelated subjects are 
conducted largely in isolation of each other. This needs to change.
From a domestic perspective, it would appear that the changes and 
growing pressures on the middle classes reflect a structural shift rather 
than a cyclical phase. According to most analysts, the current economic 
crisis in the western world will continue to dominate in the coming years, 
with political and social implications lingering long after growth resumes 
and economic restructuring begins to take hold. History teaches us that 
such convergence of social, economic and political tensions implies a 
high risk of turbulence and upheaval. The question is, given the current 
cultural, political and technological context, what would such instabilities 
look like? The first and hardest-hit societies so far, Greece, Spain and 
even to some extent the US, provide us with initial clues and data. 
Based on current trajectories, it seems the phenomenon of ‘anomie’ 
rather than regime collapse might be our biggest systemic risk. 
Anomie is a manifestation of network decay. In essence, it is the gradual 
structural breakdown of social bonds, standards and infrastructure for 
cooperation. As it progresses, the middle classes increasingly remove 
themselves from the political landscape, ultimately surrendering it to 
radical minorities. Similar in its systemic nature to low-intensity conflict, 
the real danger is that no events are big enough to cause transformative 
reaction. The systemic damage is only fully understood once fully 
manifested, by which point reconstruction becomes a long and painful 
process. The main objective of policymakers is thus to approach anomie 
as a gradual and network-based phenomenon rather than as a set 
of separate conditions and to develop strategies that will intervene to 
counteract it. 
Strategically, national governments should focus on four main 
objectives.
First, they should seek to transform existing frameworks for 
managing social risk. Current institutional arrangements are based on 
the concept of safety nets; that is, providing support of last resort for 
the weakest individuals in society while assuming the rest will always 
be able to sort themselves out. This is a static and individual-based 
approach that should be replaced by a dynamic and networked-based 
one. A new operational rationale for managing social risk in a globalised 
world should be based on enhancing social resilience. This includes 
supporting seemingly stronger groups and communities at their most 
fragile tipping points. 
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Second, there is a need to define new indicators of social network 
decline and early warning systems. Further research is now needed 
to assess how anomie could manifest itself across the social network 
and what kind of intervening actions will have the greatest impact. Our 
analysis leads us to suggest that a set of new indicators should be 
developed so as to allow the continuous assessment of shifts within the 
system (for instance, quantifying graffiti on the streets, mapping fragile 
communities, mining social networks to detect local decay and running 
surveys to monitor political disengagement). 
Third, governments should develop new avenues and resources for 
political participation and self-organisation at the local level. If a 
key risk of anomie is the gradual disengagement of the middle classes 
from the public space, policymakers should provide as many platforms 
and avenues as possible to keep them proactively involved. This might 
require certain deregulation in the use of public spaces and resources 
so as to allow further local initiatives outside the management of local 
authorities. 
Finally, we need to re-evaluate the traditional discourse between 
government and citizens and its implied social contract. Local, 
community, and business leaderships have to redefine social 
expectations, resource allocations, and government deliverables 
towards national resilience in our sovereignty-based, yet highly 
interdependent world. Our existing perceptions regarding roles, rights 
and commitments emerged within the old Newtonian-based framework. 
They would now also benefit from a complexity-driven reconsideration 
adapted to 21st-century realities; that is, forward looking towards the 
emerging rather than the existing global context. 
For example, Thomas Friedman (2005) argues that ‘Globalisation 
2.0’ has been driven by individuals, but this trend might have 
exhausted itself, with future competition relying more and more on the 
recollectivisation of efforts. Overall, the driving rationale for a renewed 
social contract must be based on the need to create a self-reinforcing 
national social system within an open global one. Traditional perceptions 
assumed a relatively closed system in which domestic power relations 
needed to be negotiated, resulting in the traditional focus on defining 
rights, separate roles, and boundaries (citizens, employers, businesses, 
government). Within our emerging new world more emphasis will need 
to be given to commitments, fuzzy boundaries and multiple roles, be 
it the role of businesses in skills creation and education, or the role of 
citizens in promotion and innovation.
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Most neoclassical economists emphasise the importance of allowing 
free markets to allocate resources in society. Austrian economics seems 
to have a more mature perspective on institutions than the neoclassical 
school but, nonetheless, they both advise adopting a broadly economic 
liberal view. Both these schools of thought have also heavily influenced 
the political right’s views of economics; the neoclassical strand having 
been particularly influential in mainstream economic policy and analysis.1
At the same time, the most successful economies, at least if measured 
by GDP, have found success largely through developing a broadly free 
market economy. Most notably, China has lifted hundreds of millions of 
people out of poverty since the 1970s, in part because it chose to chart 
a free market course. 
But free markets are far from perfect; the economic and financial crises 
of recent years are testimony to that. In chapter 4 on the financial 
system, Greg Fisher notes that financial crises to some extent originated 
in the nature of human psychology when free markets were applied to 
the process of capital allocation. Something akin to ‘groupthink’ can 
lead private financial markets down a path that ends at a cliff and, very 
often, a recession follows. 
According to the increasingly influential school of complexity economics, 
the misallocation of resources during asset price booms and the 
underutilisation of resources in recessions that follow are examples of 
‘emergent phenomena’ – in other words, characteristics that arise from 
the multiple interactions of the constituents of the economic system. 
These emergent characteristics are problematic when the combined, 
seemingly rational, ‘micro’ decisions or attributes of agents can create 
‘macro’ outcomes that are detrimental for many or all those agents. This 
is a critical lesson from complexity economics.
For example, in answer to the question: what causes the unequal 
distributions that seem to automatically emerge in computer 
programmes that simulate the multiple interactions of virtual agents 
1	 Most	standard	economic	textbooks	are	structured	around	the	approach	of	neoclassical	economics,	
see	for	example	Lipsey	and	Chrystal	2007.	For	an	accessible,	if	heavily	preconceived,	account	of	
Austrian	economics	see	Butler	2010.
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with diverse attributes and decisions?, the complexity economist Eric 
Beinhocker (2007) writes:
‘[I]n	essence,	‘everything’.	The	skewed	(wealth)	distribution	is	
an	emergent	property	of	the	system.	It	is	a	macro	behaviour	
that	emerges	out	of	the	collective	micro	behaviour	of	the	
population	of	agents.	The	combination	of	the	shape	of	the	
physical	landscape,	the	genetic	endowments	of	the	agents,	
where	they	were	born,	the	rules	that	they	follow,	the	dynamics	
of	their	interactions	with	each	other	and	with	their	environment,	
and,	above	all,	luck	all	conspire	to	give	the	emergent	result	of	a	
skewed	wealth	distribution.’
Or as Paul Ormerod (2001) states:
‘The	behaviour	of	the	(economic)	system	as	a	whole	can	
never	be	understood	by	mechanistically	adding	together	its	
component	parts:	just	as	a	living	creature	is	more	than	the	sum	
of	the	individual	cells	which	make	up	its	body,	so	the	economy	
and	society	are	more	than	the	sum	of	the	individuals	who	
inhabit	it.’
Neoclassical economics finds it difficult to account for such emergent 
problems because it is based on a framework of simple, bilateral 
exchange; that is, individual agents that choose whether or not 
to exchange their resources with other agents. In such a framing, 
emergent problems cannot arise because agents can opt out of any 
exchange they deem not in their interests. Individual optimisation can 
only lead to social optimisation in this framework. This is not to say that 
neoclassical economics does not recognise the existence of economy-
wide problems, it does. But either it finds it difficult to make a clear 
causal connection between its individually focused framework and 
wider phenomena or it is forced to regard the wider phenomena as the 
result of some external disruption to the normal running of free bilateral 
exchange.
The underlying theme of this chapter is that the new fields of complexity 
theory and network theory help us to consider the economy as a 
dynamic network, rather than the static model of two-way exchanges 
that underlies orthodox economics. We now have much better 
conceptual technology, thanks to the processing power of computers, 
to make sense of – and model – dynamic networks. This new toolbox 
helps us to understand that emergent problems, to which orthodox 
economics is largely blind, can and do emerge in economic systems. 
And, given this new understanding, we can start to consider policy 
options that might respond more effectively to such problems. 
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Emergent	problems	and	the	state
Although the school of complexity economics and the idea of emergent 
phenomena are relatively new, the recognition of the existence of 
system-wide economic problems is obviously not. It has long been a 
staple of the great majority of economic thinking that there are at least 
some fundamental challenges for an economy which can only be solved 
through some form of collective action. For example, rightly or wrongly 
most economists accept the need for a central bank to control the flow 
of money so that systemic problems such as extreme price volatility do 
not prevent an economy operating effectively. 
However, the most common collective solution to system-wide 
economic problems has been to use the power of the state in a great 
diversity of ways. Ever since powerful central authorities emerged in the 
first city states, governments have used a wide variety of tools including 
taxes, regulation, licensing, law, ownership, welfare payments and 
simple exhortation to address all sorts of economic problems that seem 
to outstrip the effort of any single individual. Examples include currency 
volatility, business cycles, inflation, deflation, mass unemployment and 
inequality.
However, the notion that the state as it currently operates can indeed 
offer effective and sustainable solutions to emergent problems is 
problematic for complexity theory. As Paul Ormerod explains in 
chapter 2 of this collection, a key problem with policymaking focused 
on state solutions is that it incorporates the notion that society acts like 
machines. This is to a large degree because mainstream economics 
has taken a very narrow view of human nature and interaction, in which 
human beings are generally motivated by relatively straightforward 
material goals and can be trusted to act rationally to measures which 
affect those material goals and their capacity to achieve them. This has 
tended to lead to a ‘buttons and levers’ view of policy options, which as 
he states is about adjusting individuals’ incentives. 
Complexity theory, however, is based on the core observation that 
social systems are dynamic, evolving networks in which individual and 
collective behaviour can shift and change rapidly and unexpectedly. 
Rather than general outcomes being the aggregate result of a mass of 
rational, individual actions, those individual actions are deeply influenced 
by both the perception and the reality of other individual actions and 
the general outcomes themselves. This introduces a degree of fluidity 
and unpredictability into a system which means attempts to control an 
economy by gathering data, making forecasts and developing policy 
will always be subject to a high risk of failure, particularly over longer 
timescales. In this context, mechanistic approaches to policy can be 
extremely problematic.
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The new fields of complexity and network theory indicate that there are 
at least four broad reasons for this. 
First, idiosyncrasies matter. Despite attempts to escape a ‘one size fits 
all’ approach in many areas of policy, it is extremely difficult for centrally 
determined economic policy to remain sensitive to the very wide 
diversity of circumstances that affect different parts of the economy.
Second, targets set remotely can be inaccurate proxies for real aims, 
often resulting in distorted incentives. The most obvious example of 
this is the broad use of prescriptive targets for the NHS, notably under 
the last government, which a number of studies noted led to hospitals 
neglecting fundamental aspects of patient care.2
Third, network effects can drown the very incentives that are at the 
heart of so many policy responses. For example, research indicates that 
people who are obese are often in social networks of obese people – in 
such circumstances, there is often little a government can do to reduce 
the prevalence of obesity. 
One piece of research emphasised this point particularly well in the 
economic sphere,3 in which the authors conducted two experiments 
concerning consumer preferences. In one experiment, consumers 
were isolated from each other and asked to rank their preferences of 
48 songs. The second experiment was identical to the first except that 
consumers were given the ranked preferences of other consumers. 
The preferences of the second group were dramatically different to 
the first, demonstrating that the preferences of other people were 
highly influential on individuals’ choices. These are network effects par 
excellence.
And, fourth, incentives are often set as if people were selfish maximisers 
of their own utility. However, research indicates this is an inaccurate 
assumption. For example, a study by Simon Burgess and Marisa Ratto 
(2006), noted that the intrinsic motivation of public sector workers, such 
as those in care services, can differ significantly from those in the private 
sector. If true, this would make the economics of the public sector 
substantially different to the private sector.
Seeking	new	techniques	to	resolve	emergent	
problems
Some might argue, notably from the neoclassical school, that the 
above comments point to a state that is ineffective and often damaging, 
which means that keeping its influence to a minimum is the right 
response to the recognition of complexity. Unfortunately, the corollary 
of this response is the willingness to accept that the often deep and 
widespread human misery that results from emergent economic 
2	 See	Booth	2010
3	 See	Salganik	et	al	2006
16513: Lent and Fisher
problems is simply an irresolvable fact of life. We do not believe that it 
is necessary to accept such a pessimistic conclusion because such 
pessimism fails to acknowledge that there can be more to a collective 
response to emergent problems than a mechanistic, centralised state. 
The question is not whether it is worth developing a collective response 
but whether we can develop a collective response that takes account 
of the more dynamic and unpredictable economy posited by complexity 
theory. 
The following examples build up a sense of what the characteristics of 
such a response might be. Although we identify four key features, they 
are by no means exhaustive.
1. Non-ideological
It seems that attraction to ideology is an exceptionally powerful feature 
of human behaviour. That attraction can present itself in unmistakable 
form such as at the extremes of the left and right wing; or it can appear 
in the more subtle but unquestioned, or even unnoticed, assumptions, 
values and principles that can inform mainstream policymaking. We 
would argue that neoclassical economics, for example, is an ideological 
outlook based on particular assumptions and moral values (often 
presented as science) which has come to shape economic policymaking 
for many decades.
However, one of the implications of complexity theory is that any attempt 
to explain and predict economic phenomena based on universal and 
absolute assertions will ultimately fail. Economic activity is too diverse 
and interacts in too many complex ways to allow for generalisation, and 
the patterns of economic activity and relationships are continuously 
evolving. Policy based on intellectual foundations that assume otherwise 
will fail outright, succeed only partially or succeed only for limited periods 
of time.
If we define ideology as a body of ideas then, of course, escaping 
ideology altogether is impossible. Policy will always require some 
foundation in values and assumptions about the nature of the problem 
to which one is responding. Indeed, this may be one reason why policy 
always does seem to fail at least to some extent. 
However, there are degrees of ideological commitment. We would 
argue that the most forthright ideological views will result in bad policy 
development over a long enough time horizon. Such approaches will 
oversimplify the causes of economic behaviour and phenomena and the 
problems that arise from them.
2. Reflexive
We would argue, however, not just for the mitigation of ideology but also 
for an approach which continuously challenges and rethinks ideological 
outlooks, including those subtler forms that afflict the mainstream.
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To ensure that our economic policy remains meaningful in a system 
characterised by inherent unpredictability and dynamism we need to 
develop a governing culture and institutional processes built upon a 
perpetual reassessment of ‘solutions’. Curiously, this leads us to a more 
Hayekian view of the economy (his actual views, not the popular myths) 
in which institutional emergence is an essential part of society.
Tendencies towards groupthink, inertia, consensus and orthodoxy 
must be identified early and subject to challenge and disruption. There 
are potentially many ways this can be done, including the introduction 
of sunset clauses into all new legislation with significant economic 
implications, the creation of challenge units in all spending government 
departments, and more rigorous and continuous monitoring and 
evaluation of the impact of economic policy.
3. Diversity and devolution
The emphasis complexity economics places on idiosyncrasies and 
change in the progress of economic phenomena militates against any 
notion that a single policy ‘solution’ will necessarily be an effective and 
permanent response to emergent problems. In short, in many policy 
domains there is too much variability between regions and sectors for 
a single policy to have consistent or predictable outcomes across a 
nation; and change, which is inevitable in a complex economic system, 
will render policy solutions obsolete over a long enough time period.
For this reason, we would argue that economic policy needs to become 
more diverse in its development and application. One obvious way to 
do this is to devolve economic power to a more local level to allow the 
creation of policy frameworks more suited to the specific characteristics 
of a particular area. Hence, many complexity theorists emphasise the 
notion of subsidiarity in human governance and organisation.
However, it should also be possible to create a more experimental 
approach to economic policymaking with different initiatives and ideas 
being attempted in different regions and in different sectors. Some of 
these initiatives may prove appropriate only to specific sectors but, with 
an appropriately non-ideological and reflexive approach, some may 
prove to be genuine breakthrough policies, which could be transferred, 
tailored and scaled. Needless to say such an open and innovative 
approach would require a significant culture change within the many 
central government departments.
4. Collaborative
Although we have referred to the importance of finding collective 
solutions to emergent problems in this chapter, we believe the term 
‘collaborative’ to be more appropriate. We emphasise this because 
the idea of a collective response has historically indicated a degree 
of shared perspectives and common values and identity which would 
undermine some of the principles outlined above. 
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Complexity discourages any notion that collective endeavour is – in 
and of itself – an adequate solution to economic problems. There is no 
inherent benefit to be found in the collectivism of the strong state, the 
class movement or identity grouping. Instead we would argue for efforts 
to meet emergent economic phenomena based upon the collaborative 
endeavour of many different perspectives and values. The ties that may 
bind such diverse outlooks are not enduring and deep but are instead 
created by a shared desire to solve a problem. 
We would point, for example, to the spirit of collaboration that infuses so 
much of the internet where large-scale collaborative efforts (for example, 
in the creation of open source software or major knowledge resources 
such as Wikipedia) thrive on the very fact that the many individuals 
involved bring different perspectives, experience and understandings.4 
We believe that a similar spirit of practical problem-solving collaboration 
between diverse attempts to resolve economic problems is the best way 
to find sustainable solutions to emergent problems that accord with the 
imperatives of complex economic systems.
Conclusion
We live in a time of serious economic volatility. The financial crisis of 
2008 and the associated global recession are still reverberating around 
the world. The European financial system remains susceptible to a crisis 
emanating from Greece; the stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves 
accumulated over the past 15 years, notably by China and oil exporting 
nations, remain vulnerable to a dollar collapse; and, perhaps most 
importantly, the political and economics communities do not seem 
able to grasp why the financial crisis arose in the first place. This lack 
of understanding can only hamper attempts to bring about meaningful 
change in our global economic system.
At the same time, the basis of the economics profession, neoclassical 
economics, has been shown to be seriously deficient in light of these 
crises and the challenges that remain. Most – not all – of economics 
today is highly mathematical, bearing little resemblance to the real world, 
and it seems to be of little relevance to contemporaneous economic 
questions. Given the resources devoted to the economics profession, 
this is a shameful state of affairs.
The main thrust of this chapter has been to emphasise there is hope 
in the form of complexity and network theory. These new fields of 
study, which have revolutionised many parts of the natural sciences, 
have found their way into the social sciences, including economics. 
While abstract and new, these fields also paint a picture that is much 
more recognisable than the inaccurate abstractions of neoclassical 
economics. So we are not advocating the replacement of one set 
of inaccurate abstractions with another: these new fields emphasise 
4	 See	Shirky	2009,	Tapscott	and	Williams	2008
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building up an understanding of the real world from the ground up, 
providing a more realistic and less ideological picture of reality. They 
also offer a new way of thinking about the role of collective action, 
collaboration and institutions, including the state, in the economic 
system. Moreover, these new fields are inherently apolitical – they ought 
to be useful to all political parties. We should make greater use of them.
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NEW IDEAS
for CHANGE
We live in uncertain economic times. The financial crash and subsequent 
downturn have shaken the global economic system to its core.
If one thing is certain, it is that the events of recent years have thrown 
mainstream economic thinking into disrepute.
In the aftermath of the crash, scholars and commentators are turning to 
new, heterodox economic theories as a way of better understanding how 
the economy really works and how the economic system might be managed 
more effectively.
Yet although new economic thinking offers a far better account of how the 
economic system functions, we don’t yet have a clear idea of its implications 
for policymaking. In economic policymaking, orthodox economics remains 
the only game in town.
This book starts from the premise that insights from new economic thinking 
need to be taken seriously. It seeks to bring new economic thinking to the 
attention of policymakers and to reappraise the ways in which policy is 
designed and implemented when real-world economics is taken into account.
‘practical men, who believe themselves exempt from any 
intellectual influence, are generally the slaves of some 
defunct economist’ 
John Maynard Keynes, 1936
